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Abstract 
This study analyses the topic of leadership in African Union (AU) peace 
operations and conflict mediation. Using the case studies of AU mediation in 
Madagascar, and the AU mission in Somalia, the study investigates how 
leadership is produced in AU interventions, how regional and sub regional actors 
interact with each other, and how regionalisation of peace processes match to 
dominating approaches in international peace and security management. The 
research is informed by an analysis of academic and policy literatures, as well as 
data gathered through 41 interviews with key policymakers and implementers at 
the AU and Southern African Development Community (SADC) headquarters. 
This thesis makes its primary contribution to studies of leadership and 
contemporary conflict management in Africa. It outlines the importance of socially 
constructed forms of leadership, and how this influence (and is influenced by) the 
relationship between AU states, sub-regional organisations, and the AU itself. By 
doing so, it poses significant questions with regards to how the AU is expected 
to demonstrate a hierarchical form of leadership on the African continent. It also 
contributes to contemporary debates regarding the role of regional and sub-
regional organisations in international conflict resolution, most notably to the 
fields of liberal peacebuilding, and cosmopolitan approaches to peacekeeping. 
Moreover, the thesis broadens contemporary understanding of peace and conflict 
on the African continent and contributes to policy debates over strategic 
interventions in regionalised peace interventions. 
 
Key words: peace operations, leadership, conflict mediation, peace 
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Chapter 1: Introduction of the study 
 
1.0 Introduction 
This thesis examines the extent to which the African Union (AU) provides 
leadership in African peace and security, and how it coordinates with Regional 
Economic Communities (RECs) or Regional Mechanisms (RMs). The literature 
review of regional peace interventions in Africa indicates unclear boundaries of 
leadership between the AU and RECs in responding to regional security 
challenges. In response to these ambiguities, this study investigates how 
leadership is produced in the African Union peace operations and conflict 
mediation, how regional and subregional actors interact with each other, and the 
extent to which AU provides hierarchical leadership in relation to the RECs. In 
this study leadership is defined as the participant(s) ability and process of 
influencing a group of individuals or institutions in attaining specific own or 
collective goals (Northouse, 1997; Yukl, et al., 2002; Yukl, 1989, 1999; 2002; 
Vera, and Crossan, 2004). The thesis, therefore, integrates two topics of 
leadership and regional peace interventions. The African Union Peace and 
Security Architecture (APSA) provides for a regionalised and delegated 
framework of peace interventions to subregional organisations that form AU 
peace and security pillars1.  Central to the APSA framework is the idea of 
collective action and coordination of peace efforts between the AU and 
subregional partners2. It is from this backdrop that this study investigates the 
nature of AU leadership in collective action with subregional partners in peace 
interventions. The research further scrutinises how AU navigates the 
regionalisation of peace. In this light, the thesis examines the theoretical 
                                                      
1 The AU has several subregional groups or RECs, some of which have developed their own 
subregional peace and security arrangements. These include: Arab Maghreb Union (UMA); 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-
SAD); the East African Community (EAC); Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS); Southern African Development Community (SADC); and the Economic Community 
of Central African States (ECCAS). In addition, the Eastern Africa Standby Force Coordination 
Mechanism (EASFCOM) and North African Regional Capability (NARC) both have liaison offices 
at the AU. See AU Handbook 2016. 
2 The term ‘regional partners’ is used to describe subregional organisations and AU member 
states. 
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underpinnings of peace interventions and how formal structure enables or 
constrains collective action within the AU peace interventions3. The term ‘peace 
intervention’ in this study is used to cover both peace operation (the actual 
deployment of troops for peacekeeping and peace enforcement) and conflict 
mediation.  
 
Using the case studies of AU mediation in Madagascar, and the AU’s peace 
operation in Somalia (AMISOM), the study further explores the normative value 
of cosmopolitan and liberal peace theories in the practice of peace interventions 
within the African continent. The central tenets of cosmopolitan and liberal peace 
theories are democracy, human rights, collective action and leadership in building 
sustainable peace globally. From this backdrop, the study examines the extent to 
which cosmopolitan and liberal peace theories explain the collective leadership 
of peace interventions within the AU. The central idea of collectiveness in the 
promotion of liberal values is a vital framework for analysing leadership and 
coordination of peace efforts between the AU and subregional partners. By 
linking these two theories, the research contributes to stronger connections 
between dominating peace intervention theories and contemporary regional 
leadership.  
The case study approach is used to understand and explain the complex 
phenomenon of international leadership (Bryman et al., 1988; Parry et al., 2014: 
137). An interpretive paradigm is adopted in order to understand 
how leadership is defined, exercised and experienced (Ross and Matthews, 
2010). The study recognises the interactions of actors that take place in 
leadership and the interpretive paradigm provide the necessary tools for 
analysing such phenomena (Silverman, 1997; O'Reilly, and Kiyimba, 2015). 
Qualitative methodologies are employed in order to allow in-depth interaction 
between the researcher and participants in interrogating regional leadership 
dynamics within the AU (Mahoney, 2007). The research is informed by data 
                                                      
3 For overviews, see Hall and Taylor, 1996; Aspinwall and Schneider, 2001; Weingast, 2002. 
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gathered through interviews with key policymakers and implementers at the AU 
and SADC headquarters.  
This study recognises hegemonic leadership theories in peace interventions but 
is mainly using constructivist epistemologies. The constructive approach offers 
significant opportunities for examining the interactions that occur in African 
collective action and the nature of regional leadership within the AU. The study 
acknowledges that states’ interactions, through their intentional actions, construct 
and reconstruct their social identities in dealing with security challenges triggered 
by dynamic environmental factors (Dunne, 2001; Park, 2014: 75), hence making 
constructivist approaches appropriate in this research. Chapters 3 and 4 provide 
a more detailed discussion on the constructivist epistemologies adopted in this 
study. The next section provides a brief background to the AU peace and security 
framework as a way of setting the preliminary context of the research.  
 
1.1 A brief background of the African Union 
The AU transitioned from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) on 9 July 2002 
and adopted several mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and 
resolution. The transition was necessitated by the increasing need for efficiency 
and effectiveness in dealing with political, economic and developmental issues 
facing the African continent (Akokpari et al., 2008; Makinda, 2008; Ayittey, 2010; 
Muchie, 2013; Mangu, 2014). The change to AU was made in order to streamline 
the organisation and prepare it more accurately for global challenges in fulfilling 
the African peoples' aspirations (AU Handbook, 2016). While the OAU’s main 
objectives were to provide a united front in the fight against colonialism, the AU’s 
objectives were different and more comprehensive. The AU is geared towards 
addressing the current needs and challenges of the continent, where issues of 
peace and security are predominant (Makinda, 2008; Ayittey, 2010).  
 
The establishment of the AU was made on the premise of greater cooperation 
and strengthened links with Regional Economic Communities (RECs), as pillars 
for achieving the objectives of the AU. The AU is inter-governmental and overly 
  4 
state-centric in nature, where institutional decisions are made by the Heads of 
States and Governments. The Executive Council within the AU is a meeting of 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs or other Ministers charged with the responsibility of 
dealing with the AU. The policies discussed by the Executive Council feed into 
the AU Assembly. It is, therefore, important to note that AU decisions and policies 
are an outcome of member states’ interactions that take place within the AU 
platform. The AU Commission is headed by the Chairperson and is mainly 
involved in the day-to-day management of the Union.4 The AU Peace and 
Security Council (PSC)5 is responsible for all peace and security matters and is 
assisted by Specialised Technical Committees (STCs) established within the 
Secretariat and headed by Commissioners. The organisation chart of the AU is 
provided in Chapter 5. 
 
1.2 African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) 
The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) adopted in July 2002 is a 
key framework of the AU mechanism for promoting peace, security and stability 
in the African continent. Article 3 of the AU Constitutive Act specifically identifies 
peace and security as the AU’s core objective. According to the AU Handbook 
(2014:28) APSA has several key elements, including: the PSC, which is the 
standing decision-making organ of the AU on matters of peace and security; 
Continental Early Warning System; Panel of the Wise; African Standby Force; 
and the Peace Fund. The various African peace and security mechanisms work 
in tandem with the peace and security structures of the RECs and Regional 
Mechanisms (RMs) set up to support regional peace and security (AU Handbook, 
2014) 6. A further discussion on APSA is provided in Chapters 5 and 6. 
 
                                                      
4 See more at: http://www.au.int/en/about/nutshell#sthash.KT6itgEP.dpuf 
5 The PSC has 15 members. All are elected by the AU Executive Council and endorsed by the 
Assembly at its next session. Members are elected according to the principle of equitable 
regional representation and national rotation. National rotation is agreed within the regional 
groups. 
6 See more at: http://www.au.int/en/organs/recs#sthash.2JCLvX1G.dpuf  
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1.3 African Union Peace Operations  
A total of eight AU-led peace operations have been deployed since 2003. The 
Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD), under the AU Commission 
Department of Peace and Security, is responsible for the execution of all PSC 
decisions on the deployment of peace operations. The Department of Peace and 
Security is also in charge of planning, deployment, sustainment and liquidation of 
PSOs (AU Handbook 2014: 39). Table 1.1 shows the AU peace operations. 
 
Table 0.1.1 AU Peace Operations 
Mission  Brief Description 
African Union Mission in Somalia 
(AMISOM) 
Under UNSC resolutions 1744 (2007) and 
2093 (2013). Humanitarian assistance and 
protection of civilians 
African Union - United Nations Mission 
in Darfur (UNAMID) 
Jointly established by the PSC and UN 
Security Council (UNSC) in June 2007 
(PSC/PR/COMM(LXXIX) and UNSC 
resolution 1769 (2007). Humanitarian 
assistance; promotion of respect for 
human rights and the rule of law 
Regional Cooperation Initiative for the 
Elimination of the Lord’s Resistance 
Army (RCI-LRA) 
AU mandate 2011 
(PSC/PR/COMM.(CCCXXI)). To conduct 
counter-LRA operations in affected 
countries and protect local people 
African Union led International Support 





Protection of civilians and the restoration 
of security and public order; stabilisation of 
the country and restoration of the central 
Government’s authority; security sector 
reform. 
African Union Mission in Burundi 
(AMIB) 
2003 AU mandate. To supervise, observe, 
monitor and verify implementation of the 
ceasefire agreement to consolidate the 
peace process in Burundi. From June 
  6 
2004, AMIB was succeeded by UN 
mission 
African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) AU PSC Communiqué PSC/PR/Comm(X). 
To monitor the 2004 Humanitarian 
Ceasefire Agreement between parties to 
the conflict in Sudan. AMIS transformed 
into a full peacekeeping mission in 2004, 
mandated to contribute to the 
improvement of general security in Sudan. 
In 2007 AMIS became the joint UN–AU 
Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) 
African Union Mission for Support to the 
Elections in Comoros (AMISEC) 2006 
and African Union Electoral and 
Security Assistance Mission to the 
Comoros (MAES) 2007 
PSC/PRC/Comm.1(XLVII) 2006 and 
PSC/PRC/Comm.1(XLVII) 2007. 
Mandated to provide a secure 
environment for the 2006 elections. The 
Mission also had the duty to protect its 
personnel and civilians around the polling 
stations 
African Union led International Support 
Mission in Mali (AFISMA); mandated by 
PSC Communiqué PSC/AHG/COMM/2. 
(CCCLIII) of 25 January 2013 
A joint AU operation with ECOWAS. Also 
mandated by UN Security Council 
resolution 2085 of 20 December 2012. 
Protection to civilians’ mandate. 
Transferred its authority to the UN 
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization 
Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) (UNSC 
resolution 2100 of April 2013) 
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It is important to note that AU has been involved in numerous conflict mediation 
missions using both the Panel of the Wise and subregional structures. 
As indicated earlier, this research focuses on two particular case studies, which 
are African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) from 2007 to the present and 
the AU-SADC joint mediation in Madagascar from 2009 to 2014. Whilst not a 
standalone AU peace operation, this mediation mission has had significant 
implications for the AU as a peace actor on the continent and for how it interacts 
with the RECs beneath it. Further justification for selecting these case studies is 
provided in Chapter 4. The next section focuses on the rationale and motivation 
of the study and key research questions. 
1.4 Rationale of the study 
Due to the significant number of African countries experiencing security 
challenges, regionalism has been recommended as one important means of 
resolving long-standing African security problems (Williams, 2009a, 2009b; 
Ancas, 2011; Hill, 2011; Gelot, 2012). Regionalism has, therefore, received 
increasing attention as a major potential force for economic and security 
cooperation, and development (Gamble and Payne, 1996; Söderbaum, 2003; 
Acharya, 2007, 2012; Fawcett, 2016). However, ‘the make-up and performance 
of regional organizations around the world is marked by a great deal of diversity’ 
(Acharya, and Johnson, 2007: 1). Although some progress has been made 
towards regional integration and collective security arrangements, Africa still 
faces significant challenges towards reaching that goal. Critics have pointed out 
that most African countries lack the economy of effort in continental platforms due 
to multiple membership in different regional groupings, as a result this hinders a 
concerted approach towards regional integration (Herbst, 2007; Nathan, 2012; 
Černohous, and Kříž, 2014). At the same time, the paradox is that the continental 
arrangements in peace interventions seem to have gathered momentum. This 
research is undertaken to understand how leadership is produced in African 
peace interventions. What are the motivations in African collective action or 
peace interventions and how does the AU interact with subregional actors in the 
production of leadership? 
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The thesis carries important implications for the study of regional leadership in 
peace interventions and regional cooperation. More specifically, it contributes to 
the topics of leadership and regionalisation of peace and security. The March 
2005 reporting of the Commission for Africa found that Africa had experienced 
more violent conflicts than any other continent in the preceding four decades 
(Cilliers, 2008; Cilliers et al., 2010). Peace operations had been singled out as 
one of the most effective ways of dealing with such conflicts. The 2004 Report of 
the UN High Level Panel indicated that deploying military capacities for 
peacekeeping as well as peace enforcement had become a valuable tool in 
ending wars and post-conflict recovery of states ravished by violent conflicts. 
However, the report noted the dwindling global supply of available peace-keepers 
(UN Report, 2004a, 2004b).  The use of regional forces for peacekeeping has 
been recommended as one of the solutions to mitigate the short supply of 
peacekeepers (UN Report, 2004a, 2004c). On the other hand, scholars have 
argued that engaging African troops in regional conflicts is the most effective way 
of ensuring timely response to African security challenges (Dompere, 2006; 
Francis, 2006).  
 
Developing from Chapter 8 of the UN Charter, regional arrangements have 
gradually become an important feature in contemporary conflict management in 
sub-Saharan Africa. It is noted that regional organisations in Africa have 
increasingly been involved in conflict management and have conducted more 
peace operations than any other continent (Bellamy et al., 2010: 309; Majinge, 
2010; Paliwal, 2010). The increase of regional peace operations and conflict 
mediation mechanisms raises the question of how these peace efforts are led 
and managed. In more practical terms, there is the question of resources and 
necessary capabilities from member states and subregional organisations (UN 
Report, 2004a, 2004b). This thesis investigates how peace and conflict is led on 
the African continent and contributes to studies of leadership and contemporary 
conflict management on the continent. 
 
Additionally, the AU has been recognised in UN literature as a developing model 
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in regional peace interventions. However, there is a paucity of literature on the 
leadership of regional peace operations and how subregional partners relate to 
the AU. From this backdrop, this research contributes to knowledge on regional 
peace and security frameworks. Although significant literature exists on the UN-
AU relationship, there is little literature on how the AU negotiates its continental 
leadership with subregional organisations in peace and security. Hence, the 
conceptual analysis for AU leadership and subregional cooperation in peace 
interventions is lacking and this research contributes to this gap in the knowledge.  
 
While the AU Protocol on the establishment of PSC under article 5(2) of the 
Constitutive Act of the AU provides for collective security and timely response to 
conflict crisis in Africa, few studies have been done to examine the PSC’s efficacy 
in mitigating collective action problems. The APSA assessment study conducted 
in 2010, reported contradictory views from some subregional organisations on 
AU leadership in peace interventions. Specifically, some subregional groups 
argued that, ‘the AU Commission should not view itself as an implementing 
agency, but it should rather play more of a coordination role’ (AU APSA Report, 
2010: 9). From this backdrop, this research investigates how the AU is expected 
to demonstrate a hierarchical form of leadership on the African continent and how 
it relates with subregional organisations. Although the AU PSC has the overall 
mandate for peace and security on the continent, the APSA assessment report 
points to controversies in leadership. Additionally, since APSA is based on a 
delegated peace intervention framework to subregions, this research analyses 
how the AU deals with inevitable problems on delegated powers (Peters, 2012; 
Hall and Taylor, 1996). 
This study, therefore, contributes to contemporary debates regarding the role of 
regional and subregional organisations in international conflict resolution. Its 
primary contribution will be to fill an identified gap in the literature which focuses 
specifically on leadership in peace operations on the African continent. As the 
literature review in Chapters 2 and 3 will show, this in turn makes important 
contributions to the fields of liberal peace building and cosmopolitan approaches 
to peacekeeping. Moreover, the thesis broadens contemporary understanding of 
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peace and conflict on the African continent and contributes to policy debates over 
strategic interventions in regionalised peace interventions 
 
1.5 Limitations and scope of the study 
The study involves a review of international relations (IR) and leadership theories 
that are diverse topics in their own right. These fields are wide, and no single 
theory can best explain the leadership phenomenon in international peace 
interventions. To overcome this limitation, this study does not debate the 
international relations and leadership theories but focuses on how leadership is 
produced and the extent to which leadership in African peace interventions is 
provided by the AU. While it adopts two wide and diverse topics, the thesis 
contributes to wider discussions over peace and security at regional and 
international levels and opens the door for further comparative case studies. 
 
The study acknowledges that different IR theories are used to describe 
leadership in international politics. However, from the review of the literature, the 
study adopts a social constructivist approach as the most appropriate framework 
for understanding African peace interventions due to its conceptual power in 
analysing interactions and relations of participants to a collective, and at the same 
time recognising the role of power in collective action. 
 
The study makes two assumptions; first, that leadership is a process, both 
contextual and determined through interactions of participants to a collective; 
second, that the AU as a continental organisation is an influential participant in 
the production of leadership for peace interventions in the continent. From these 
two assumptions, the research investigates the mechanisms and circumstances 
that produce leadership and how leadership can be described and analysed in 
AU peace interventions. The interrogation continues to find out if the AU is the 
influential continental actor in leadership production and to what extent it provides 
leadership in peace interventions.  
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1.6 Motivation of the study  
From my current research and experience in peace operations I have found the 
subject of leadership challenging in regional peace interventions. As a student of 
African history, I have found the African regional integration unique. There seems 
to be no consensus on the path to African regional integration and I have been 
fascinated by how the AU manages to strike a consensus in regional peace 
interventions with subregional actors. The leadership dynamics demonstrated by 
the AU’s failure to deploy the pledged 5000 peacekeeping troops to Burundi’s 
conflict since 20157 are some motivations for this study. On the other hand, while 
subregional organisations are AU peace and security pillars, the leadership 
linkages are not clear. However, there is limited research on the extent of AU 
leadership and its interaction with subregional partners in peace interventions. 
Thus, this research affords me an opportunity to interrogate the topic of 
leadership, considering that AU has conducted several peace missions since its 
inception. The research will provide further knowledge on the conceptualisation 
of leadership evident in AU interventions, how they are constituted, and how they 
match to dominating approaches to leadership in international conflict 
management.  
 
1.7 Research objectives and key questions 
The main objective of this study is to investigate the extent of the AU leadership 
in African peace interventions, how this leadership is produced and its nature in 
regional peace interventions. The research interrogates how the AU interacts with 
subregional actors in regional peace operations and conflict mediation and 
examines the extent to which regionalisation of peace has developed in Africa. In 
                                                      
7 In mid-December 2015 the PSC took its boldest actions to date to halt the spiralling crisis in 
Burundi. In its communiqué of 17 December, the PSC authorised the deployment of a 5 000-
strong African Prevention and Protection Mission in Burundi (MAPROBU, from French: Mission 
Africaine de Prevention et de Protection au Burundi) for six months (renewable). The PSC 
expressed its determination by invoking Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act. This provision 
allows the AU – following a decision by the AU Assembly of Heads of State – to intervene in a 
country ‘in grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity’. The 
PSC therefore recommended such an intervention to the Assembly, which ultimately decided on 
the deployment. However, this peacekeeping mission was never deployed. 
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order to achieve the overall objective, the study has the following specific 
objectives;  
i. To investigate AU interaction with the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) in joint conflict mediation in Madagascar. 
ii. To examine AU interaction with national contingents/troop contributing 
countries in the African Union Mission in Somalia. 
iii. To understand how leadership is constituted in AU peace interventions.  
1.7.1 Key research questions 
This study answers the following key research question; using the examples of 
the AU mission in Somalia and AU joint mediation with the Southern African 
Development Community in Madagascar, to what extent does the African Union 
provide leadership in peace operations and conflict mediation? This question is 
supplemented by the following secondary questions:  
i. What nature of leadership is produced in African Union joint conflict 
mediation with Regional Economic Communities/subregional actors?  
ii. What nature of leadership is produced in peace operations authorised and 
mandated by the African Union Peace and Security Council? 
iii. How does the African Union peace and security structure facilitate the 
regionalisation of peace interventions? 
iv. To what extent are African peace interventions motivated by liberal and 
cosmopolitan peacekeeping thinking? 
v. What are the prospects of regionalisation of peace interventions within the 
African Union? 
 
1.8 Thesis structure 
This thesis contains eight chapters that are divided into three sections. Section 
one includes two literature reviews that address the topics of leadership and 
regional peace interventions.  Chapter 2 presents leadership ontologies that 
guide the thinking and conceptualisation of leadership. Constructive and 
hegemonic models of leadership are described and analysed with the aim of 
identifying how formal and informal leadership influences cooperation in 
international negotiations. Chapter 3 reviews key literature on the regionalisation 
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of peace and how liberal and cosmopolitan peacekeeping theories influence 
peace interventions. The chapter further explores the linkages between 
cosmopolitan thinking and leadership in peace interventions. The analysis also 
covers anticipated collective-action problems in delegated peace interventions. 
Section two of the thesis includes the methodology and context of the study. 
Chapter 4 outlines the methodology adopted in the study and case study 
selection. The methodology chapter is informed by the literature review and 
outlines how the gaps identified in the literature will be filled by the research. 
Chapter 5 sets out the context of the study and provides the structural overview 
of the AU and SADC, in order to highlight the research focus.  
 
Section three of the thesis provides the research findings, analysis, discussion 
and conclusion of the study. In Chapter 6 the focus is on the AU and SADC Joint 
Conflict Mediation in Madagascar. This chapter interrogates how AU interacts 
with SADC as a regional economic community and pillar of APSA. Chapter 7 
focuses on the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). This chapter 
investigates how AU manages its peace operations and how it relates with troop 
contributing countries (TCCs). In both Chapters 6 and 7 the general argument is 
that AU leadership is socially constructed through interactions with subregional 
partners and at the same time highlights the significance of national and regional 
interests, in the processes of regional peace interventions. Chapter 8 puts the 
whole thesis into perspective by examining evidence of leadership, liberal peace 
building and cosmopolitan peacekeeping in AU interventions. Chapter 9 
concludes the thesis, summarising its findings and outlining the implications of 
the study to leadership and contemporary conflict management in Africa. This 
concluding chapter also highlight areas for further research in regionalised peace 
interventions in Africa. The thesis identifies challenges to existing notions of AU 
leadership and sheds light on potential proposals for reform in AU regional 
interventions. 
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Chapter 2: Leadership 
 
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter reviews major theoretical approaches to leadership that formulate 
the analytical framework of this study. Specifically, the chapter focuses on how 
leadership is produced. Leadership literature and future directions of leadership 
theory point to the notion of a “post-heroic” outlook of unitary leadership8 and 
draw attention to a collective form of leadership (Drath et al., 2008; Avolio, 
Walumbwa and Weber, 2009). However, collective leadership is largely found in 
research dealing with organisational management, particularly, education, health 
care and social psychology (Bolden, 2011; Currie, and Lockett, 2011; Fitzsimons, 
James, and Denyer, 2011). This chapter brings the collective leadership debate 
to a field of research that is predominantly defined by unitary leadership. The 
chapter examines how leadership is produced using both unitary and collective 
approaches to identify leadership practices in regionalised peace interventions 
within the AU.  
The first part of this chapter provides a conceptual analysis of leadership, how it 
is defined and understood. A further analysis on emerging leadership ontologies 
is provided in order to expand the definition of leadership and show how it is 
utilised in this study. The second part of the chapter analyses the 
conceptualisation of international leadership. In this light, mainstream theoretical 
perspectives on regional leadership such as hegemonic leadership and collective 
or shared leadership are analysed. The chapter intensifies the debate on how 
leadership can be understood in an African peace and security framework, 
highlighting the need to understand leadership in regionalised peace 
interventions. In doing so, the chapter contributes to leadership models of 
regional peace and security. Several scholars have noted that although 
leadership in international institution building remains a significant topic in any 
case of international collective action, little research has been done in the field 
                                                      
8 Unitary leadership is used to describe the presence of a leader and follower relationship and 
the interaction between these two entities that produces leadership. 
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(Underdal, 1994; Sjostedt, 1999; Tallberg, 2006; Dent, 2010; Kyeong-Hee, 2012). 
This study will contribute to knowledge by investigating and clarifying how 
leadership is constituted in African peace interventions.  
2.1 Conceptual analysis of leadership as a unitary phenomenon 
Leadership theory is highly diverse but is unified and framed by an underlying 
tripod ontology of leader, follower and shared goals (Stogdill, 1974; Bass, 1990; 
Gardner, 1990; Sorenson et al., 2004, Bennis, 2007; Drath et al., 2008; 
Northouse, 2014, 2015). In this light, leadership has been conceptualised as a 
process that involves actor(s) intentional influence to guide a structure and 
facilitate activities and relationships in a group of actors or organisation 
(Northouse, 1997; Yukl, et al., 2002; Yukl, 1989, 1999; 2002; Vera, and Crossan, 
2004; Iwowo, 2015). Leadership is defined broadly in terms of (a) influencing 
individuals to contribute to group goals and (b) coordinating the pursuit of those 
goals (Herzik and Brown, 1991; Hollander, 1992a; Hogan et al., 1994; Bryman, 
1996; Yukl, and Becker, 2006). Drawn from this framework, leadership provides 
focus and direction for a diverse group of individuals or states with different 
cultural orientation to have a particular approach in encountering common 
problems. Leadership is then looked at as building a team and guiding it to victory 
(Hogan et al., 1994). Northouse in his contribution indicates that ‘(a) leadership 
is a process, (b) leadership involves influence, (c) leadership occurs within a 
group context, and (d) leadership involves goal attainment’ (1997: 3). There is a 
consensus in the literature that leadership involves the pursuit of common 
objectives and, therefore, there exists a commonality of interests between a 
leader and followers (Goethals et al., 2004; Northouse, 2015). This 
understanding of leadership is best pictured by a rudimentary sketch, as shown 
in Figure 2.1 and developed by Drath et al., (2008). 
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Figure 2.1 Tripod ontology framework adopted from leadership variables in Yukl 
(2002: 11).  
Source:  A framework based on the tripod ontology (Drath et al., 2008: 641) 
As shown above, leadership within this framework is marked with a directional 
influence and interaction between leader and followers. The assumption is that 
the situation or context under which leadership takes place are independent 
variables (Drath et al., 2008). In other words, the context under which leadership 
is produced is not imbedded in the process of producing leadership since leaders 
and followers already exist.  
 
The tripod ontology, also referred to as the traditional leadership approach, 
features in most leadership literature. Leadership theory has therefore, mostly 
been conceptualised as a dichotomy of leader-follower relationship in heroic or 
‘great man’ theories (Galton, 1869; Woods, 1913 cited in Drath et al., 2008), or 
trait theories (Jenkins, 1947; Mann, 1959; Kenny and Zaccaro, 1983; Zaccaro, 
Foti and Kenny, 1991; Zaccaro, 2007), where followers operate under the 
leader's influence in a vertical relationship. The leader-member exchange theory 
also describes leadership as a leader-follower phenomenon (Graen and Uhl-
Bien, 1995; Uhl-Bien, Graen and Scandura, 2000). It is noted elsewhere that 
leadership needs purpose, as the activity of mobilising others has to be linked to 
the larger task of providing guidance and direction in a given situation (Helms, 
Some materials have been removed due to 3rd party copyright. The 
unabridged version can be viewed in Lancester Library - Coventry 
University.
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2014: 265). In the same vein, Nannerl Keohane indicates that ‘leaders determine 
or clarify goals for a group of actors and bring together the energies of members 
of that group to accomplish those goals’ (2010: 23). A growing number of scholars 
have specifically focused on the role of followers and characteristics of followers 
(Lundin, and Lancaster, 1990; Kelley, 1992; Bjugstad et al., 2006; Collinson, 
2006). The path-goal theory has mainly focused on leader’s intuition or behaviour 
in guiding followers, rather than on how shared goals emerge and develop 
(Evans, 1970; House, 1971). There is little literature on the nature of goals, how 
goals emerge, and how they are achieved (Drath et al., 2008: 638). The next 
section explores further developments in theoretical approaches to leadership 
and specifically shared leadership. 
2.2 Shared leadership analytical framework 
Theoretical developments of leadership theory have conceived leadership as a 
shared or distributed undertaking. The shared and post-heroic conceptualisation 
of leadership has challenged the unitary command ontology and argues that 
leadership is mainly becoming collectively constructed and negotiated during 
interactions of parties to the shared goals (Gronn, 2002; Cox, Pearce and Perry, 
2003; Crevani, Lindgren and Packendorff, 2007; Drath et al. 2008). Shared 
leadership integrates several environmental variables of leadership that are 
incompatible in the traditional leadership tripod. Unambiguously, shared 
leadership is inconceivable in the tripod and in contexts where followers 
participate in the construction of leadership (Cox et al., 2003). Drath et al. (2008: 
636) have proposed a leadership ontology based on three leadership outcomes; 
(a) direction – widespread agreement in a collective on overall goals, aims and 
mission; (b) alignment – the organisation and coordination of knowledge and 
work in a collective; and (c) commitment – the willingness of members of a 
collective to subsume their own interests and benefit within the collective interest 
and benefit.  
The direction, alignment and commitment (DAC) formulate the three key 
elements that mark the occurrence or production of leadership. On the other 
hand, in the traditional tripod it is the presence of leaders and followers interacting 
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around their shared goals that marks the occurrence of leadership. It is important 
to note that the DAC ontology transcends and includes the tripod ontology. 
However, it pulls together all the social and contextual factors in interactions that 
produce DAC (or leadership) rather than just focusing on leader and follower 
characteristics (Drath et al., 2008). DAC ontology asks questions beyond leaders 
and their interaction with followers in the attainment of shared goals. The 
proposal of Drath and colleagues seeks leadership theory ‘to explain how people 
who share work in collectives produce direction, alignment, and commitment’ 
(Drath et al., 2008: 636). A further review of DAC ontology and how it relates to 
this study is done below.  
Shared leadership is conceptualised as a social construct resulting from 
interactions among actors to a collective with intentional influence over structure 
or institutions (Cox et al., 2003; Ensley et al., 2006: 220; Crevani et al., 2007; 
Drath et al., 2008; Hoch, 2013). In this light, leadership is approached with 
constructivist epistemologies and defined as a collective influence, collaborative, 
and a process of group interaction that is dynamic and responds to situational 
contexts, where partners in the collective ‘negotiate shared understandings about 
how to navigate decisions and exercise authority’ (Cox et al., 2003: 53). In other 
words, shared leadership reflects a situation where team members [multiple 
actors] engage in leadership and is characterised by collaborative decision-
making and shared responsibility for outcomes’ (Hoch, 2013: 161). Shared 
leadership can occur in the traditional vertical framework but is mainly located 
within teams where a collective is a key source of influence. It is important to note 
that shared leadership does not deconstruct the hierarchy but focuses on the 
processes that produce leadership. The emphasis is placed on interaction and 
collective influence. From this backdrop, partners to an undertaking develop 
competences and skills that enable them to influence group goals, acting as both 
leader and follower thereby diminishing the leader-follower dichotomy (Pearce 
and Sims, 2000). 
 
The application of shared or collective leadership from organisational setting to 
regional (international) leadership has been attempted elsewhere (Osborn, and 
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Marion, 2009; Zwartjes et al., 2012; Park, 2014; Rattanasevee, 2014). However, 
such analysis on AU peace interventions is lacking. An investigation of APSA has 
mainly analysed the implementation challenges and assessment of the 
architecture (Murithi, 2008; Boutellis and Williams, 2013; Vines, 2013; Williams 
and Boutellis, 2014; Makinda et al., 2015). This study contributes to the 
conceptualisation of shared leadership within the AU through the interrogation of 
AU – SADC relations and AU – TCC interactions in collective peace efforts. As 
shown above, shared leadership is conceptualised as a group property, whose 
set of functions is carried out by the group of actors as a whole (Ensley et al., 
2006: 220; Vugt et al., 2008; Hoch, 2013: 161). The key aspect of shared 
leadership is high levels of knowledge sharing where actors build on each other’s 
ideas (Ensley et al., 2006; Drath et al., 2008). Hence, the assumption is that there 
exist high levels of networking and interactions among different actors in shared 
leadership. It is convincingly argued that peace interventions are usually a 
collective effort due to their political and logistical demands (Bellamy and 
Williams, 2004, 2009b; Williams, 2008a, 2008b; Williams, and Haacke, 2008; 
Bellamy et al., 2010). This study will therefore, examine how the peace 
interventions’ goals are initiated and developed, how the AU PSC provides the 
traditional vertical leadership (as indicated above) and how the leadership is 
shared with subregional actors. These questions assume continuous interactions 
among parties involved in leadership. Consequently, there are inevitable 
relational developments that impact on the nature of leadership produced. The 
next section reviews the relational approaches to leadership and how these relate 
to shared leadership. 
2.3 Relational approaches to leadership 
Another important feature of leadership theory is the role of relations in leadership 
production. In this light, relational theory has been influential in the 
conceptualisation of shared leadership (Dachler and Hosking, 1995; Murrell, 
1997; Drath, 2001; Ospina, and Sorenson, 2006; Uhl-Bien, 2006; Hosking, 2007). 
Relational theory has a constructionist ontology, whose basic argument is that 
meaning is generated and sustained in the context of interaction and is 
negotiated over time (Gergen, 2009; Nabers, 2008; Hunt et al., 2009; Metcalf, 
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and Benn, 2013). Using the constructivist argument in relational theory, other 
scholars have argued that the meaning of the terms leader, follower, and shared 
goals is not fixed, but is continuously being framed and reframed from context to 
context over a period of time (Hollander, 1992b; Drath et al., 2008: 640). An 
immediate implication of this argument is that the definition of a leader is 
contextual and can shift among participants over time during interactions. In other 
words, leaders, followers and their shared goals are not naturally occurring but 
reflect the context under which shared goals are developed. This perspective of 
leadership challenges the traditional tripod discussed above, where leaders and 
followers seem to be both given and permanent. While the tripod ontology is 
useful in leadership theory, it is important to note that the concept of leadership 
is expanding beyond the leader-follower dyad and that relational theory helps in 
the understanding of shared leadership.  
Relational theory therefore, complements the emerging concepts of shared 
leadership, where leadership and contexts are interrelated social constructions 
created through continuous interactions (Uhl-Bien, 2006). From this background, 
leadership may shift over time in response to the developing challenges to an 
institution (Drath, 2001; Anwar, 2006). In this light, leadership might evolve from 
one entity or single leader to multiple influence, as well as from one single leader 
to another.  The general argument here is that leaders and followers are socially 
constructed for the purpose of providing a basis for social cooperation and may 
change when the context on social cooperation evolves (Drath, 2001; Drath et 
al., 2008: 641; Dess et al., 2013). The relational theory provides another angle of 
viewing leadership and how it is produced. There is little literature that analyses 
relational dynamics in the production of African leadership in peace and security. 
To fill this gap, the research aims to interrogate the relational aspect in the 
production of leadership in peace operations and conflict mediation.  
It is important to understand how meanings of leadership are developed in a 
regional security framework that is decentralised, as in the case of the AU. The 
discussion on leadership boundaries between AU and subregional organisations 
is missing in the literature, and it is not known where AU and SADC leadership 
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starts or ends in the regional peace and security framework. Building on the 
questions raised in the previous section on shared leadership, the study will 
further examine the extent to which relational approaches to leadership exist 
within the AU peace and security framework. The study will investigate the single 
versus multiple centres of influence and how they are coordinated for social 
cooperation of the collective.  Relational approaches are emergent theoretical 
developments in leadership that go beyond the traditional understanding of 
leadership. This research will examine how these developing concepts of 
leadership provide new knowledge on how regionalised peace and conflicts are 
managed in Africa. The discussion above introduced the conceptualisation of 
leadership as DAC within the shared leadership approach. The section below 
further discusses how the DAC relates to shared leadership and what questions 
are asked within the framework. 
2.4 Leadership as direction, alignment and commitment  
DAC ontology is the emergent conceptualisation of leadership that transcends 
the traditional tripod approach. The framework is integrative and provides a 
broader understanding of leadership in virtually all contexts and all kinds of 
collectives with shared work (Porter and McLaughlin, 2006; Drath et al., 2008). 
As highlighted above, peace operations and conflict mediations are usually a 
collective undertaking where division of labour is evident. In this light, the study 
will examine the usefulness of DAC ontology in understanding the AU leadership 
of peace interventions in the continent. Through the DAC analysis, the thesis will 
contribute to the study of leadership through testing this emergent leadership 
ontology in regional peace interventions. The outline of the DAC framework 
above briefly described its basic tenets and it is important to further describe the 
basic definitions that have been provided. Drath et al., (2008: 647) define 
direction as a short form of shared direction, which is the agreement in the 
collective about the aim, mission, vision, or goal of the collective's shared work. 
Under this definition, members of the collective are assumed to have a shared 
understanding of the goal and broad agreement on the value of that aim. They 
define alignment as the organisation and coordination of knowledge and work, 
achieved through a given structure. Alignment is conceived to be produced when 
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the group work is coherent and might be loose, flexible, and change over time. 
Finally, they use commitment as a short form of mutual commitment and define 
it as the willingness to integrate own efforts and benefits within the collective effort 
and benefit. Commitment in a collective is said to be produced when group 
members ‘allow others to make demands on their time and energy’ (Farley, 1986 
cited in Drath et al., 2008: 647). The level of commitment may vary from undivided 
loyalty to low level commitment. DAC is conceptualised as a dynamic outcome 
that responds to changing contexts and the environment in which the shared work 
of the collective operates. Hence, DAC is continually reconstructed or reframed 
and developing. This section uses the basic sketch of DAC ontology developed 
by Drath and colleagues in order to review their approach to leadership and 
examine how it is differentiated from the traditional tripod ontology.  
 
Source: A framework based on the DAC ontology (Drath et al., 2008: 642) 
 
Figure 2.2 provides the contrasts in leadership conceptualisation that require 
further studies. According to Drath and colleagues, the focus in this 
conceptualisation is on the DAC outcomes or leadership outcomes and how 
those outcomes are produced, and less emphasis on leaders and followers. The 
overall assumption within the framework is shared work on how DAC or 
leadership is produced leading to collective leadership beliefs and practices. The 
basis of defining leadership in this framework is both the collective and 
Some materials have been removed due to 3rd party copyright. The 
unabridged version can be viewed in Lancester Library - Coventry 
University.
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independent existence of DAC elements.  These elements are interrelated and 
enable cooperation and shared work to be achieved, while in the tripod-based 
framework all three elements must exist for leadership to occur. Another major 
difference between the DAC framework and tripod framework is that the ‘outcome 
of leadership in the tripod is the attainment of shared goals, while the outcome of 
leadership in the DAC framework is DAC - a means to attaining ends of various 
kinds’ (Drath et al., 2008: 643). Additionally, since leadership is identified by the 
production of DAC, the context or situations have a significant influence on 
leadership. This is in contrast to traditional leadership where context is an 
independent variable. Context and leadership, in the case of DAC, become 
constitutive and interdependent elements that are mutually interacting and 
reinforcing each other. In this light, the DAC framework defines the basis of 
shared leadership as a contextually generated practice where the leader and 
follower participate on an equal footing and their leadership understanding 
mutually supports each other.  
The DAC conceptualisation of leadership is therefore, integrative and broadens 
the existence of leadership. Additionally, an analytical advantage of using an 
integrative conceptualisation of leadership lies in its functionalism, where the 
focus is on outcomes that are generated in leadership (Morgeson and Hofmann, 
1999; Goethals and Sorenson, 2007). The work of Morgeson and Hofmann 
indicates that while structure and processes are important in leadership theory, 
the focus on leadership outcomes has the potential to integrate several levels of 
leadership analysis. For instance, within the DAC ontology, leadership is still 
produced where one or two elements of DAC are absent, while in the tripod 
ontology missing one element may constitute the non-existence of leadership 
(Drath et al., 2008). Although this conceptualisation runs the risk of defining a 
greater range of social interaction as leadership, it provides the specificity of 
outcomes that must be generated for the interaction to qualify as leadership. 
The conceptualisation of leadership in a DAC framework has its roots in the work 
of Gardner (1990) who described direction as the process of creating shared 
goals and how a unity of purpose (alignment) can be achieved for goal 
  25 
attainment.  The work of Bass (1990), Kouzes and Posner (1987), and Kotter 
(1990) discussed the process of motivating others in sharing the vision, creating 
the path for goal attainment, and inspiring commitment.  All these scholarships 
formulate DAC as the outcome of leadership where all interactions and networks 
created are aspects of leadership practice. This abstract framework is used in 
this study to understand how the work of member states individually or as a group 
of states (in a subregion) and their interaction with AU produce DAC in peace 
interventions. Within this DAC scholarship members can produce leadership 
without having any overall implicit or explicit concept of leader-follower as framed 
by the tripod. The assumption is that all members to a collective have beliefs on 
how to produce DAC. Hence the combination of their leadership beliefs will 
produce collective leadership without creating the leader-follower dichotomy 
(Boehm, 2001). It is important to note that the element of power and influence 
still exists in the formulation of DAC. As members to a collective interact, their 
beliefs9 (on how to produce DAC) interact with other beliefs thereby forming 
collective beliefs that are widely shared. The beliefs of members with more power 
and authority are more likely to be adopted in leadership practices, than beliefs 
held by members with less power and authority (Drath et al., 2008: 644). It is 
argued that for leadership beliefs to exist, they must be supported and justified 
by other beliefs (Quine and Ullian, 1978; Rorty, 1990). For instance, one’s 
membership or leadership to a collective must be acknowledged and supported 
by other members in the group. Hence, beliefs occur in mutual support and 
justification (Quine and Ullian, 1978; Drath and Van Velsor, 2006). Beliefs in DAC 
production have a historical account and cannot be changed easily since they 
require a simultaneous change of beliefs in the other parties in a collective (Rorty, 
1990; Drath, and Van Velsor, 2006).  
The DAC framework is relational as it provides for interpretation of interactions 
and beliefs held by a collective (Palus and Drath, 1995; Murrell, 1997; McNamee 
and Gergen, 1999; Fletcher and Kaufer, 2003; Hosking, 2007; Uhl-Bien, 2006; 
Gergen, 2009). Members of a collective continuously justify the leadership 
                                                      
9 The term ‘beliefs’ is used to describe knowledge or ideas. 
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practices and beliefs held in the production of DAC. It is argued that for DAC to 
exist, members to a collective must accept that the group efforts will yield 
intended outcomes (Morgeson and Hofmann, 1999). As shown above, the DAC 
framework broadens the definition of leadership as all three leadership outcomes 
(DAC) are independent (though interrelated) where each outcome can be 
produced without the other and in different quantities. For instance, a collective 
can produce direction without alignment or commitment (Drath et al., 2008). Drath 
and colleagues further illustrate the existence of alignment without direction or 
commitment through the Abilene paradox10 (Harvey, 1996). On the other hand, 
‘there can be commitment without direction or alignment, as when members of a 
collective are passionate in their desire to act but cannot agree on a shared 
outcome to aim for and cannot organize themselves’ (Drath et al., 2008: 647). 
However, the desired and effective leadership outcome is when all three 
elements of DAC are produced and complement each other. In this light, the 
effectiveness of leadership can be assessed by reference to the degree of DAC 
produced. The study will therefore, examine the extent to which a DAC framework 
is useful in analysing AU leadership in peace interventions.  As highlighted above, 
the DAC framework provides an approach to understanding a wide range of 
leadership contexts that transcend and include the tripod ontology of leaders, 
followers, and their common goals, hence the traditional leadership ontology is 
not replaced but viewed together with DAC in AU peace and security framework.  
Within the tripod ontology, leadership originates from leaders and is 
acknowledged or accepted by followers through commanding, persuading, 
influencing and motivating. In the DAC ontology, leadership is produced through 
dialogue, interaction and sense-making where group members in a collective 
meet in the middle in mutual transformation (Palus and Drath, 2001; Osborn and 
Hunt, 2007; Drath et al., 2008). Within the DAC framework, the tripod leadership 
elements are re-conceptualised as mutually and socially constructed, achieved 
through a joint effort outside the lens of leader and follower. The work of Huxham 
and Vangen (2000a, 2000b) has analysed how shared leadership works in inter-
                                                      
10 In this paradox a group pursues collective ends that are counter to the preferences of 
individual group members. 
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organisational collaborations. They concluded that leadership mechanisms in 
collaborations requires media (structures, processes and participants) and 
activities (managing power, setting and controlling the agenda, and 
empowerment). The structures allow leadership roles to be performed by 
participants to the collaboration. Similarly, processes allow communication to 
take place in collaboration and channel participants’ activities. There is little 
research that explores how leadership is produced and practised in AU peace 
interventions, despite several peace interventions having been undertaken by the 
AU. This work examines how each of the two leadership ontologies works in AU 
regionalised peace interventions and how they supplement each other. The next 
section review approaches to regional leadership that emanate from both the 
leadership ontologies discussed above. 
2.5 Approaches to regional leadership 
Reviews of the leadership literature in international relations mainly define 
leadership following the two epistemological and ontological approaches 
discussed above. The first approach adopts a realist view that emphasises the 
power and national sovereignty of states (Carr, 1946 Morgenthau, 1967; Waltz, 
1979; Gilpin, 1984). A further discussion on the realist approach is given below. 
The second approach is mostly constructive, focusing on interaction, and 
constitutes the shared ideas about self, other and the world, relying on the 
intersubjective internalization of ideas, norms and identities (Burns, 1978; Young, 
1991; Wendt, 1992; Dunne, 1995a; Wiener, 1995; Abshire, 2001b; Nabers, 
2008a, 2010; Keohane, 2010; Zhang et al., 2012; Helms, 2014). The term 
‘intersubjectivity’, frequently used by constructivists, is equivalent to ‘common 
knowledge,’ as used in everyday language referring to the beliefs held by 
individuals about each other (Nabers, 2008: 11). The constructive approach to 
leadership is also discussed further below. The thesis utilises both approaches 
to understand how leadership within the AU is conceived and practised. 
 
Since the end of the Cold War, regional interactions have become the vessel of 
legitimacy, leadership, and soft power among countries in specific geopolitical 
localities (Vieira and Alden, 2011: 514). Soft power is mostly associated with the 
  28 
use of attraction in country’s values and policies rather than coercion as in hard 
power (Nye, 2004, 2006, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2011). Dirk Nabers (2008a: 5) 
convincingly observes that, ‘leadership plays a crucial role in tackling 
internationally relevant problems and … strong leadership seems to be essential 
for guiding and directing a group of countries towards collective action.’ There is 
a thin line that separates leadership from power in international relations. In other 
words, the two concepts are integrative and at times synonymously used. For 
instance, the question of leadership and cooperation among international actors 
becomes critical when some actors are economically and/or militarily more 
powerful than others (Midford, 2000). It is acknowledged that those states that 
bear more costs in tackling international problems have more weight than those 
with little military and economic muscle, because their voice is considered crucial 
for the outcome of the given political process and these states can be considered 
“leaders” in international affairs (Nabers, 2008a: 5). In this light, leadership is 
conceived to follow the traditional tripod discussed above. 
 
The observation by Nabers deserves more attention when regional leadership is 
considered from the AU perspective. Leadership becomes a pertinent topic of 
inquiry because the AU does not have the status of a state in terms of military 
and political elements, but it is a collective of states that intervene in African 
conflicts. As highlighted above, little research has been done to understand how 
the AU provides leadership in regard to peace interventions or how leadership is 
conceived in this collective. What makes leadership more appealing for research 
is the argument that most African countries have a high propensity for sovereignty 
and are relatively small with small economies (Francis, 2006; Hill, 2011; Nathan, 
2012; Flemes and Lobell, 2015). Additionally, there are several subregional 
organisations that are actively involved in peace interventions, for instance, 
SADC, ECOWAS and IGAD. It is therefore, important to know how small states 
with small economies come together and tackle contemporary conflicts within the 
AU. The next section provides a further discussion on the realist approach to 
leadership through the analysis of hegemonic leadership theory. 
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2.6 Hegemonic leadership theory 
The term ‘hegemony’ features prominently in many contributions from the 
‘structural leadership’ school, which focuses on ‘the underlying distribution of 
material capabilities that gives some states the ability to direct the overall shape 
of world political order’ (Ikenberry, 1996: 389). In other words, hegemonic global 
leadership essentially refers to the state leadership of a global or regional system 
on the basis of its superior structural capabilities and ability to provide public 
goods, such as stability, order, or peace (Keohane, 1988; Cooper et al., 1991, 
Nye, 2004, 2008a). Hegemonic leadership fundamentally describes an actor’s 
position of predominance within the international system (Helms, 2014: 266). 
Within international relations scholarship, it is argued that leadership is effective 
and sustainable when states acknowledge a leader’s vision of international order 
and internalize it as their own (Nabers, 2008a: 24).  In the study of international 
politics, states are the principal actors and most literature has referred to states 
as leaders in the international political system (Dunne, 1995b; Nabers, 2008b; 
Hill, 2011; Vieira, and Alden, 2011). According to hegemonic-stability theory, a 
regional or global hegemon can contribute to securing the peace and stability of 
the international system (Gilpin, 1981; Keohane, 1988). However, it is also noted 
elsewhere that they also have the potential to destabilise the international order 
(Nye, 1990, 2004).  It is argued that the existence of a hegemonic or dominant 
actor, serving as an institutional focal point and regional paymaster, is an 
important precondition of a successful regional integration and leadership (Mattli, 
1999a: 65).  
 
From a realist perspective (Morgenthau, 1967; Waltz 1979), power capabilities 
are the determining factor in states’ choices. For classical realists, international 
institutions are always a function of the power and interests of the leading state 
(Carr and Cox, 1964: 170-1; Morgenthau, 1967: 175). The neorealist hegemonic-
stability theory explains the link between power distribution in states and the 
stability of international institutions, where those states with power (hegemonies) 
provide leadership in international relations (Krasner, 1983, 1985; Strange, 
1983). According to this approach, international institutions are usually created 
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or prevented by dominant powers during periods of hegemony. In contrast, 
however, other branches of neorealism maintain that the consideration of relative 
gains, stop states from cooperating with one another (Nabers, 2008: 6). However, 
as we shall see in the next chapter, states do share common interests in 
maintaining international order. It is argued elsewhere that common interests and 
threats provide incentives for states to exercise collective leadership in dealing 
with these threats (Yamashita, 2012; Wunderlich, 2013, 2008; Park, 2014). While 
states’ cooperation in tackling peace and security challenges that have the 
potential to destabilise international order or cause widespread humanitarian 
crises can be achieved through hegemonies, not all circumstances of cooperation 
require hegemonic leadership. Cooperation of states is also determined by 
common interests and threats, as shown above.  
 
The case of the AU provides a unique perspective of cooperation that transcends 
hegemonic influence. For instance, it is argued that there are no clear 
hegemonies within the African continent due to their small economies (Francis, 
2006; Hill, 2011; Nathan, 2012). A quick review of AU peace operations in 
Somalia indicates that the mission is spearheaded by poor states. A detailed 
review of the AU mission in Somalia is done in Chapter 7. Hence, while 
hegemonic leadership theory provides an important viewpoint for analysing 
leadership in international peace interventions, it is insufficient to explain how 
leadership within AU peace interventions is conceived. The next section 
therefore, further reviews how power is conceptualised and how this 
understanding of power is reflected in constructive approaches to leadership.  
2.7 Conceptualisation of power and constructivist approaches 
to leadership 
Steven Lukes (1974) defined power from three dimensions: First, power is 
exercised when ‘A’ makes ‘B’ do what ‘B’ would not do otherwise. In this regard, 
there are sanctions or threat of sanctions attached to power relations in a 
hierarchy. This dimension of power relates to the traditional leadership tripod that 
is realist in nature. The second dimension of power concerns the de facto power 
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of the members within a group in the decision-making process. Lukes maintains 
that the rules within any decision-making system naturally bias the mobilisation 
of resources for competing agendas against some individuals and groups in 
favour of others. This dimension of power therefore incorporates not only 
coercion, but also influence, authority, and manipulation. As discussed above, 
this dimension relates to hegemonic leadership theory, where leadership is 
determined by the state economy and a desire to influence others. Notions of 
power and leadership have developed over time, where the distinction is made 
between hard and soft power, as shown above. This distinction reduces the 
conceptual tension between leadership and power (Helms, 2014: 265). Whereas 
hard power relies heavily on the possibility of coercing people, soft power ‘co-
opts people rather than coerces them’ (Nye, 2010c: 307), and its use effectively 
involves a change from power over others to power with others (Nye, 2011, p. 
xvii)11. There is now a broad consensus that, while ‘leadership involves power’, 
‘not all power relationships are instances of leadership’ (Nye, 2010c: 305). It has 
also been well illustrated elsewhere that ‘leadership mobilises; naked power 
coerces’ (Burns, 1978: 439). Helms (2014: 262) observes that over the past 
decades, notions of leadership have become considerably more complex and 
demanding. For example, there is a growing understanding that power and 
leadership are related, but not identical, and that coercion and force are largely 
incompatible with contemporary understandings of leadership (Nye, 2004, 
2008b, 2011; Helms, 2014). Hence, leadership literature demonstrates a further 
development and departure from superior structural position to that of 
cooperation on the basis of values that are promoted. More specifically, 
leadership has been considered to relate to actors seeking change. This 
discussion takes us to the third dimension of power as advanced by Lukes (1974). 
 
In the third dimension, a global or regional organisation or state exercises power 
over another state by influencing, shaping, or determining its wants, beliefs, and 
understandings about the world. This third dimension refers to a process of what 
                                                      
11 In such a relationship, domination and coercion are being replaced by attraction and 
persuasion, see Ludger Helms (2014: 265) 
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is described as discursive hegemony (Nabers, 2008a: 8). It is this third dimension 
of power that predominantly relates to states’ contribution to and participation in 
regional or global peace interventions.  It has been argued elsewhere that power 
in leadership can also be analysed by focusing on discourse (Nabers, 2008b, 
2010; Destradi, 2010). ‘Leadership is mainly a discursive project, relying on 
intersubjective understandings for collective action to become possible’ (Nabers 
2008a: 13). In this case leadership is generated through interactions that produce 
political coalitions for action.  As highlighted by Wiener, international leadership 
should also be studied from a constructivist perspective, independently from the 
possession of material power resources by the leader (Wiener, 1995). More 
generally, there is a consensus that leadership does not imply in a strict sense 
the exercise of power by the leader since the followers’ participation is sometimes 
voluntary and in their own interest (Wiener, 1995; Drath et al., 2008), where 
participation is mostly on a voluntary basis and frequently shaped by states’ 
interests and values. Acceptance, of the leader and the production of leadership 
in this case, will be determined by the leader’s influence, legitimacy and the 
states’ beliefs and shared values and norms (Wendt, 1992; Dunne, 1995a).  
 
Constructive approaches to leadership lie within the third dimension of Lukes’ 
description of power, where institutional legitimacy (which influences the 
production of leadership) has to be internalized in the intersubjective 
understandings of states in a given regional setting (Wendt, 1992, 1994, 1995; 
Dunne, 1995b, 1998). Several studies have discussed the AU legitimacy in 
regional peace interventions (Dompere, 2006; Francis, 2006; Williams, 2008a, 
2008b, 2009a, 2009b; Hill, 2011; Nathan, 2012; Murithi, 2017). This study will 
add more knowledge by investigating the extent to which AU institutional 
legitimacy is viewed by subregional actors and how it influences the production 
of leadership. Additionally, the study investigates the power approaches to 
leadership adopted by the AU in its regional peace interventions. The existence 
of several subregional institutions in peace interventions implies the need to 
understand how leadership in African peace interventions is produced. 
Understanding how collaborations are formed in resolving regional conflicts is 
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vital for the coordination and support of peace efforts. Through this analysis, the 
study will contribute to knowledge of contemporary regional peace interventions 
and how they are led and implemented on the African continent.   
 
Another conceptualisation of power and leadership is provided by Oran Young 
(1991). He defined the concept of leadership in international institutional 
bargaining by examining three forms of leadership: structural, entrepreneurial 
and intellectual. In agreement with others, in structural leadership international 
actors or states translate their relative power capabilities into bargaining leverage 
by making use of material threats and promises ‘… in the form of bargaining 
leverage over the issues at stake in specific interactions’ (Young, 1991: 287-288). 
In entrepreneurial leadership, Young indicates that a leader will be able to act as 
an agenda setter, finding innovative solutions to overcome stalemates, or operate 
as broker to gain support for salient solutions. The emphasis here is to achieve 
mutually acceptable outcomes within actors for the collective good.  Finally, 
intellectual leadership is a reflective process, where the ‘power of ideas shape 
the intellectual capital available to those engaged in institutional bargaining’ 
(Young, 1991: 300). Within the intellectual leader scholarship, the emphasis is on 
the power of ideas to shape the way in which participants in institutional 
bargaining understand the issues at stake and to orient their thinking about 
options available to resolve the issues’ (Young, 1991: 287-288). In identifying 
goals and breaking those goals into manageable pieces, the leadership process 
is driven by particular ideas. Vivian Schmidt argues that ‘actors can gain power 
from their ideas even where they may lack the power of position’ (2010:18). The 
argument of expert knowledge (power of ideas) in producing leadership in 
international politics is increasingly acknowledged in the more recent literature 
on international relations (MacDonald, 2009; Hurrell, and MacDonald, 2012). 
What is apparent in the production of this leadership is the emphasis on the 
interaction of actors that allows the ideas to be shared and accepted by others in 
the collective.  However, what is lacking is an investigation on how ideas are 
shared among actors in regional peace interventions and how these ideas shape 
the regional approach in resolving conflicts within the AU. It is important to 
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understand the value attached to expert knowledge by a collective, in order to 
determine the extent of cooperation and coordination in tackling identified 
security challenges. This study investigates how expert knowledge is shared 
through the division of labour among the AU and subregional actors in 
undertaking peace operations and conflict mediation. The research further 
interrogates how leadership production is shaped by expert knowledge. 
 
Intellectual leadership is, therefore, in agreement with soft power and 
constructivist approaches as values are shared in the interaction that produces 
leadership (Nye (2004, 2006, 2010c). Young’s separation of power from 
leadership implies that international leadership is not only performed by a 
hegemonic state but also by a widely accepted leader through inter-subjectivity, 
and whose decisions are voluntarily accepted by international actors (Wiener, 
1995: 221). Following Nye’s soft power argument and Young’s intellectual leader 
conceptualisation, leadership can also be exercised by regional institutions such 
as the AU even though they lack the qualities of a hegemonic state. On the other 
hand, the processes of producing leadership in Young’s contributions are typified 
in the DAC ontology, since leadership involves the creation of vision (direction), 
defining values, creating strategic reforms (alignment) and motivating actors in 
capitalizing on opportunities and mitigating collective challenges (commitment) 
(Burns, 1977, 1978, 2003; Abshire, 2001a; Zhang et al., 2012). As the DAC 
conceptualisation transcends the traditional leadership, it is understood through 
constructivist epistemologies since the aim is to achieve a common and collective 
good, through the unifying purpose, and facilitated by collective values and 
beliefs of actors involved in a collective (Burns, 1977, 1978, 1998, 2003; Abshire, 
2001b; Zhang et al., 2012). Hence, the constructive approach to leadership 
involves identifying and articulating a vision, sharing it among the group and 
creating a path for realising those goals (Zhang et al., 2012). Using this 
framework, this study will investigate the extent to which the AU and subregional 
partners jointly identify, share and pursue common goals in resolving conflicts on 
the African continent. From this backdrop, the study will shed more light on the 
understanding of leadership in regional peace and security interventions in Africa.   
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Leadership in collective action can also be understood from the global political 
leadership conceptualisation (Beinecke and Spencer, 2007). Global political 
leadership refers to the actions of actors that pursue particular goals and seek to 
mobilise support in favour of these goals among potential participants (Helms, 
2014: 266). These goals may relate to regional approaches in resolving specific 
collective problems like cross border conflicts. In this light, mobilisation efforts by 
regional actors are primarily based on attraction to the goal itself and specific 
strategies of persuasion implemented by the initiators. Constructive approaches 
to leadership, therefore, provide a strong conceptual approach in understanding 
global political leadership. From Helms’ analysis, (other things being equal) the 
chances of accomplishing goals (in this case, mobilising participants to act in a 
specific situation) will be strongly shaped by the ability to identify and exploit 
existing opportunities to act, and by the amount to which potential participants 
perceive the architect's actions and goals as legitimate (Helms, 2014: 266). This 
can also take the form of ‘inclusive leadership’, as leadership ‘on behalf of the 
world’ not just in line with the initiator’s own interests (Bradford and Lim, 2011, 5-
9). While a realist theoretical perspective can also explain the global political 
leadership approach, there are two different leadership outcomes produced. The 
hegemonic approach aims to realise the leader’s own self-interested goals by 
presenting them as common to those of subordinate states, while the constructive 
approach focuses on internalising those goals among the collective as their own 
in order to realise or facilitate their common objectives (Destradi, 2010: 921). The 
interaction within the constructive approach then produces DAC among the group 
of participants.  In this instance, members interact, communicate and negotiate 
to realise the shared goals. The study will analyse how goals are set (peace 
missions and their expected goals), how participants are mobilised to act for 
certain goals, what values and motivations (of participants) are attached to the 
goals and how those goals are achieved. 
2.8 Conclusion 
In conclusion, this chapter has explored several approaches to leadership from 
both realist and constructivist perspectives. The emphasis throughout this 
chapter has been on how leadership is produced in each school of thought. The 
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constructive forms of leadership proposed by (Burns, 1978; Young, 1991; Wendt, 
1992; Dunne, 1995a; Wiener, 1995; Zhang et al., 2012; Abshire, 2001a; 
Keohane, 2010; Nabers, 2010; Helms, 2014) and the idea of ‘soft power’ 
developed by Nye (2004, 2008b, 2011) formulate the backbone of discussion in 
this study and provide supportive frameworks for analysing leadership within the 
AU.  
 
The chapter has also provided two ontologies that are used to conceptualise 
leadership. The traditional leadership approach provides a hierarchy of a leader 
and follower that is defined by directional influence. On the other hand, the DAC 
theoretical approach to leadership provides for shared leadership, where 
environmental factors to leadership production are more pronounced than the 
leader-follower dyad. It is shown in the chapter that regional leadership is a 
discursive project based on interaction and socialisation of international actors 
(which are usually states) with the aim of creating shared or collective goals.  
From this theoretical backdrop, this study will examine how this directional 
influence occurs in AU peace interventions. The key assumption here is that there 
exist leaders and followers (or leader and follower roles) in AU peace and security 
architecture, and leadership is produced through the interaction of the AU as a 
leader and subregional actors as followers. On the other hand, a further analysis 
of leadership scholarship indicates that the field has increasingly undergone new 
theoretical developments that have rendered the tripod understanding insufficient 
in conceptualising leadership. It is argued that while the leader-follower 
dichotomy is important in understanding leadership, it is too simplistic and 
‘prescribes, rather than describes, a division of labour’ that exists in leadership 
production (Gronn, 2002: 428; Bennis, 2007). It is also noted that other important 
variables in leadership theory, such as context and relational factors, are 
significant but remain outside the leader-follower dyad framework (Crevani et al., 
2007).  In this light, the study will further examine how the DAC theoretical 
approach to leadership is reflected within the AU peace and security leadership. 
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The study will also examine how African regional actors in peace and security 
link their own interests to those of the AU in creating a regional response to 
conflicts. In order to do this, the next chapter provides a review of regionalisation 
theories that relate to peace interventions. The chapter goes further to analyse 
dominating theories that explain the motivations towards peace interventions. 
Specifically, the chapter pays attention to liberal and cosmopolitan peacekeeping 
theories in regional peace interventions and contributes to contemporary debates 
regarding the role of regional and subregional organisations in international 
conflict resolution. The next chapter, therefore, broadens the contemporary 
understanding of peace and conflict on the African continent and contributes to 
policy debates over strategic interventions in regionalised peace interventions. In 
this study, both leadership and regionalisation are connected to collective action 
in peace and security. 
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The chapter will first define terms used in peace interventions, and then move to 
review debates in the regionalisation of peace and security. It will assess the 
motivations for regional peace frameworks and how they have developed over 
time in Africa. The use of regional organisations and regional cooperation has 
become an increasingly important phenomenon on the African peace and 
security agenda for the past 40 years and requires further research (Hill, 2011). 
The literature review will also pay attention to liberal and cosmopolitan 
peacekeeping theories, which both posit that organisations coordinate and take 
a degree of leadership in peace interventions. This review is done to identify gaps 
in the literature and formulate the basis for the study. Following this analysis, the 
study will review the UN-AU relationship as a basis for interrogating the AU 
relationship with subregional actors. Peace interventions have mostly been 
tackled from a global perspective where the UN through the UN Security Council 
has provided the hierarchical leadership. The review of the UN-AU relationship, 
therefore, provides a significant foundation for understanding AU regional 
perspectives in peace interventions. This chapter will therefore provide a relevant 
framework for analysing the African regionalisation of peace and the extent to 
which African peace interventions are motivated by liberal and cosmopolitan 
peacekeeping thinking. The next section provides the definition of terms used in 
the study. 
 
3.1 Definition of terms and evolution of peacekeeping  
This section defines relevant concepts in peace interventions and regionalism 
used in this study. In particular it examines the conceptual framework of conflict 
mediation, peace operations, peacekeeping and peace building. It is 
acknowledged that the conceptual understanding of the terms used is wide and 
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diverse. The definitions are therefore, narrowed to describe their meaning in this 
study. 
 
3.1.1 Conflict Mediation 
Scholars have defined conflict mediation as a process of conflict management, 
that involves a third party in influencing conflicting parties to change their 
perception or behaviour without resorting to physical force, or invoking the 
authority of the law (Bercovitch, and Gartner, 2009: 6). This study uses the 
mediation definition provided by Bercovitch, and Gartner (2009).  It is important 
to note that there is no single definition of mediation and the term is defined 
differently by scholars from different academic backgrounds. However, there is a 
consensus in the literature that mediation is a form of joint decision-making in 
which a third party has some influence on the process of conflict settlement; and 
there is a system of exchange and social influence; i.e. communication, 
expectations and interests (Folberg and Taylor, 1984 Augsburger, 1992; 
Bercovitch, 2009; Kleiboer, 1996; Bercovitch and Gartner, 2009; Eisenkopf and 
Bächtiger, 2013; Jones, 2013; Moore, 2014). In this light, mediation is a problem-
solving approach without the use of force that is shaped and influenced by the 
interaction of a wide range of dimensions, such as mediators, and the general 
environment, such as the context of dispute and nature of conflicting parties. 
While a third party plays a significant role in influencing the behaviour of the 
parties, the outcome is ultimately decided by the disputants (Moore, 1986). The 
topic of mediation is wide and diverse; hence, this study does not engage itself 
in the content and analysis of mediation within the AU but asks questions on how 
mediators (AU and SADC) initiate mediation and what considerations influence 
this process; and how mediators relate to each other and interact with conflicting 
parties. These questions are specifically answered in relation to AU joint 
mediation with SADC in Madagascar. 
 
3.1.2 Peace operations, peacekeeping and peace building 
The term ‘peace operation’ is more practical than theoretical and is not covered 
in the United Nations Charter. It encompasses peacekeeping, peace building and 
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peace enforcement. There are broader ranges of practice covering these terms 
that bring some ambiguity to their definition. This study will utilise the UN 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) conceptualisation, which 
defines Peacekeeping as the use of military, police and civilian personnel to lay 
the foundations of sustainable peace; Peace enforcement as the use of military 
and other measures to enforce the will of the UN Security Council; and Peace 
building as measures aimed at transforming relationships and structures in 
society to reduce future conflicts (UN, 1992; Boutros-Ghali, 1992; Bellamy, 2009; 
Bellamy et al., 2010; Zelizer, 2013). William Durch (2006: xvii) defined peace 
operations as ‘internationally authorised, multilateral, civil-military efforts to 
promote and protect… transitions from war to peace’. This definition is in 
agreement with Bellamy et al. (2010: 18) who view peace operations as the use 
of uniformed personnel (police and/or military) with or without UN authorisation, 
with a mandate to; 
1. Assist in the prevention of the armed conflict by supporting a peace 
process; 
2. Serve as an instrument to observe or assist in the implementation of 
ceasefires or peace agreements; or 
3. Enforce ceasefires, peace agreements or the will of the UN Security 
Council in order to build peace.  
Peace operations are generally used to prevent, limit and manage violent 
conflicts and combine military force and the civilian component in order to 
effectively reach out to local societies and achieve stable peace. Hence, the 
major element in peace operations is the deployment and use of the military in 
order to provide public security to citizens in host countries. There is emphasis 
on robustness of the military component for the protection of civilians to be 
achieved (Williams, 2009b; Curran et al., 2015).   
 
According to the UN, peace building is a more ‘complex, long-term process aimed 
at creating necessary conditions for positive and sustainable peace by 
addressing the deep rooted structural causes of violent conflict in a 
comprehensive manner’ (UNDPKO, 2008: 18). Peace building measures address 
  42 
core issues that affect the functioning of society and state. Former UN Secretary 
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali defined peace building as ‘action to identify and 
support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to 
avoid a relapse into conflict’ (UN, 1992: 11). Other scholars have defined it as 
measures taken to prevent the recurrence of violence and all efforts employed to 
transform the underlying structural, cultural, and relational roots of violent conflict 
(Lederach, 1997; Zelizer, 2013). Hence, peace building involves a wide range of 
international and national actors, such as civil society and governmental actors. 
It also involves sets of processes and tools to transform the relationships, culture, 
and institutions of society in order to prevent, end and transform conflicts 
(Imboden, 2012; Zelizer and Oliphant, 2013: 8; Hatto, 2013). In general, peace 
building focuses on transforming relationships and structures in society to 
decrease the likelihood of future conflicts, while peacekeeping and peace 
operations involve the deployment of the military and civilian components to 
support the implementation of a ceasefire, where peace agreements exist or to 
enforce peace where there is no peace to keep. 
 
3.1.3 Evolution of peacekeeping 
Peacekeeping foundational standards and rules have generally been established 
on three aspects that include: consent of all parties to conflict; strict neutrality of 
peacekeeping forces; and prohibition of the use of force, except in self-defence 
(which has later been modified to cover defence of the mandate) (MacQueen, 
2006; Bellamy et al., 2010). These standards reflect the first-generation 
peacekeeping12 where ceasefire is already in place and peacekeepers’ 
responsibility is to observe the adherence of the ceasefire agreements. The UN 
peacekeeping has emphasised consent of the host party, based on the principle 
of sovereignty of all UN member states. However, as discussed later in the 
chapter, the UN has made some modifications to consent, especially where 
consent cannot be granted by all parties in the conflict. Neutrality of 
peacekeeping forces entails peacekeepers remaining neutral in their conduct and 
does not actively support, protect or favour one party over another in the conflict 
                                                      
12 The first-generation peacekeeping covered the period between 1956-1987 
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area. This neutrality, however, must make a positive contribution to peace for the 
mandate to be effective and not indicate inaction (Thakur, 2006). Non-use of 
force, except in self-defence, has been one of the most challenging practices of 
peacekeeping, especially when peace enforcement is added to the mandate 
(Williams, 2009b). However, this limitation has at times been modified to include 
the defence of the mandate as demonstrated by UN Security Council Resolution 
2098 of 2013 for the UN intervention brigade in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(UN, 2013). 
 
The second-generation peacekeeping13 brought in more complex conflict 
dynamics where peacekeepers were more active and were deployed in situations 
where there was no peace to keep. This, therefore, gave peacekeepers the 
mandate to create conditions for peace, including early peace building activities 
after the conflict (De Carvalho and Ettang, 2011; Fraser 2015: 60-1). 
Contemporary peacekeeping14 has brought in even more complex roles of 
peacekeepers that include peace enforcement, where peacekeepers are actively 
involved in direct combat with belligerents in the protection of the mandate and 
of civilians (UN, 2013). This evolution of peacekeeping has mainly been 
developed on an ad hoc basis depending on the dynamics and nature of the 
conflict. Trudy Fraser indicates that ‘the problem with this developmental model 
is that best practices have not proven to be unilaterally transferable, nor does 
each specific peacekeeping mandate fit neatly into the prescribed rules of law for 
decision making and implementation’ (2015: 61). In this light, there is a problem 
of predictability of peacekeeping practices. What makes it even more complex is 
that peacekeeping has evolved from global to regional and subregional levels. 
Although peacekeeping has developed over time and in different conditions, the 
standards and rules for peacekeeping practice have remained the same, focusing 
on the same assumptions of consent, neutrality and non-use of force. At this 
point, it is important to note that AU peace operations (regional peace operations) 
have been conducted in situations where there is no consent from all parties to 
                                                      
13 The second-generation peacekeeping covered the period between 1987-1993. 
14 This is from1993-present (i.e. 2016). 
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conflict and no peace to keep (Francis, 2006; Williams, 2009b). The departure of 
AU peace operations coupled with the lack of predictability of peacekeeping 
practices necessitates the need to understand how regional peace operations are 
conducted. Significant literature on AU peace operations has paid attention to the 
key issue of resources (financial and logistical); however, the analysis on what 
leadership looks like in AU peace interventions is missing. This research will 
make contributions in this area of regional peace interventions.  
 
3.1.4 Region and regionalism and regional integration defined  
The central question of what constitutes a region has been examined by several 
scholars (Hettne, 1996a, 2006b; Väyrynen, 1997a; Tarling, 2006; Wunderlich, 
2008; Söderbaum, 2009; Fawcett, 2016). Some scholars indicate that regions are 
units or ‘zones’ based on groups, states or territories, whose members share 
some identifiable traits (Väyrynen, 1997a; Fawcett, 2016).  The distinguishing 
characters of a regional zone are in terms of size and nature, in that they are 
larger than a single state and can exist as a temporary or permanent organisation 
(Fawcett, 2016). Others indicate that regions can be identified by cultural, 
linguistic, economic or political ties (Mansfield and Milner, 1999: 591; Mattli and 
Stone, 2012). Wunderlich (2008: 49), in summarising Björn Hettne (1996b), adds 
that regions can emerge as collective or international actors in their own right with 
a distinct identity, actor capabilities, and a certain degree of legitimacy and 
decision-making structures.  
 
There is a consensus in the literature that regions are not permanent fixtures of 
international relations but historical, cultural, political and economic structures, 
which change in form and function over time (Ravenhill, 1995; Väyrynen, 1997b; 
Hettne, 2005; Söderbaum, 2009; Fawcett, 2016). This implies that regional 
boundaries are always fluid and arbitrary (Väyrynen, 1997a: 6). A growing 
number of scholars acknowledge that ‘there are no natural or scientific regions’ 
but that ‘all regions are socially constructed and hence politically contested’ 
(Söderbaum, 2009: 479). Regions are first and foremost imagined constructs 
depending on social, economic and political interaction of the actors involved in 
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the regionalisation processes (Hettne, 2005: 544). They evolve in particular 
economic and socio-political contexts (Ravenhill, 1995: 181, Söderbaum, 2005: 
91). The definition of what constitutes a region is, therefore, to a large extent self-
determined by the external and internal public, private actors, and participants 
involved in regionalism and regionalisation (Allison 2008; Wunderlich, 2008: 49). 
There is an understanding that regions are a construction of human action 
through the lens of cultural identity, shared values and norms (Bressand and 
Nicolaidis, 1990). Hence, they can be constructed or deconstructed, intentionally 
or non-intentionally in the process of global transformation (Tarling, 2006:12). 
The construction of regional institutions is, therefore, a result of interactions 
among states and is shaped by their norms and values. Constructivist theoretical 
approaches indicate the importance of cognitive and ideational factors in 
regionalism and these approaches are discussed later in this section. 
 
Regionalism has been described as ‘a conscious awareness of shared 
commonalities and the will to create institutions and processes to act upon those 
commonalities’ (Evans, 1996: 11; Park, 2006). It is a deliberate effort by states in 
a given region to improve their conditions, solve common problems, or project 
influence beyond the region (Evans, 1995; Emmerson, 2009a: 3). Regionalism is 
formal and managed by governments and other state-sponsored actors with an 
aim of achieving regional order (Schulz, Söderbaum and Öjendal, 2001: 5; 
Wunderlich, 2008: 4). Wunderlich (2008) points out that the theories of 
regionalism originated from the need to find theoretical explanations for the 
development of regional integration and solutions to the security dilemma arising 
out of the condition of international anarchy (the absence of a supreme authority 
above the state level). Zajontz and Leysens (2015: 302) introduced the concept 
of ‘developing regionalism’ to highlight the evolutionary nature of regionalism in 
social and structural terms. This points to the departure of a narrow definition of 
regionalism in terms of economic growth, but also to include other forms of 
regional development paradigms, such as security cooperation and collective 
conflict management. It has been highlighted above that common threats are 
some motivating factors that bring states together to resolve common problems.  
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Regionalism and regionalisation have at times been used interchangeably to 
mean the same thing although other scholars have defined them differently.  For 
instance, some have defined regionalisation as the informal processes that result 
from forms of co-operation, integration, connectivity and convergence within a 
particular cross-national territorial area (Bressand and Nicolaidis, 1990; Hettne 
and Söderbaum, 2000: 458; Park, 2006). This definition focuses on the informal 
nature of cooperation and excludes other actors such as states or governments 
in regionalisation. Another study has defined regionalisation as a process (formal 
or informal) of adapting norms, policy making process, structures and identity to 
both align with and shape a new collective set of norms, priorities and interests 
at the regional level (Warleigh-Lack, 2007: 51). The second definition is broader 
and represents an intentional process of political, security or economic 
cooperation based on some commonalities of objectives among states in a given 
region (Hettne and Söderbaum, 1998, 2003; Heng, 2014). This study uses the 
second definition of regionalisation which refers to the process of integration in 
the search for manageable solutions to common problems by states and regional 
organisations (Wunderlich, 2008: 24; Heng, 2014). Philomena Murray observes 
that regionalism constitutes attempts within historical time-frames to move 
towards interstate cooperation and even beyond national sovereignty (Murray, 
2010: 611). For instance, Murray points out that East Asian regionalism is a 
framework based on open economic regionalism, normative priors and security 
imperatives. Normative priors are defined by Acharya (2009: 4) as existing local 
beliefs and practices that determine how external norms are incorporated. In this 
instance, the Asian regionalism is dominated by political imperatives in managing 
their own intra-regional conflicts, and accelerating economic growth, social 
progress and cultural development (Murray, 2010: 611). This study will assess 
the motivations leading to African regionalisation of peace and security. It will 
examine the extent to which African regionalisation facilitates leadership 
production and collective action. 
 
Regional integration is linked to regionalism and is a process of forming 
institutions and creating a new polity by bringing together a number of different 
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constituent parts (Christiansen, 2001). Other scholars observe that regional 
integration is a strategy of small and medium-sized states to survive in an ever-
changing external environment (Milward, 1992; Shaw and Söderbaum, 2003; 
Söderbaum, 2009). As rightly observed by others, globalisation and the related 
increase in transnational activities (resulting in security interdependencies) imply 
that contemporary problems faced by states have extra-territorial dimensions that 
require common solutions (Wunderlich, 2008: 44-46). In this context, regional 
cooperation provides one possibility of adapting the nation-state to an 
increasingly interdependent and globalised world. Such adaptation and 
interdependence is projected through state and regional policies. This study will 
investigate the extent to which AU and SADC peace and security policies are 
harmonised to promote clear leadership in peace interventions and how the two 
organisations interact with each other to complement a common approach to 
security challenges. The next section provides the theoretical approaches to 
regional cooperation and regionalisation of peace and security.  
 
3.2 Theoretical approaches to regionalism  
The theoretical debate in explaining regionalism has always revolved around 
supranational and intergovernmental approaches (Crombez, 1996; Hooghe, 
1999; Tsebelis and Garrett, 2001; Schimmelfennig and Rittberger, 2006). As 
earlier indicated, this research will not engage in the debate between 
intergovernmentalism and supranationalism but will use their central tenets to 
form a framework for the study. Supranational approaches aim at restraining 
sovereignty of national states by establishing institutions and decision-making 
bodies that supersede and override the sovereign authority of the national states. 
On the other hand, intergovernmental approaches emphasise the centrality of 
sovereignty and the national state within the context of international and regional 
cooperation. There is a consensus in the literature that supranationalism is non-
existent in African regionalism (Francis, 2006; Murithi, 2008, 2017; Williams, 
2008a, 2008b; Nathan, 2012; Olivier, 2010. In this light, the theoretical 
approaches discussed in this section are mainly intergovernmentalist in nature. 
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State-centric theories and intergovernmental approaches to regionalism share 
the centrality of the nation-state as the primary subject of analysis (Wunderlich, 
2008: 16; Fabbrini, 2013). In this regard, sovereignty is the central theme of 
national states. According to Wunderlich, sovereignty is a twofold concept with 
an external and an internal dimension. A state as a ‘sovereign’ does not recognise 
an external superior, nor does it accept an internal equal. Thus, sovereignty gives 
state control a legitimate basis. ‘At the bottom line, sovereignty is a right, a 
socially recognized capacity to decide matters within a state’s jurisdiction’ 
(Caporaso, 1996: 35).  States also control exclusively the use of external 
violence, and sovereign states have to recognise each other and their territories. 
States are often depicted as unitary, sovereign and rational actors following 
certain national interests, although such approaches have been criticised as too 
simplistic (Moravcsik, 1999; Wunderlich, 2008). Due to the assumed lack of 
hierarchy (because of sovereignty) among states, international relations literature 
has explored ways of cooperation in the international system of states from both 
a realist and constructivist perspective. A review of realist and constructivist 
approaches is important in order to examine AU leadership and subregional 
cooperation in peace interventions. Below is an overview of both schools of 
thought. 
 
3.2.1 Anarchy and order in the international system 
The question of anarchy and order has been attempted by many in international 
relations scholarship (Morgenthau, 1948; Waltz, 1979; Wendt, 1992; Dunne, 
1995a, 1995b). There is a consensus, however, that potentially mutual benefits 
and gains provide the binding element necessary for inter-state and regional 
cooperation. Realism and neorealism focus mainly on security-related forms of 
regionalism, where cooperation is aimed at enhancing states’ relative security 
(Waltz, 1979; Mattli, 1999a, 1999b; Kim, 2014). The dominant position of the 
hegemonic power imposes a clear hierarchy and leadership in the provision of 
security (Gilpin, 1981). Hence, regionalism and regional security, for realists, is 
considered within the context of material possession, geopolitics and national 
interests (Mearsheimer, 2001). The emergence of alliances and other forms of 
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cooperation has been argued as a means of improving security and ensuring 
state survival (Mattli, 1999a, 1999b; Wunderlich, 2008; Kim, 2014). The resulting 
balancing behaviour among states from this perspective is bound up with the 
distribution of the relative capabilities of each participant in the international 
system. Wunderlich and others observe that regional cooperation, 
conceptualised in such a manner, is hardly anything more than the 
institutionalisation of an alliance against a common threat or against the 
hegemonic sphere of interest of a great power (Fry, O’Hagan and Tayeb, 2000: 
129; Wunderlich, 2008: 19). Although realists’ perspectives of regional security 
and cooperation provide a significant basis for understanding the process of 
regionalisation, it is insufficient to explain the regional cooperation in regions that 
lack hegemons. Additionally, the realist approach attaches cooperation to 
national security interest, and therefore fails to explain social factors that develop 
due to interaction or socialisation of states in the international system. As pointed 
out earlier, this study will not provide a detailed analysis of international relations 
theories but will use their basic tenets to understand how cooperation of states is 
attained. This is done to provide a framework of analysis for the study of AU 
regional interventions. Constructivist theories in international relations provide the 
social as well as the power perspective for understanding the process of 
regionalisation. The next section reviews some constructivist approaches in the 
collective action of states. 
 
3.2.2 Conceptualisation of International Society  
International Society is a central concept within the English School understanding 
of international relations (Buzan, 1993; Dunne, 1998; Buzan and Little, 2002; 
Barnett and Duvall, 2004; Linklater and Suganami, 2006; Brown and Ainley, 
2009; Adler, 2013). Its basic idea is that just as individuals live in human society, 
states live in an international society of states which they shape and are shaped 
by. This concept is mainly approached with constructivist epistemologies. A 
society of states is characterised by common interests and common values that 
form a common set of rules in their relations with one another (Bull, 1995; Bull, 
and Watson, 1984: 1). However, Hollis and Smith argue that ‘there is no single 
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international society, if by society one means an integrated grouping with a 
common identity and a common way of seeing the world’ (1990:95). Bull’s 
position was that international society can exist in the absence of linguistic, 
cultural or religious agreements. English School writers argue that international 
society can be multi-domination and include states that have radically different 
cultures and philosophies of government. In their view, the central task of 
diplomacy is to promote understanding and discover common ground between 
societies that are wedded to different cultures and prone to misunderstand each 
other’s aspirations and intentions (Linklater, 2009: 94). Bull’s overview of 
international society provides a holistic understanding of international relations 
that drive international order. Bull argues that states are usually committed to 
limiting the use of force, ensuring respect for property and preserving trust in their 
relations with one another as independent political communities (1995). Those 
shared interests in maintaining international order – rather than any common 
culture or way of life – are the ultimate foundations of international society 
(Linklater, 2009: 92-3). Bull differentiated international society as a ‘system of 
states’ (or international system), which he argued, is formed by continuous 
interaction among states that influence their decision-making processes and 
behaviour, but the degree of integration is less than in international society 
(1995). International society is also viewed as the institutionalisation of shared 
interest and identity amongst states, leading to the creation of shared norms, 
rules and institutions (Buzan, 2004: xvii). The central debate within international 
society is on the degree of integration and cooperation between pluralists and 
solidarists. 
 
Pluralism according to Buzan defines second-order societies of states with a 
relatively low degree of shared norms, rules and institutions amongst the states. 
In this regard, the focus of society is on creating a framework for orderly 
coexistence and management of collective problems of a common fate (Buzan, 
2004). On the other hand, solidarism defines international societies with a 
relatively high degree of shared norms, rules and institutions among states, 
where the focus is not only on ordering coexistence, but also on cooperation over 
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a wider range of issues, whether in pursuit of joint gains, for instance trade, or 
realisation of shared values, such as human rights (Buzan, 2004: xviii; Linklater, 
2009). Pluralists argue for non-intervention and sovereignty for order to be 
sustained in international relations, while solidarists are progressive in that they 
believe that international society can develop wide-ranging norms, rules and 
institutions, covering both coexistence and cooperation in pursuit of shared 
interests, including some scope for collective enforcement (Buzan, 2004: 8; 
Linklater and Suganami, 2006).  
 
Nicholas Wheeler using humanitarian interventions and building on a solidarist 
version of international society argues that the growing intrusion of humanitarian 
norms in post-cold war and cosmopolitan moral awareness demands that we 
respond where practicable to what he calls ‘supreme humanitarian emergencies’ 
(2000: 238). Pluralist international society theory, however, rejects humanitarian 
intervention as a violation of the cardinal rules of sovereignty, non-intervention, 
and non-use of force (Wheeler, 2000: 11). The evolution and diversity of 
international society conceptualisation attempts to address the concerns of 
whether societies of states can develop the protection of civilians through peace 
interventions. Solidarism envisions states in international society coming together 
to enforce human rights laws.  This conception of international society recognises 
that individuals have rights and duties in international law, but it also 
acknowledges that individuals can have these rights enforced only by states 
(Wheeler, 2000: 11). It is acknowledged that states have different and often 
conflicting ideas about protection of civilians; however, some human rights 
violations are so immense that states have to consider setting aside sovereignty 
and intervene in each other’s internal affairs (Linklater, 2009: 98). The prevailing 
debates within the English School and concept of international society are diverse 
and beyond the scope of this study. However, there are links in international 
society approaches to regionalism that are relevant to this study. 
 
3.2.3 Constructivist approaches to regionalism 
In international society, states are always in the process of creating their own 
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primary rules, as well as secondary rules that govern their creation, interpretation 
and enforcement (Linklater and Suganami, 2006). What is central in this concept 
of international society is that states interact with each other and create norms 
and values that are not driven by material possession. In other words, states will 
agree to create a condition of order that is translated to common action in dealing 
with common problems such as cross border conflicts (Hurrell, 2007; Emmerson, 
2009b; Diehl, 2014). International society is, therefore, approached with 
constructivist epistemologies (Dunne, 1995a; Reus-Smit, 1999, 2000, 2009; 
Linklater, 2009). The interaction between international society and 
constructivism, explains how states cooperate in anarchy (Dunne, 1995a, 
1995b). This relationship between international society and constructivism 
provides understanding of international order and fills the gap left by other 
theories in international relations such as realism. International society is mainly 
close to the constructivists’ argument in that the interests of states must always 
be considered in conjunction with the moral and legal principles of international 
society (Linklater and Suganami, 2006). Wheeler observes that ‘states follow 
their interests, but the way they define these interests is shaped by the rules 
prevailing in the society of states’ (2000: 24). Wheeler here emphasises that rules 
of international society enable and constrain state actions. Constructivists argue 
that states can be social agents participating in ‘games’ with unqualified 
acceptance of the appropriate set of conventional assumptions (Dunne 1995a: 
377). In this light, the constructivist approach provides another building block for 
the analysis of regionalism. Social constructivism ‘provides a theoretically rich 
and promising way of conceptualising the interaction between material 
incentives, intersubjective structures, and the identity and interests of the actors’ 
(Hurrell, 1995: 72).
 
Instead of focusing solely on material incentives, 
constructivists emphasise the importance of shared knowledge, learning, 
ideational forces and normative and institutional structures. It is argued that 
belonging to a particular grouping may in time redefine national interests and 
geostrategic preferences (Wendt, 1994; Dunne, 1995a). The international and 
regional systems are seen as socio-political constructions driven by collective 
interactions, emerging from social, political, economic and strategic interactions 
  53 
(Wunderlich, 2008).  
 
Within the constructivist school national-states’ interests emerge and change in 
the regionalisation process where actors may not only pursue material objectives 
but also group goals. Constructivism generally rejects rational theory arguments 
that regionalisation processes and international cooperation are determined by 
strategic interests and relative gains and losses of states (Waltz, 1979; Gilpin, 
1981). ‘Cooperation relies not only on reason (as the term rationalists implies) 
but on the consensus established by the customs of state practice’ (Dunne 
1995b: 135). The interaction between international society and constructivism 
provides a different and plausible explanation in understanding the evolution of 
cooperation in other regions of the world, such as Africa, where trade or human 
rights have not been the major source of integration. Constructivists argue that 
interests and preferences of states are determined through processes of 
interaction and are socially constructed (Fierke, 2006). This indicates that 
conditions such as anarchy and security dilemma situations are not inevitable but 
are socially constructed and, therefore, can be de-constructed (Wendt, 1992, 
1994, 1995). Through socialisation, member states coordinate their national 
policies to find a solution to common regional problems.  
 
From this background, this research will investigate the extent to which states’ 
interactions through subregional frameworks cooperate and construct leadership 
in peace interventions. Social constructivism grants explanatory power to non-
material factors such as identities, norms and principles that allow states to 
cooperate in collective action. Little research has shown the roles of African 
subregional actors in peace interventions (Williams, 2009b; Cawthra, 2010; 
Ancas, 2011; Gelot, 2012).  Indeed, there is little literature on how central tenets 
of international society produce and shape leadership of peace interventions 
within the AU. The extent to which AU leadership norms and beliefs shape the 
behaviour of states and orient them towards collective action is still missing in the 
literature (Hettne and Söderbaum, 2000). Norms and identities are also argued 
to shape the awareness and acceptance of certain objectives and a sense of 
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belonging (Wendt, 1994; Fierke, 2006). In this light, this research asks the 
following question: To what extent do the leadership norms and beliefs of the AU 
shape the conduct of peace interventions and influence the production of 
leadership among African peace and security actors (AU and subregional 
actors)? Leadership identities that are shaped in the process of interaction and 
intersubjective understanding constitute the crucial link that connects the 
structure of the international or regional environments, interests of various actors, 
and formation of policies (Hettne, and Söderbaum, 2000; Sweeney, 2005; 
Wunderlich, 2008). Hettne and Söderbaum (2002: 33), stress the necessity for a 
wider framework for the analysis and understanding of regions and regional 
processes, beyond political and economic factors but also socio-cultural aspects. 
This study will contribute to this knowledge through the regional leadership 
analysis of AU peace interventions.  
 
3.2.4 Intergovernmentalism  
Intergovernmentalism provides another building block for the analysis of 
regionalism. As in international society, within intergovernmental approaches, 
states are the main actors in the international system. International institutions 
provide a common framework for cooperation that reduces uncertainty and 
minimises transaction costs (Moravcsik, 1994; Emmerson and Walter, 2008; 
Fawn, 2009; Burchill et al., 2013). Within the intergovernmental scholarship, the 
regional bodies or institutions provide a platform for interstate bargaining. Policy 
making is made through negotiation among member states or through carefully 
circumscribed delegations or authority (Pierson, 1996).   Theoretical debates 
within this perspective have dealt with questions of states’ influence on collective 
decision making (Moravcsik, 1991; Ferguson, 2003). Within the liberal 
intergovernmentalism scholarship, states define their underlying preferences and 
negotiate with other states to create appropriate international institutions for 
collective action and fulfilment of their goals (Kim, 2014). The key claim within 
liberal intergovernmentalism is that the main driving force of regional integration 
is the international economic interdependence, rather than geopolitical goals, 
security concerns, or the ideological visions of politicians (Moravcsik, 1993, 1995; 
  55 
Wincott, 1995; Tatham, 2011). However, in some cases integration is driven more 
by political reasons than economic interests. Beeson points out, that regionalism 
is not just a functional response to intra-regional economic developments but ‘an 
essentially political process informed by multidimensional economic and strategic 
factors’ (2005: 970). In agreement with Beeson, Kim indicates that states pursue 
regional integration as a way of enhancing both their regime security and their 
bargaining position against major economic powers in the world (2014: 389). The 
central point here is that a common interest among states drives integration 
among states. The emphasis on the central role of the state in integration 
provides powerful lens through which we can explain the integration process 
elsewhere. Integration outcomes constrain, and control collective action 
problems associated with rational choices to enhance the credibility and 
commitments to international institutions (Moravcsik, 1991, 1998; Beeson 2005). 
Intergovernmentalism provides another analytical framework through which we 
can assess African regionalism and peace interventions. It is observed that 
African regional integration is still work in progress (Nathan, 2012, 2013; Olivier, 
2010). However, African leaders seem to agree that conducting regional peace 
interventions is a common goal. What is unclear in this instance is how they 
cooperate under the AU framework in the conduct of peace operations and joint 
conflict mediations. This research is therefore undertaken to interrogate how 
cooperation and collaboration is achieved among AU and subregional actors, 
thereby providing more insights on leadership. 
3.2.5 Security governance 
The security governance approach provides the last building block for the 
analysis of regionalism in this study. Governance consists of rule systems, 
through which authority is exercised and accepted as legitimate by the governed 
(Rhodes, 1996; Dean, 2007; Miller and Rose, 2017). Global and regional 
governance can, therefore, be understood as a loose framework of global and 
regional regulation, in both institutional and normative domains (Wunderlich, 
2008; Norheim-Martinsen, 2010). A central question is: How is governance 
carried out within international settings? Network analysis provides a framework 
for interaction upon which governance is facilitated (Breslin et al., 2003; 
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Rosamond, 2005). Other scholars indicate that network approaches see a 
network as a set of relatively stable relationships which are non-hierarchical and 
interdependent, linking a variety of actors who share common interests and 
acknowledge that co-operation is the best way to achieve those common goals 
(Börzel, 1997). Transnational linkages and networks play a critical role in both 
formal and informal integration (Bressand and Nicolaïdis, 1990). Norheim-
Martinsen (2010) provides a comprehensive summary of security governance as 
advanced by Webber et al. (2004). Security governance in this case consists of 
five features, which are: (a) heterarchy, or the existence of multiple centres of 
power; (b) the interaction of multiple actors, both public and private; (c) formal 
and informal institutionalisation; (d) relations between actors that are ideational 
in character; and (e) a collective purpose (Webber et al., 2004: 4–8). 
  
Heterarchy15, as the first feature of security governance, ‘reflects the central 
proposition in the governance literature that the hierarchical mode of policy-
making associated with government must be supplanted by an understanding of 
how actors other than government … take part in increasingly complex and 
decentralised policy-making processes’ (Norheim-Martinsen, 2010: 1353). In this 
instance, the provision of security has become less hierarchical, partly due to new 
roles adopted by regional organisations. However, the role of states is still vital in 
security governance. Secondly, the provision of security involves multiple actors, 
hence, the interaction of multiple actors beyond the state, for example, the 
growing involvement of the military, aid workers, police officers, and private 
contractors in post-conflict reconstruction (Norheim-Martinsen, 2010: 1354). 
Thirdly, the interactions in institutionalised settings provide a socialisation and 
networking context that allows actors to develop shared ideas and a common 
understanding of what the organisation’s purpose and legitimate scope of action 
is, which is then sustained and enforced as they develop an allegiance to the 
institution and the cause. Finally, Norheim-Martinsen indicates that the central 
                                                      
15 The growth of multiple centres of power and co-ordinated actions taken in response to 
common and increasingly complex security challenges, cited in Norheim-Martinsen, 2010: 1353 
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message conveyed in the security governance literature is that institutions act as 
socialising agents. Not merely as arenas for coordinated action, suggesting that 
there exist certain collectively held ideas and norms that structure the relations 
between the actors involved whenever they interact in institutionalised settings 
(Norheim-Martinsen, 2010:1357). Such ideas are interpreted and reproduced by 
international institutions, which, in turn, project them as appropriate norms of 
legitimate behaviour (Risse-Kappen, 1994; Desch, 1998; Parsons, 2002). The 
conceptualisation of security governance based on socialisation, internalization 
of norms and interaction, allows regional peace and security to be studied and 
understood using constructivist approaches. On the other hand, due to the 
presence and active role played by the states, security governance 
acknowledges the notions of power and influence associated with realist 
approaches to security cooperation in the international system. This study utilises 
the security governance framework to examine networking, coordination and 
cooperation that exist in African peace interventions. 
3.3 Motivations for regional peace operations and conflict 
mediations 
The study of peace operations has mainly been focused on state level analysis. 
However, several scholars indicate that regional level analysis can help explain 
how states in given regions reach shared understandings about their role in 
peace operations, which may be different from other regions (Katzenstein, 2000; 
Tavares, 2008; Bhattacharyya, 2010; Schulz and Söderbaum, 2010; Taylor, 
2011; Rein, 2015). Through the analysis of regional peace interventions more 
knowledge is developed on the nature of leadership, motivations and division of 
labour in the conduct of peace missions (Bhattacharyya, 2010; Schulz, and 
Söderbaum, 2010; Taylor, 2011). From this backdrop, the interaction between 
the regional and subregional actors in the African context requires further study 
in order to fully understand how regional networks interact with each other in 
contemporary conflict management. There is little literature that has analysed the 
interactions that occur between the AU and subregional partners in the actual 
conduct of joint conflict mediations or peace operations (Cawthra, 2010; Ancas, 
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2011). The review of this literature indicates gaps in knowledge in this regard. For 
instance, the APSA Assessment study (2010), observed a lack of clarity within 
the principles that guide the regional and subregional peace frameworks. On the 
other hand, Vines (2013) has assessed APSA since 2002 but did not examine 
the subject of leadership and nature of interactions between the AU and 
subregions. By investigating the leadership trends in both subregional and 
regional peace efforts, this study will contribute to the knowledge of leadership in 
regional and subregional interactions – specifically, on how liberal and 
cosmopolitan theories promote collective action and leadership in peace 
interventions. The next section provides a review of these theories and asks 
questions on how they relate to African peace interventions. 
 
3.3.1 Liberal peace theory  
The Liberal peace model comprises commitments to democracy, the rule of law 
and human rights as basic tenets that sustain peace (Doyle, 2005; Jackson, 
2011; Chinkin and Kaldor, 2017). There is a consensus within the liberal school 
of thought that the basis of a lasting peace is the provision of a legitimate political 
authority of the state that is provided through democratic elections16. The 
promotion of liberal peace theory has been the driving force for UN peace 
operations and conflict mediations. For instance, former UN Secretary General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali argued that: 
 
‘There is an obvious connection between democratic practices such as the 
rule of law and transparency in decision making, and the achievement of 
true peace and security in any new and stable political order. These 
elements of good governance need to be promoted at all levels of 
international and national political communities’ (UN 1992: §59). 
 
                                                      
16 See World Development Report 2011. Conflict, Security and Development. World Bank; see 
also DFID and UK-AID 2010. Building Peaceful States and Societies: A DFID Practice Paper.  
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He further stated that: ‘democracy at all levels is essential to attain peace for 
a new era of prosperity and justice’ (UN 1992: §82). Similarly, another former 
UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, speaking in 2005 indicated that: 
 
‘The right to choose how they are ruled, and who rules them, must be the 
birth right of all people, and its universal achievement must be a central 
objective of an organisation (the UN) devoted to the cause of larger 
freedom… The UN does more than any other single organisation to promote 
and strengthen democratic institutions and practices around the world’ (UN 
2005: §§148 and 151).  
 
The views of the UN peace interventions have normally reflected the broader 
international perspective of state construction based on liberal peace and 
democracy. Within the liberal peace literature, democracy and capitalism are 
critically viewed as the vehicles for peace (Paris, 2004; Jackson, 2011; Jackson, 
2015). It is important to note that, while liberal practices are generally considered 
the best option for governing in a post-conflict environment (Paris 2002, 2003), 
the transfer of the political liberal practices from the international community 
(usually Western liberal countries) to non-liberal states has received a fair level 
of criticism (Morphet, 2000; Duffield, 2001; Pugh, 2004). Other scholars 
acknowledge that although liberal peace is the dominant theory that underpins 
contemporary peace interventions, its application in the state formation of post-
conflict states requires comprehensive analysis (Nadarajah, 2009; Bellamy et al., 
2010; Chandler, 2010; Jackson, 2015; Nadarajah and Rampton, 2015; Jackson 
and Beswick, 2018).  
 
Literature on liberal peace has mainly focused on the role of 
International/Western democracies in the promotion of liberal practices in post-
conflict countries (Doyle, 2001; Kolm, 2005; Jackson and Albrecht, 2010). There 
have been relatively few studies that have described the African peace 
architecture as a liberal peace instrument, but they have not fully linked AU peace 
interventions with the broader liberal peace debate (Vines, 2013). This research 
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will examine the linkages between the AU peace interventions and promotion of 
liberal values and practices within the AU. In this light, the research investigates 
the extent to which liberal peace is reflected and promoted in AU peace 
intervention and how liberal peace perspectives enhance leadership in African 
collective action. The study therefore will contribute to knowledge of common 
practice in AU peace interventions and such knowledge is necessary for policy 
support in African peace interventions. 
 
3.3.2 Cosmopolitan peacekeeping 
Cosmopolitanism has strong links to the post-Westphalian view that states have 
the responsibility to protect their citizens (Linklater, 1996, 1998; Fraser, 2007). 
Likewise, individual states are accountable to international society in upholding 
their citizens’ rights. On the other hand, international society has a responsibility 
to assist and if need be force states to fulfil their responsibilities to protect civilians 
(Bellamy et al., 2010: 41). The underlying tenets of cosmopolitan theory are 
democracy, human rights and human security for all human beings and therefore, 
conceptually linked to the promotion of liberal peace. Additionally, the theory 
promotes collective action and leadership in implementing cosmopolitan values. 
Scholars in cosmopolitan thinking argue for principles of democracy to apply in 
the international arena for the peace and stability of all human beings (Archibugi 
and Held, 1995; Archibugi, Koenig, and Marchetti, 2011) and human security for 
all peoples (Brown and Held, 2010). While cosmopolitan school of thought 
supports collective action in promoting democratic values and human security, 
the question of leadership in the collective remains an issue of debate.  
 
The basic approach of cosmopolitan theory has mainly been the antithesis of 
sovereignty and the role of the state in ensuring human security (Tan, 2004; Van 
Hooft and Vandekerckhove, 2010; Brown, 2011). Other scholars have argued 
that the state is the limiting factor in achieving human rights for all peoples and 
international organisations should play a pivotal role in ensuring human security 
(Archibugi, 2012). In addressing the issue of global peace, others have provided 
a framework of how peace at the local and national level can build into a global 
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level through the development of a cosmopolitan peacekeeping framework 
(Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2005). Cosmopolitan peacekeeping theory 
argues for the ‘enforcement of cosmopolitan norms, i.e. enforcement of 
international humanitarian and human rights laws’ that would enable the 
protection of civilians (Kaldor and Salmon, 2006: 31-2). In this light, the 
enforcement and promotion of human rights values ties liberal and cosmopolitan 
theories to leadership. A further discussion on these linkages is provided below. 
The cosmopolitan theory highlights the development of high capability in both 
military and civilian components in conflict resolution. It projects peace beyond 
creating political and humanitarian space, as in the negative peace dimension17, 
to development and peace building in a positive peace dimension. In other words, 
cosmopolitanism argues for the creation of space for civilian activity to operate 
on the long-term political, economic and cultural dimensions of change that 
address power asymmetries, poverty and marginalization (Curran and 
Woodhouse, 2007: 1055). Cosmopolitan values connect peacekeeping and 
peace building, to make peace building a focus of peacekeeping activities. 
Central to the theory is the deployment of a robust peace operation to protect 
civilians. It values the creation of a credible force that is willing and able to enter 
into combat to protect ordinary people. Cosmopolitan theory argues that military 
force can and should be used to ‘save strangers’ (Wheeler, 2000). Elliott and 
Cheeseman suggest that there is a growing recognition that militaries have been 
deployed as ‘forces for good’ within the cosmopolitan peacekeeping ethic, in 
response to genocide and gross abuse of human rights (2004: 24-28). The use 
of force is central to this theory, since there would be no consent from belligerents 
or those that threatened civilians (Kaldor and Salmon, 2006; Bellamy et al., 2010: 
27).  
 
Cosmopolitanism provides ‘a normative framework that can be used to redefine 
peacekeeping by applying international humanitarian standards to realise notions 
of human security’ (Curran and Woodhouse, 2007: 1056). Several scholars have 
                                                      
17 Negative peace is essentially the condition where there is no active violence, but structural 
causes of violence are present, while positive peace is beyond negative peace and the 
structural causes of violence are removed.  
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envisaged the means by which cosmopolitan peace operations can be led. The 
idea of developing a standing United Nations Emergency Peace Service 
(UNEPS) that is capable of protecting civilians from harm and implement the full 
range of UN’s human security agenda has received much support from 
cosmopolitan scholars (Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2005; Curran and 
Woodhouse, 2007; Bellamy et al., 2010: 26). The conceptualisation of UNEPS 
involves the establishment of an independent international organisation for the 
implementation of peace operations. While the UNEPS has not yet been 
developed, regional peace interventions within the AU have increased, where 
states have a major influence. This study, therefore, examines how cosmopolitan 
ideas promote the leadership of peace interventions among African regional 
institutions and partners. 
 
Studies on cosmopolitan peacekeeping have mainly been conceptualised from a 
Western or European perspective and no research has been done to examine 
cosmopolitan peacekeeping theory in AU peace operations. Although some 
scholars have argued against the involvement of the state in the implementation 
of cosmopolitan values, the African peace interventions have been led by states. 
In this light, this research contributes to cosmopolitan peace operations in the 
African context in two ways. First by examining the extent to which AU peace 
operations are driven by cosmopolitan principles of democracy, human rights and 
human security for all. Thereby linking cosmopolitan and liberal peace theories 
together. Second, by analysing the role of the states in the implementation or 
promotion of the cosmopolitan values. It is in the second contribution that this 
study provides clear linkages between cosmopolitanism and leadership of peace 
interventions within the AU. From this backdrop, the research provides more 
insights in contemporary African conflict management and how it relates to the 
international conceptualisation of peace operations.   
 
The theoretical approaches to the understanding of peace operations and conflict 
mediations provided in this chapter are not exhaustive. As demonstrated above, 
the dynamics of peace interventions are too practical to be explained by a series 
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of theories alone. Hence, the last part of this chapter reviews some practical 
literature on regional and global peace interventions and how they have 
developed over time. 
 
3.4 The United Nations and regionalisation of peace and 
security 
Insofar as globalised peace interventions are a growing reality, the nature of 
global-regional cooperation including the role of the UN is worth exploring 
(Yamashita 2012; Weiss and Welz, 2015). Such analysis also identifies how 
further developments at the global, regional and national levels have progressed. 
The traditional role of the UN in peace interventions has evolved and regional 
organisations have been encouraged to also take a lead, especially in Africa (UN 
2004c; Weiss, 2007). The UN Agenda for Peace (1992 §64) pointed out that,  
 
‘regional arrangements or agencies in many cases possess a potential that 
should be utilized in [...] preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peace-
making and post conflict peace building … regional action as a matter of 
decentralisation, delegation and cooperation with UN efforts could not only 
lighten the burden of the Council but also contribute to a deeper sense of 
participation, consensus and democratisation in international affairs’18.  
 
The UN charter, Chapter VIII encourages ‘regional arrangements’ in peaceful 
resolution of regional conflicts within their regions. With the increased demand 
for peacekeepers, regional organisations are seen as a solution since the UN is 
overstretched. Article 51 acknowledges the right of states to act in collective 
defence, which permits regional organisations to defend member states without 
prior authorisation from the UN Security Council. However, article 53, 
emphasises that regional organisations may not conduct enforcement actions 
without authorisation from the UN Security Council. As noted by Bellamy et al., 
‘in practice the legal bases both for the cooperation between the UN and regional 
                                                      
18 An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, A/47/277-
S/24111 (17 June 1992), para. 64.  
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organisations have not been made clear within the resolutions of either the 
security council or the regional organisations concerned’ (2010: 304). The 
principle of subsidiarity between the UN and regional groups is acknowledged in 
both Art. 33 (1) and Art. 52 (2) of the UN Charter. However, the view that regional 
organisations have priority in dispute settlements in their own region has received 
a fair level of support (Goulding, 2002; Francis, 2006; Gelot, 2012). On the other 
hand, it is argued that the ‘global legitimacy pyramid’ (Coleman 2007: 57) puts 
the UN at the top of the pyramid followed by regional organisations and 
subregional organisations at the bottom of the pyramid. The hierarchy in 
international peace and security is mainly justified by the collective legitimation 
process that is determined by the number of member states forming each 
organisation (Claude, 1966; Coleman, 2007).  The concept of legitimacy in 
regional peace operations is contested.  There is also considerable support for 
the idea that each region should develop mechanisms for peace interventions 
and resolve conflicts in their regions because regional organisations have more 
legitimacy in their localities (Goulding, 2002; Williams and Bellamy, 2005; Gelot, 
2012). Despite much debate on regional and global legitimacy in peace 
interventions, there is less clarity on legitimacy of regional and subregional actors 
in peace interventions. The question of legitimacy becomes even more important 
where the boundaries of authority are not clearly defined. For instance, it remains 
unclear on how regional peace operations are led and how regional and 
subregional actors interact and produce leadership in Africa. This research is 
undertaken to contribute to this knowledge by investigating the extent to which 
legitimacy varies in regional and subregional peace interventions.   
 
3.4.1 Potential advantages and disadvantages of regional peace interventions 
Several scholars have made contributions towards potential advantages and 
disadvantages of regional PSOs (Bellamy and Williams, 2005, 2010; Williams, 
2009b; Angelov, 2010; Gelot, 2012). It is acknowledged that there are great 
variations in regional capabilities, as well as in the nature of conflicts. As a result 
of this, there should be a flexible model of co-operation, where the modalities of 
co-operation should be determined on a case-by-case basis according to the 
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added value of each organisation (Angelov, 2010: 605). Studies indicate that, 
first, there is a potential greater legitimacy and sensitivity due to greater working 
knowledge within the regional organisations (Goulding, 2002). The states of a 
region have a better grasp of a conflict situation and its cultural backdrop than 
other nations (Williams, 2013a). Here it is assumed that local knowledge is vital 
to negotiation.  
 
Second, their geographical proximity allows regional actors to deploy and supply 
troops relatively quickly (Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2005; Curran and 
Woodhouse, 2007). The assumption is that regional actors have the capability 
and resources to deploy in a timely way for peace operations.  
 
Third, it is argued that in some cases parties to a conflict may prefer the 
involvement of regional actors rather than the UN or other external bodies; hence 
the frequent calls for Arab, or Asian, or African solutions to regional problems 
(Gelot, 2012; Diehl and Balas, 2014). This argument ‘relies on the notion that the 
people and government in the region have a natural affinity with those in the same 
geographic area and have suspicion on what they perceive as outside 
intervention’ (Diehl, 2007: 541; Diehl and Balas, 2014). An example of perceived 
outside intervention is given in the Darfur region of Sudan, Zimbabwe, and 
Eritrea-Ethiopia conflicts.  
 
The fourth argument suggests that the region’s proximity to the crisis in question 
means that its members have to live with the consequences of unresolved 
conflicts, such as refugee crises and hence, are more likely to sustain 
engagement over the long run (Murithi, 2008).  
 
Finally, regional operations may be the only realistic option in conflicts where the 
UN has declined to intervene. Regional arrangements can fill the gap left by the 
selective approach of the UN Security Council in international conflict 
management (Francis, 2006; Gelot, 2012), for instance, in Burundi, Darfur, 
Liberia and Somalia. It is acknowledged in the literature that these advantages 
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are to some extent overstated, and there are obvious disadvantages associated 
with regional interventions (Diehl, 2007; Francis, 2006). This research will 
investigate the extent to which these potential advantages are reflected in AU 
and subregional peace interventions and draw lessons that can be learnt from 
these regional interventions. In this light, the research results have the potential 
to inform future peace interventions in Africa. It is important to note that there are 
potential disadvantages of regional peace interventions that require further 
review. 
 
Peace operations are costly to conduct and require massive financial and 
logistical support, and there is significant evidence from the research that most 
regional structures lack the experience, bureaucratic structures, and resources 
necessary to conduct peace operations effectively (UN 2002: 217; Francis, 2006; 
Williams, 2009b; Bellamy et al., 2010). The issue of resources in peace 
operations has been widely acknowledged; however, their link to leadership of 
regional peace interventions is missing. This research will make its contribution 
by investigating the extent to which lack of resources in African peace 
interventions affects leadership production in peace interventions. Among the 
potential disadvantages of regional peace interventions, it is argued that 
geographic proximity to the conflict does not automatically generate regional 
consensus on how to respond (Diehl, 2007). Diehl observes that internal state 
conflicts are least likely to generate regional consensus (2007: 540-1). Diehl’s 
observation agrees with others who argue that regional organisations are 
particularly susceptible to the pull of partisan interests, especially those 
associated with regionally influential states such as Nigeria in ECOWAS. South 
Africa in SADC, and the United States of America in the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO) (Francis, 2006; Bellamy et al., 2010: 312). It is argued that 
because of the inability of regional organisations to act against their most 
powerful members, regional organisations’ peace operations ‘are unlikely to be 
authorised in conflicts that directly involve global powers or regional powers’ 
(Francis, 2006; Diehl, 2007: 543). David Francis (2006) in his analysis of 
ECOWAS deployments in the 1990s indicates that the Nigerian led ECOWAS in 
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Liberia (1990) and Sierra Leone (1997), used regional arrangements to legitimise 
their activities in conflicts that were of direct relevance to them and where 
Nigerian leaders had personal interests. This manipulation was also observed in 
the South African led SADC operation in Lesotho (1998), and the Russian led 
CIS operation in Abkhazia/Georgia (1994). While the argument of influential 
regional powers is valid, it fails to explain the leadership of peace interventions 
where the influential regional powers are absent, for instance, in the AU mission 
in Somalia. This research will therefore investigate the extent to which the 
absence of regional powers balances the partisan interests and how it affects the 
production of leadership.  
 
Despite the potential disadvantages, in sub-Saharan Africa, regional 
arrangements are increasingly becoming an important feature in contemporary 
conflict management, where peace operations are the major tool. The AU and 
other subregions within the continent, such as ECOWAS, SADC and IGAD, have 
shown considerable willingness and initiative to undertake peace interventions, 
though they lack relevant capabilities (Bellamy et al., 2010). Most of these peace 
missions have been short-term with the intention of handing them over to the UN 
forces, for instance, the ECOWAS mission to Cote d’Ivoire (2002-3) and Liberia 
(2003), the AU operation in Burundi (2003-4), the AU mission in Somalia (2007-
present). By the end of 2007 the AU mission in the Darfur region of Sudan was 
merged into a hybrid AU-UN operation known as UNAMID. It is therefore 
important to understand the mode of cooperation that has been implemented 
between the UN and regional organisations, in order to establish the basis of 
investigating the AU relations with subregional organisations such as SADC.  
 
3.5 The trends in UN-Regional peace support coordination 
The debate on UN-regional peacekeeping cooperation has evolved over time and 
there has been incremental progress in the development of global-regional 
peacekeeping cooperation over the past decade. The Supplement to the Agenda 
for Peace, established the forms and principles of coordination between the UN 
and regional organisations in peacekeeping. The forms of coordination include: 
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(a) consultations; (b) mutual diplomatic support; (c) mutual operational support; 
(d) co-deployment of field missions; and (e) joint deployment of a mission. The 
principles are: (a) the need for agreed mechanisms for consultation; (b) the 
primacy of the UN; (c) the need to set out a clearly defined and agreed division 
of labour: and (d) the need for states to pursue a consistent policy in tackling the 
same situation through the UN as well as the regional organisations (UN, 1995).19 
The predominant question has not focused on the question of principles and 
forms of cooperation per se but rather on the practical one of how to ‘meet the 
increase in demand for UN peacekeeping, particularly in Africa’.20 The former UN 
Secretary General, Kofi Annan, in 2004 noted that ‘the experiences of the past 
few years suggest that this new multi-layered security architecture is already 
beginning to emerge. The challenge today is to move beyond purely ad hoc 
arrangements and put in place a system capable of generating a rapid and 
flexible response to crises in Africa and elsewhere’ (UN, 2005)21. These 
statements point towards the notion of partnering, where there is a need to 
institutionalise an emerging network of peacekeeping partners and sharing of 
peacekeeping resources and expertise (Yamashita 2012: 175).  
 
Scholars have analysed the relationship of the UN with regional organisations in 
peace operations (Gelot, 2012; Yamashita, 2012). It is shown that subcontracting 
and partnering have been the conceptual models, defining the UN-regional 
organisations’ relationship in peace operations (Yamashita (2012: 169). In the 
subcontracting mode of global-regional cooperation, regional peace operations 
are in essence authorised by the UN, monitored and delegated to regional 
organisations. Within this arrangement, the UN enjoys a lesser operational 
burden while regional organisations enjoy the availability of UN resources and 
clear legality for their robust operations (Gelot, 2012; Yamashita, 2012). 
Subcontracting, however, presumes a hierarchical relationship, while partnering 
                                                      
19 Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the 
Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the UN, A/50/60-S/1995/1 (25 January 1995), paras 86–
8; see also para. 24.   
20 Report of the Secretary-General, A/58/694 (26 January 2004), para. 3.  
21 Report of the Secretary-General, A/58/694, para. 84.  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is non-hierarchical and interactive in nature. Partnering implies a ‘more horizontal 
relationship wherein the UN and regional peacekeeping bodies form a network of 
peacekeeping partners with interconnected capabilities’ (Yamashita 2012: 170).  
 
The Peace Operations 2010 directive (which is the current framework of 
peacekeeping reform) links the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
(DPKO), European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and 
the AU as important partners. Its plan of action proposed the development of a 
DPKO strategy for the enhancement of AU peacekeeping capacities; technical 
modalities and procedures for the engagement of EU Battle Groups in support of 
UN peace operations; and an action plan to take forward practical UN-NATO 
cooperation in peacekeeping. At the same time, the directive describes the AU 
as a ‘key external partner’ and confirms a commitment to supporting the building 
of African peacekeeping capacities.22  
 
While regional organisations, such as NATO, EU and AU, in general express 
support for the idea of strengthened cooperation with the UN, there have been 
differences in tone among them (Wilson, 1995; Simma, 1999; Kaplan, 2010; 
Weiss and Welz, 2014; Reichard, 2016). NATO and EU have generally resisted 
more control from the UN (Kaplan, 2010; Reichard, 2016). It is observed that for 
the EU, a less hierarchical relationship is presupposed in institutionalising 
operational linkage with UN, and yet at the same time it is fairly careful in 
recognising the mandating authority of the Security Council (Major, 2008; 
Brantner and Gowan, 2008). The AU for its part, while it has expressed some 
concerns, has taken a more affirmative approach to the issue, emphasising the 
‘complementary and mutually reinforcing’ roles of the two organisations 
(Yamashita, 2012: 170). The AU supports the idea of UN support for capacity-
building mainly on the sub-contracting model but is less committed to outright 
control of its peace operations by the UN (Ancas, 2011; Boutellis and Williams, 
2013; Williams and Boutellis, 2014). It is observed that both organisations 
selectively use both models to promote their interests.  
                                                      
22 UN ‘Peace Operations 2010’, pp 4-6   
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While the UN has stressed its hierarchical supremacy, it has also acknowledged 
that cooperation between the UN and regional organisations should take place in 
accordance with ‘their respective mandates, scope and composition’ and ‘in 
forms that are suited to each specific situation, in accordance with the Charter’ 
(Yamashita, 2012: 173).23 However, the role of regional efforts remains critical 
and, where appropriate, should be supported by the Security Council (Gelot, 
2012). The observations and acknowledgements by the UN in support of regional 
engagements, demonstrate a flexible hierarchy and network of peace 
interventions. The UN partnering model is based on the realistic 
acknowledgement of the emergence of regional organisations as peacekeeping 
actors ‘in their own right’ and the assessment that this ‘offers substantial 
opportunities’ to the UN.24  There is substantial information on the UN perspective 
of regional peace operations and how they must be coordinated. Other studies 
have highlighted the competition and tension among the UN, AU and RECs, in 
developing a regional partnerships capability in Africa (Ancas, 2011). What is 
missing, however, is an analysis of how this competition and tension is generated, 
what leadership outcomes are developed and what mode of co-operation 
between the AU and its subregional actors is adopted. This study will examine 
the AU interaction with the subregional organisation (SADC) and National 
Contingents in AU peace operations in order to respond to this identified gap in 
regional peace interventions. It is acknowledged that regional organisations have 
different views on the mode of partnership and relationship with the UN, despite 
a clear legal framework. With the increased African involvement, it is vital to 
understand the mode of cooperation that has been developed through practice 
within the AU and subregions for timely responses to conflicts in the region. In 
order to understand the regionalism and leadership in peace interventions within 
the African continent, it is important to further review the relationship between the 
UN and AU. 
                                                      
23 General Assembly Resolution 49/57 (17 February 1995), Annex, paras 4–10 (quotation from 
paras  4–5).  
24 Report of the Secretary-General, A/60/640 (29 December 2005), para. 29.  
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3.6 UN-AU Framework in perspective. 
The UN-AU collaboration on peace and security has evolved since 1965.25 
Williams and Boutellis (2014: 258) convincingly indicate that: (1) collaboration 
becomes a necessity because the majority of the UN Security Council’s activities 
has been on African peace and security; (2) UN Security Council has the primary 
– but not exclusive – responsibility for maintaining international peace and 
security; (3) neither institution can cope with the multitude of peace and security 
challenges in Africa; and (4) while the AU is a critical political authority for conflict 
management in Africa, it lacks the necessary material and financial capabilities 
for rapid and  decisive action in peace interventions as evidenced by the 2012-
2013 crisis in Mali which is still ongoing.26 The UN-AU relationship has an 
important impact on both the legitimacy and success of peace operations in Africa 
(Ancas, 2011; Gelot, 2012). However, the relationship between the UN and AU 
has not developed to predictable levels. The increased levels of violent conflicts 
in Africa indicate that the AU will continue to organise peace missions outside the 
UN umbrella, although there have been calls to establish the UN-AU cooperation 
beyond ad hoc arrangements (Williams and Boutellis, 2014).  
 
Although there is an apparent need for collaboration, Williams and Boutellis 
indicate that the UN-AU relationship ‘has at times been characterized by 
considerable conflict, mistrust, and tension, often hindering the predictability and 
conduct of effective peace operations’ (2014: 254). For instance, unlike the UN, 
the AU has actively developed ‘a different peacekeeping doctrine; that engages 
peacekeeping troops in active warfare’ (Williams and Boutellis, 2014: 263). 
                                                      
25 The Organization of African Unity signed a cooperation agreement with the UN on 15 
November 1965, which was updated on 9 October 1990 by the two Secretaries-General of the 
organizations. Further UN-OAU cooperation with regard to peacekeeping was called for in a 
variety of UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, perhaps most notably 
Security Council Resolution 1197 (18 September 1998). This trend continued with the new AU 
and is in evidence in UN Security Council Resolutions 1809 (16 April 2008) and 2033 (12 
January 2012).  
26 The planned regional intervention, termed the African-led International Support Mission in 
Mali (AFISMA), was authorised by the U.N. Security Council in December 2012. However, 
AFISMA required many months to prepare. See African Union, ‘Report of the Chairperson of the 
Commission on the Operationalisation of the Rapid Deployment Capability of the African 
Standby Force and the Establishment of an “African Capacity for Immediate Response to 
Crises”’ (AU doc. RPT/ Exp/VI/STCDSS/(i‐a)2013, 29–30 April 2013), para. 53. 
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Williams and Boutellis observe that these different views have been a source of 
conflict on force requirements and budget for peace operations within the UN and 
AU collaboration. They further note that while the AU enjoyed a deep, multi-
dimensional and maturing relationship notably in Darfur and later in Somalia on 
the one hand, on the other hand, the UN Security Council and the AU PSC were 
deeply divided over how to respond to the crises in Libya and Côte d’Ivoire and 
over the financing of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). It is also argued that 
the AU’s limited bureaucratic, logistical, and financial capabilities have produced 
a highly unequal partnership with the UN (Gelot, 2012). Hence, some scholars 
argue that peace operations in Africa have been characterised by the great power 
politics27 (Černohous and Kříž, 2014; Williams and Boutellis, 2014). Despite 
these limitations the AU has demonstrated its willingness to conduct more peace 
operations. 
 
There are several unanswered questions emanating from the AU-UN doctrinal 
differences that relate to leadership and coordination of peace missions within 
the UN-AU and AU-Subregional frameworks. What is obvious with this new 
doctrine is that, first, AU troops are involved in full combat with belligerents, 
hence, troop contributing countries (TCCs) are willing to put their troops are risk. 
Second, the military component is required to be robust enough to establish 
credibility and enforce belligerents’ compliance. Third, there must be 
comprehensive logistical support to sustain the operations, on which the AU is 
already challenged. Finally, there is a need for clear leadership structures for 
guiding such operations. Additionally, the financial benefits (allowances) for 
TCCs for such deployments are minimal at the AU level as compared to the UN 
(Gelot, 2012). These observations originating from the AU’s new doctrine in 
peace interventions generate a puzzle regarding how the AU negotiates with 
African partners in its implementation. How does the AU garner the support from 
member states to engage in full blown warfare that has minimal financial 
                                                      
27 See John Mearsheimer (2001), The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Mearsheimer argues 
that great powers behave according to certain "offensive realist" principles in promoting their 
national interests in the international system, similarly to the history of great powers over the 
last two centuries.  
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benefits? And how is leadership produced in this framework of peace 
interventions with subregional partners? The answers to these questions are 
missing in the literature and this research will respond to these questions.  
 
Williams and Boutellis also point to another challenge in the UN-AU relationship 
in regard to authorisation of ‘humanitarian military intervention’ in Africa.28
 
The 
source of tension is Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the AU, in which the 
Union’s Assembly gives it the right to intervene in its member states in ‘grave 
circumstances’, namely, genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. On 
the other hand, the UN Charter stipulates that military force against a sovereign 
government can only be used in self-defence or with the express authorisation of 
the UN Security Council.29 In this instance, legitimacy struggles over which 
institution should exercise political authority in responding to a particular crisis 
still linger between the UN and AU, as demonstrated in the Libyan civil 
interventions by NATO and Western countries in 2011 (Williams and Boutellis, 
2014: 276). It is important to note that the UN-AU relationship has been 
developing over time, yet it still has apparent challenges. On the other hand, the 
AU-subregional relationship in peace operations is comparatively new. With the 
exception of a few studies (Agoagye, 2004; Williams, 2009a, 2009b; Cawthra, 
2010; Ancas, 2011) there are relatively few studies on AU relations with 
subregional partners. Additionally, these studies have focused on existing 
challenges and did not look at how leadership is produced and developed within 
the AU relations with subregional actors. This study will, therefore, address this 
gap and provide more insights on how the mode of cooperation in AU and 
subregional structures works. The results will inform future studies on AU peace 
and security frameworks and how African regional actors produce leadership in 
their peace interventions. 
  
                                                      
28 Humanitarian military intervention is defined as the use of military force by external actors, 
without host state consent, aimed at preventing or ending genocide and mass atrocities.  
29 Article 53 of the UN Charter states: ‘no enforcement action shall be taken under regional 
arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council’.  
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3.7 Conclusion 
In conclusion, this chapter has highlighted several regional theoretical 
frameworks that will be used in the study. Although international society 
conceptualisation has primarily focused on understanding international order, 
scholars in this field have also considered the prospects of applying it to regional 
analysis (Buzan, 2001; Linklater and Suganami, 2006; Navari, 2008). This study 
will utilise international society and constructivists’ tenets to understand the 
leadership and conduct of peace operations within the AU. The analysis of 
international society provides the conceptual understanding of shared interests 
and collective action in international system society. This analysis is central to 
the study of leadership and regional peace and security. Although international 
society acknowledges the existence of anarchy, it also provides an understanding 
of how order is achieved in international relations through constructivist 
approaches. The construction of norms, values and identities is central to the 
understanding of regionalism and collective conflict management. 
Intergovernmentalism and security governance frameworks also provide a basis 
for understanding the AU’s institutional structure and its role in continental peace 
and security outcomes. They also provide an analytical framework for 
understanding decision making processes in regional organisations. The 
common feature in all theoretical approaches discussed in this chapter, is the 
view that states come together when they have a commonality of interests and 
common threats. In this light, regional institutions provide a platform for collective 
action in international anarchy. Although material incentives matter; the power of 
socialisation among member states facilitates the coordination of their national 
policies in finding solutions to common regional problems. The theoretical 
approaches presented above are therefore, constructivist in nature and will guide 
the methodological approaches of the study.  
 
The chapter has also discussed the evolution of peacekeeping from the 
traditional trinity of consent, neutrality and non-use of force, to contemporary use 
of force and non-consent. The evolution of peacekeeping has been necessitated 
by conflict dynamics in Africa. While some studies have shown the challenges in 
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the use of force in contemporary conflict management in Africa, these studies did 
not examine how leadership is produced or constructed in African peace 
interventions. This study is therefore, undertaken to contribute to knowledge of 
leadership and regionalisation of African peace and security.  
 
This chapter has also highlighted the role of liberal peace and cosmopolitan 
peacekeeping theories in understanding the motivations for collective action in 
peace operations. The discussion in this chapter has underlined the importance 
of scrutinising these theoretical assumptions in relation to African regional peace 
interventions. Analysing the extent to which these theories influence collective 
action and shape leadership production in African peace interventions is 
necessary. It is also acknowledged that regional peace operations do not take 
place in isolation, but rather they are shaped by the globalised security 
governance originating from the UN, and other international society norms and 
universal humanitarian values. In this light, the chapter has drawn 
understandings from the interaction of the UN and AU, to ask questions on how 
peace interventions are coordinated within the African continent with subregional 
actors. This research, therefore, will provide a unique perspective on 
understanding how leadership is defined and produced in contemporary conflict 
management in Africa. The increasing participation of African subregions and the 
AU in peace interventions leads to the need to comprehend the regional 
strategies, motivations and leadership in these peace efforts. 
 
The literature review on leadership and regionalisation of peace and security has, 
therefore, provided significant theoretical framework for analysing AU peace 
interventions. The reviews are linked to overall research questions in examining 
how leadership is produced and what shape it takes in AU conflict management 
with subregional actors. Additionally, the reviews have shown the predominant 
international motivations for peace interventions and allow this research to 
examine their relevance in African peace interventions. Leadership conceptual 
reviews are also linked to regionalisation processes in that they are both 
produced through the interaction of actors, making the constructive approach 
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appropriate for the study. The next chapter provides the methodology used in this 
study and the methods employed. It also highlights the challenges of the study 
and strategies used to overcome the shortfalls.   
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents the research methodology of this study. The first part of 
the chapter outlines the research paradigm in order to highlight the 
epistemological and ontological foundations of the research. This discussion is 
followed by the research methods and techniques used in the study. The second 
part of the chapter reflects on the framework for data analysis. Finally, ethical 
considerations and reflexivity of the research are discussed. The chapter mirrors 
the theoretical frameworks provided in Chapters 2 and 3 to highlight how they 
have guided the methodological approach. 
 
4.1 Research paradigm and approach 
A paradigm is defined as a ‘net that contains the researchers’ epistemological, 
ontological and methodological premises’ (Denzin and Lincoln, 2008b: 31, based 
on Kuhn, 1970; Hennink, Hutter and Bailey, 2010: 11).  Paradigms are 
perspectives or ways of looking at reality, and they ‘are frames of reference we 
use to organise our observations and reasoning’ (Hennink et al., 2010: 11). This 
study uses an interpretive paradigm as it recognises the interactions that take 
place in leadership (Bryman, 2006). Leadership is contextual and involves the 
interpretation of shared meanings among actors to a collective. The information 
collected in this study included policy makers’/implementers’ perspectives on AU 
leadership in peace interventions. Hence the research is qualitative in nature. 
‘Qualitative research is an umbrella term for a wide variety of approaches to and 
methods for the study of natural social life’ (Saldaña, 2011: 3). The study involves 
descriptions and analysis of leadership among different African subregional 
actors operating in a social setting. An interpretive paradigm is therefore 
appropriate for the study due to the social and interactive nature of leadership 
processes (Silverman, 1997; Bryman, 2006). It is rightly observed elsewhere that 
‘leadership is acutely context sensitive’ and ‘embedded in a social setting at a 
given historical moment’ (Bryman et al., 1996: 355).  Leadership in peace 
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interventions is also more complicated due to the large number of actors involved 
(Bellamy et al., 2010). The nature of conflict also determines how roles are shared 
among those involved in the intervention (Williams, 2009b). In this light, 
interaction of actors produces leadership outcomes (Drath et al., 2008). This 
study is therefore, mainly approached using constructivist epistemologies. ‘A 
fundamental principle of constructivist social theory is that people act toward 
objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have 
for them’ (Wendt, 1992: 396-397). It is also observed elsewhere that the 
sociological approach to international relations inspired by constructivists predicts 
some correlation between identity (of states and their communities) and policy 
outcomes (Moravcsik, 1999: 675). This study is approached from the view that 
leadership is mutually constituted through collective meanings that define 
structures in which actors (states or individuals) organise their actions (Wendt, 
1992, 1994, 1995). The study further acknowledges that leadership is 
constructed and reinforced through the knowledgeable practices of the actors 
involved (Reus-Smit, 2009: 221). Hence, the study is social constructivist in 
nature because it is a kind of inquiry that requires an involvement of several 
actors in interaction to see how they understand and provide meaning to a 
phenomenon (Hennink et al., 2011; Ross and Matthews, 2010. 
 
As shown in Chapter 3, resolving conflicts through peace interventions mainly 
requires collective action through established subregional, regional or global 
arrangements. In this light, some elements of shared leadership or collective 
leadership are necessary. It is also acknowledged that in some instances, 
specific states or a single state, may take up the leadership mantle, as discussed 
in hegemonic leadership theory. The interpretative dimension in this case plays 
a significant role as it allows the researcher to analyse how leadership is defined, 
exercised and experienced in a given setting (Conger, 1998). This makes 
qualitative methods more effective in capturing these interpretative dimensions 
since the method is appropriate to study social settings that cannot be quantified 
(Silverman, 1997; Conger, 1998; Kelle, 2006). 
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The advantages of qualitative methodology are that they allow researchers to 
interact with research participants and this allows flexibility (Neuman, 2000; Flick 
et al., 2007; Hennink et al., 2010). From this backdrop, the researcher can follow 
up on unexpected ideas during research and effectively explore processes that 
are sensitive to contextual factors (Bryman et al., 1996; Conger, 1998). The 
qualitative approach allowed in-depth interaction between the researcher and 
participants in exploring the topic of leadership within AU interventions. This 
approach also allowed participants to respond freely based on their knowledge 
and experience, to uncover the meanings of leadership they had based on their 
experiences (Hennink et al., 2010: 10). At the same time, the researcher explored 
more information by probing into the responses given. Probing provides an 
opportunity for more information to come out and enrich the research process 
(Conger, 1998). It is acknowledged that qualitative research enables the 
exploration of detail beyond what is provided by statistical data; it provides a 
possibility of identifying detail in social, organisational, and individual 
characteristics and attaching meaning to them (Schendul, 2011). The qualitative 
approach allowed the researcher to gain more descriptive insights on how 
leadership is produced and what it looks like within the AU peace interventions in 
Africa. It allowed the researcher to examine how the AU relates with subregional 
actors in conducting peace interventions. Hence the qualitative approach allowed 
the contexts and dynamics that produce leadership to be interrogated.  
 
4.1.1 Case study approach: AU-SADC and AMISOM. 
The study uses a multiple case study strategy in its analysis and investigates the 
leadership and interactions among different African peace and security actors 
(AU, SADC and TCCs). Case study strategy is used to ‘describe a process or the 
effects of an event, especially when such events affect many different parties; 
and to explain a complex phenomenon’ (Parry et al., 2014: 137). The number of 
actors involved in this study and the complex nature of their interaction makes 
the multiple case study approach appropriate. Additionally, ‘multiple case studies 
offer the prospect of producing results that are less likely to be deemed to be 
idiosyncratic’ (Bryman, 2004: 750). Further, the process of comparison enhances 
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the researcher’s capacity for drawing theoretical inferences (Eisenhardt, 1989 
cited in Bryman, 2004: 750). The method adopted by the study is therefore, 
appropriate because it allows the researcher to draw conclusions from each case 
study and make strong arguments on leadership production within the AU peace 
interventions. The approach therefore, contributes to the comprehensiveness of 
the study and allows the research results to be generalised. As noted by others, 
the primary purpose of qualitative research is to understand behaviour, 
perceptions or experiences that can be used to predict outcomes (Hennink et al., 
2010: 17). Through the analysis of AU leadership in the selected case studies, 
the research results can be used to understand or predict leadership outcomes 
of other AU peace interventions. 
4.2 Data collection methods 
The study is state-centric and inter-governmental in nature due to the nature of 
the researched institutions. In order to gather credible information, the study used 
written survey questions and elite interviews with policy makers, practitioners, 
politicians and academicians. The “elite” notion implies ‘a group of individuals, 
who hold, or have held, a privileged position in society and, as such, as far as 
political scientist is concerned, are likely to have had more influence on political 
outcomes than general members of the public’ (Richards, 1996: 199; Littig, 2009: 
99). Among the research participants that were interviewed, 30 were directly 
involved in leadership processes of AU and subregional organisations, while 11 
participants were politicians and experts in African peace and security. 
This research reached data saturation during data collection when collected 
information started to replicate the study (O’Reilly and Parker, 2012; Walker, 
2012), and the information collected from different research participants started 
to repeat itself. There is a consensus among scholars that data saturation is 
necessary for a comprehensive study (Guest, Bunce and Johnson, 2006; O’Reilly 
and Parker, 2012; Walker, 2012; Fusch and Ness, 2015). There is no answer to 
how many interviews are enough to reach data saturation (Bernard, 2012), and 
it remains with the researcher to make a judgement when all necessary 
information pertaining to research questions have been collected. The main data 
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collection tool was semi structured interview questions and due to their focused 
nature, they facilitated the research to reach data saturation. 
4.2.1 Semi structured interviews 
This project incorporated 41 interviews with key military personnel, politicians 
(country representatives), policymakers and policy implementers from the AU 
and SADC. Programme officers responsible for peace and security from the 
Institute for Security studies (ISS) – Ethiopia; Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit - Botswana (GIZ) and SADC Non-Governmental 
Organisation (SADC NGO). ISS and SADC-NGO are International Non-
Governmental Organisation (NGOs) and GIZ is classified as a donor agency in 
this study since it operates under the Germany Government.  Semi structured 
interviews were used because they aim at ‘obtaining descriptions of the life world 
of the interviewee in order to interpret the meaning of the described phenomena” 
(Kvale, 2007). The use of semi structured interviews allowed the researcher to 
gain insights on inter-organisational interactions between the AU and subregional 
actors. Semi structured interviews were specifically selected for this study due to 
their perceived advantages and applicability to this research. They allowed the 
interviewees to open up to new and unexpected phenomenon rather than to 
ready-made categories and schemes of interpretation that were set in structured 
questions, and at the same time allowed for clarification of some points (Baxter 
and Jack, 2008). The researcher utilised the open nature of the interviews to 
explore the dynamics that lead to leadership production among the AU and 
subregions. In other words, the semi structured interviews provided flexibility and 
allowed the researcher and participants to open up to some aspects of leadership 
that were not in the interview guide (Hudson and Ozanne, 1988; Mason, 2002).  
At the same time the focused nature of the interviews allowed key questions and 
areas of the research to be explored. It is observed elsewhere that semi 
structured interviews allow the gathering of more information because of their 
conversational nature (Moore, Lapan and Quartaroli, 2012). The researcher 
developed a good rapport with research participants that allowed a good flow of 
information during the interviews.  Furthermore, because of the focused nature 
of the interviews, the researcher was able to conduct a reliable comparative data 
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analysis from different research participants. From this backdrop, semi structured 
interviews were appropriate for this research since data were collected from the 
AU, SADC and other institutions that have different organisational settings. The 
list of interview questions is attached in Annex 1.  
 
Scholars have acknowledged that in elite interviews, it is difficult to have access 
to a large number of research participants and once interviewed it is extremely 
difficult to interview them again (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002). In this project, 
the researcher had access to over 30 elite participants in policy initiation and 
implementation at the SADC and AU. Additionally, the researcher had access to 
politicians and peace and security experts from international non-governmental 
organisations dealing with African peace and security. These research 
participants allowed the researcher to gather a sufficient volume of data for the 
research project. Semi structured interviews are also best used when the 
researcher will not have more than one chance to interview the participants 
(Kvale, 2007). In this study 15 research participants interviewed were contract-
based personnel with a specified contract duration that was coming to an end, 
hence the researcher could not have access to them after they had left their 
organisations. In this light, the use of semi structured interviews was appropriate 
since it allowed in depth discussion. At the same time the research participants 
were more open in the discussions because they would be leaving the 
organisations. 
 
Although the study focused on key players who possess significant information 
on the functioning of regional peace and security frameworks, it also appreciated 
the disadvantages that come with it. It is acknowledged that elite participants 
have the potential to influence the conduct of the research through the responses 
they provide (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002). In this light, face to face interviews 
were conducted to allow the researcher to have direct interactions that provided 
probing opportunities. Probing during interviews was vital in verifying the 
information given. Research participants signed consent forms for interviews to 
be audio-recorded which was vital to maximise the information gathered from the 
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elite interviewees. In all 41 interviews, only one research participant opted not to 
be recorded and the researcher took detailed notes during the interviews. 
 
In addition to semi structured interviews, research participants were given written 
survey questions that were followed by the interview session. The survey 
questions allowed the researcher to screen appropriate research participants and 
also compare with data collected from the interviews.  Data were also collected 
by examining different institutional documents, both published and unpublished 
related to the research. Institutional documents, written surveys and interview 
data allowed more reliability of the data and provided a plausible analysis of 
leadership strategies in AU interaction with different actors (Fairclough and 
Wodak, 1997; Cameron, 2001; Bhatia, Flowerdew and Jones, 2008). 
 
4.2.2 Sampling 
Within the AU there are more than six subregional organisations and 54 
countries. The SADC was selected due to its significant interactions with the AU 
in peace and security, specifically during the joint conflict mediation in 
Madagascar. The interactions between the AU and SADC were considered to be 
a vital source of information on how AU interacts with subregional organisations 
in peace interventions. On the other hand, the AMISOM case study was selected 
because it is the first long-term AU peace operations mission. From this 
backdrop, the case study provides significant information for analysis.  Table 4.1 
shows the sample size.  
 
The study also drew a significant number of participants from the AU 
headquarters. The focus at the AU was on those officials who have been directly 
or indirectly involved in the peace operation mission in Somalia. Expert 
practitioners in the department of peace operations and peace building at the 
Institute for Security Studies (ISS) were also part of the research participants. 
These samples provided rich sources of data that are used to understand and 
interpret the leadership trends in African regionalism with regard to peace 
interventions.  
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Table 4.0.1: Number of Interviews 




African Union Military, Politicians, Policy 
makers 
20 41 
SADC Military, Politicians, Policy 
makers 
15 
Institute for Security 
Studies – Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia 
(NGO) 



















In coming up with the interview sample, the study uses purposeful, expert and 
snowball techniques to identify research participants. Purposeful sampling seeks 
to maximise the depth and richness of the data, by selecting participants most 
relevant to the study (Hennink et al., 2010). Expert sampling involves assembling 
persons with known experience and expertise. In this instance, it was those 
participants with expert knowledge of regional organisations and African peace 
and security that were selected. Snowball sampling, also known as the referral 
sampling/process, involves identifying more research participants from 
previously interviewed participants (Denzin, 2001). The study adopted these 
sampling techniques after considering the potential limitation on the number of 
participants who possess knowledge on peace and security. However, the study 
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also acknowledges the potential methodological and ethical limitations in 
adopting these approaches, especially in accessing research participants who 
are members of the armed forces. Hence, consent was sought following the 
diplomatic and military chain of command where appropriate. Research 
participants were drawn from the directorate of peace and security at the AU, 
officials from the Organ on Politics Defence and Security at SADC, officials from 
SADC-NGO, and peace and security experts from the GIZ-Botswana Office and 
ISS office in Ethiopia.  
 
4.3 Study Sites 
The study field research sites include the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia; the SADC headquarters in Gaborone, Botswana; The Institute for 
Security Studies offices in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ): Botswana Office; and SADC NGO (a 
conglomerate of non-governmental organisations within SADC member states) 
in Botswana. These sites were chosen to allow the researcher gain access to a 
number of experts, policy makers and practitioners on African peace and security. 
A wide variety of participants were interviewed to gather the most relevant and 
fundamental information for the study. 
 
4.4 Data analysis 
From all data collected (documents and interview recordings), the texts and 
transcripts were analysed using framework analysis and NVivo software. 
Framework analysis is a five-step systematic process of data analysis. It includes, 
1. familiarisation; 2. identifying a thematic framework; 3. indexing; 4. charting; and 
5. mapping and interpretation (Ritchie and Spencer, 1994). NVivo is a qualitative 
data analysis software. Within the familiarisation process the researcher was 
familiarised with the collected data by listening to audiotapes, studying the field 
notes or reading the transcripts to obtain a comprehensive overview of the 
collected data (Ritchie and Spencer, 1994). This first stage allowed the 
researcher to become aware of key ideas and recurrent themes. 
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Identifying a thematic framework involved recognising emerging themes or issues 
in the data set. The research themes developed during the literature review and 
prior to data collection were further refined, as the researcher allowed the 
collected data to dictate the themes and emerging issues (Spencer and Ritchie, 
2002; Srivastava and Thomson, 2009). At this stage the key issues, concepts 
and themes expressed by research participants formed the basis of the thematic 
framework that was used to filter and classify the data (Ritchie and Spencer, 
1994). In this light, interview transcripts, field notes and documents were 
analysed according to emerging categories that define the leadership strategies 
in the AU and regionalisation processes in peace intervention. The identifying 
process involved making judgements about the meaning, relevance and 
importance of issues raised during interviews. 
 
The indexing process involved identifying sections of data (from transcripts in 
cases of qualitative research) that correspond to a particular theme. NVivo was 
used for this task. The indexing process was followed by charting as the fourth 
stage of framework analysis, where the indexed data were arranged in charts of 
the themes (Ritchie and Spencer, 1994; Srivastava and Thomson, 2009). The 
pieces of data were lifted from transcripts (original text) and placed in charts that 
consisted of the headings and subheadings drawn from the thematic framework 
(Ritchie and Spencer, 1994). 
 
Finally, mapping and interpretation of data involved the analysis of research 
themes from charts. In other words, categorised data within a theoretical model 
were classified and then developed an account based on the relationship 
between the themes (Creswell et al., 2003). It is highlighted that interpretation is 
a reflection of the participant and the researcher must ensure that it echoes the 
true attributes of research participants (Ritchie and Spencer, 1994: 186). 
Framework analysis is driven by and based on the original accounts of research 
participants. Since the study adopts an interpretive paradigm, the analysis and 
interpretation acknowledge the subjective meanings that research participants 
attach to their experiences. The ‘interpretive paradigm acknowledges that 
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people’s perceptions and experiences of reality are subjective; therefore, there 
can be multiple perspectives on reality, rather than a single truth’ (Hennink et al., 
2011: 15). Framework analysis is used in this study due to its systematic 
approach, which allows a methodical treatment of data (similar accounts) and 
access to original textual data for validity and transparency of the study (Ritchie 
and Spencer, 1994; Archer et al., 2005; Collis and Hussey, 2013).  From this 
backdrop within-case and between-case analysis is done thereby enabling 
comparisons to be made (Srivastava and Thomson, 2009: 78). The framework 
approach to data analysis, therefore, strengthens data reliability and validity in 
this study.  
4.4.1 Reliability and validity 
The methods used in data collection and analysis allowed the study to achieve 
reliability and validity. Reliability is the degree of consistency achieved by both 
the methods and instruments used in measuring a given entity (Bryman, 2008; 
Hennink et al., 2010; Denzin, 2013). On the other hand, validity is ensuring that 
an instrument is measuring what it is intended to measure (Johnson, 1997; Fusch 
and Ness, 2015; Denzin, 2017). The use of semi structured interviews and written 
surveys allowed consistency to be achieved since all participants were asked 
similar questions with additional probing questions to verify the information given. 
The researcher also used the triangulation method to ensure that there was 
agreement of evidence from the collected data. Methodological triangulation is 
achieved by correlating data from multiple data collection methods (Thurmond, 
2001; Denzin and Lincoln, 2008a; Denzin, 2013, 2017). This study used semi 
structured interviews, written surveys, institutional documents and field notes to 
achieve the methodological triangulation. It is also argued that data sources can 
vary based on the times the data were collected, the place, or setting and from 
whom the data were obtained (Mitchell, 1986; Denzin, 2017). This research 
collected data from two different study locations (AU headquarters and SADC 
headquarters) and from a variety of participants (military personnel, policy 
makers and implementers, non-governmental staff and practitioners). By 
collecting data from different locations and a wide range of personnel this study 
achieved data triangulation. Data-analysis triangulation was also achieved 
  89 
through the use of framework analysis, written surveys and NVivo software to 
ensure that the large quantity of data was systematically and comprehensively 
analysed. 
 
4.5 Major themes for data analysis 
This study is mainly approached with constructivist epistemologies. Constructivist 
approaches to leadership indicate that conceptualisation of leadership is a social 
construct determined through interactions based on intersubjectivity and power 
conversion capacities (Wendt, 1992, 1994, 1995; Park, 2014: 74). The study 
developed themes originating from shared leadership in order to understand the 
nature of regional leadership within the AU.  
 
4.5.1 Leadership boundaries and networks 
Data in this study are analysed by looking at leadership boundaries between the 
AU and subregional actors. The study examines where subregional actors’ 
leadership starts and ends, and where AU leadership begins. In this light, the 
question of leadership boundaries is significant in understanding how leadership 
is produced in peace interventions. In other words, leadership boundaries are 
used to assess instances of cooperation (collective) leadership and competitive 
coexistence among the AU and subregional actors (Park, 2014). The measure of 
success in establishing successful regional leadership is determined by how 
regional and subregional networks bridge leadership boundaries among 
participants to a collective (Osborn, Hunt and Jauch, 2002: 811). Data are 
analysed by examining the extent to which AU regulations and policies are 
institutionalised within subregions and how they guide peace interventions.  
 
The level of communication in a collective has an impact on how leadership is 
produced and projected in collective action (Osborn and Strickstein, 1985). The 
interactions in a collective allow important information to be passed and establish 
frameworks for action, hence leadership emerges as a socially constructed 
pattern (Osborn et al., 2002: 811).  Data collected are analysed by examining 
how AU peace interventions are initiated and how the AU communicates and 
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negotiates with subregions in collective action. The study examines the nature of 
networks developed by the AU in its interactions with subregional actors in 
conducting peace interventions. 
4.5.2 Collectiveness as a theme for data analysis 
The outcome of interactions among international actors in collective action can 
be cooperation (Wendt, 1992, 1994, 1995; Reus-Smit, 2009; Park 2014). 
Regional and subregional actors can be cooperative partners in pursuing 
collective threats. Established networks and shared leadership beliefs among 
international actors facilitate cooperation in collective action (Reus-Smit, 2009). 
In this light, data analysis examines the perceptions of research participants on 
how subregions view the AU PSC as a continental leader in African peace 
interventions. At this point, the analysis dwells on instances of cooperation 
between AU and subregions, and how such coordination is established. It is 
argued elsewhere that established communications and exchanges within a 
collective increases mutual understanding and trust, and in turn enhances the 
cohesiveness of the collective and leadership (Ensley et al., 2006; Drath et al., 
2008). Through these interactions, participants to a collective can produce and 
reproduce shared ideas and interests in tackling common problems and enhance 
regional stability (Hoch, 2013). Data are analysed by examining the AU 
interactions with subregional partners to establish cooperation among African 
peace and security actors in regionalised peace and security. The research 
results therefore, have an implication for policy interventions in the African 
security framework. 
   
4.5.3 Competitive coexistence as a theme for data analysis 
When a group of participants fails to establish cooperative relationships in 
collective action they may engage in intense competition to gain acceptance of 
their proposals (Nye, 2011). Data are analysed using both positive and negative 
connotations of competitive coexistence within the AU peace interventions 
(Lukes, 1974; Helms, 2014). Positive competitive coexistence is analysed when 
leadership dynamics encourage further cooperation, and when AU and 
subregional actors reflect on their strategies for cooperation and change their 
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policies for cooperation (Nye, 2010a, 2011). On the other hand, negative 
competitive coexistence is analysed when competitive actions lead to an 
unstructured and uncoordinated approach to peace interventions. The negative 
aspect of competitive coexistence results in a blocking power relationship in 
which participants seek to block their competitor’s leadership initiative (Park, 
2014: 79). 
From constructivist assumptions, scholars argue that international actors have 
the capacity to change their strategies through critical reflections of their own 
relative power conversion capacities and those of the competitor (Wendt, 1992; 
Park 2014). For instance, as actors in a collective interact, those with more 
influence emerge as leaders and at the same time reflect on the need for support 
of their agenda, thereby creating a context of dependency in leadership. 
Conditions for leadership, in this instance, are affected by how leaders view 
themselves and how they are viewed by other actors. Here there is more 
emphasis on the roles and influence of potential supporters since their actions 
will determine the leadership outcome. Using this framework, data are analysed 
by examining the extent of competitive coexistence (in both positive and negative 
forms) among regional and regional actors in peace interventions, and how any 
problems of competitive coexistence are navigated by the AU.  
4.5.4 Regionalisation of peace as a theme for data analysis 
Regionalisation of peace forms another basis for analysing data. The focus is on 
how the processes of regionalisation have developed over time, paying particular 
attention to how leadership is produced and exercised. Here data are analysed 
based on research participants’ perspectives and institutional documents on how 
AU and subregional actors have interacted in the selected case studies. The 
analysis also pays attention to aspects of regional sovereignty and proximity to 
conflicts. The case of AU-SADC joint mediation in Madagascar analyses how 
regional and subregional perspectives promote or hinder the processes of 
regionalisation in peace interventions. In the AMISOM case study, the analysis 
dwells on how peace operations dynamics affect AU leadership and 
regionalisation of peace. The study, in both case studies, draws conclusions on 
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the degree of cooperation and development of regionalised peace and security. 
Through this analysis, the study reveals the nature of AU leadership and how it 
is produced in African regional peace interventions. 
 
4.6 Ethical consideration 
This section describes the ethical considerations undertaken in this study. The 
study received ethical approval from Coventry University and operated under its 
ethical requirements, which are comprehensive and cover all aspects of data 
collection and usage. Ethics is required to ensure that there is no harm (to both 
the researcher and research participants) as a result of the study (Brinkmann and 
Kvale, 2008). This section outlines the following key issues: consent from 
participants; issues of privacy and confidentiality; accessibility of data; and 
reporting of results to participants.  
 
4.6.1 Informed consent and confidentiality 
During data collection the researcher obtained full consent from research 
participants before the interviews and additional consent for the interviews to be 
audio recorded. Participants were given the participant information sheet that 
outlined the research topic and purpose, the conduct of the interviews, data 
protection and confidentiality, and how data collected would be utilised. Research 
participants were also informed of their voluntary participation and option to 
withdraw at any time, including the withdrawal of information, but at least three 
months before the study completion. Research participants were also informed 
that there were no known risks associated with the project. Before the 
commencement of the interviews, participants were also verbally informed of their 
freedom to opt out of the study at any point if they were not willing to proceed or 
participate and were finally given the consent form to sign to indicate their 
voluntary participation in the study. Annex A contains full details on consent forms 
and Annex B provides the interview information sheet. 
 
To ensure confidentiality, all participants’ names were not attached to the 
responses for anonymity. Instead, numbers and letters were attached to the 
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interview recordings, and pseudonyms were used for the transcripts and 
reporting of the recorded responses. 
 
4.6.2 Reporting results to participants 
The researcher will have the opportunity to share the results of the study with the 
researched institutions (mainly the AU and SADC) through a summary of the 
findings and an executive summary of the study at the end of the research 
programme when the thesis passes the examination stage. The results will also 
be shared with the general public, through academic conferences and journal 
contributions.  
 
4.6.3 Reflexivity of the research 
As with all qualitative methods the researcher is part of the research process. It 
is encouraged that ‘researchers should take into consideration their positionality 
and the effect they can have on the situation’ (Hennink et al., 2010: 191). The 
researcher exercised due diligence to ensure objectivity and reflexivity at all 
stages of the research. ‘Reflexivity enhances the quality of research through its 
ability to extend our understanding of how our positions and interest as 
researchers affect all stages of the research process’ (Wax, 1967; 
Bourdieu,1990; Primeau, 2003: 9-10). Within this study, I can describe myself 
(the researcher) as both an insider and outsider in the research. I have 12 years 
of military experience and much of it involved peacekeeping training and actual 
deployments under UN peacekeeping. Hence, I was constantly aware of my 
existing knowledge and pre-existing assumptions of leadership of peace 
interventions at all stages of this research. On the other hand, this background 
assisted me to ask relevant questions during interviews and gain appropriate data 
from military officers who have experience in peace operations and other 
research participants. In this light, I can be considered as an insider.  
 
On the other hand, I am also an outsider, since I have never worked for the 
researched institutions. This position assisted me in being objective at all stages 
of the research. ‘Reflecting on the process of one’s research and trying to 
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understand how one’s own values and views may influence findings adds 
credibility to the research and should be part of any method of qualitative enquiry’ 
(Jootun, McGhee and Marland, 2009: 42). As a researcher I tried to be neutral 
and stayed outside my existing knowledge where necessary, although other 
scholars argue that it is impossible in qualitative research to completely detach 
the manner of generating and interpreting data without the ‘self’ (Barry et al., 
1999; Jootun et al., 2009: 42-43; Medved and Turner, 2011: 109-110). I 
endeavoured to engage in critical thinking of self and constantly scrutinise ‘what 
I know’ and ‘how I know it’ to help me avoid misinterpreting the phenomenon as 
it was experienced by research participants (Barry et al., 1999). The self-critical 
process helped me approach the topic honestly and openly during data collection 
and analysis. This process was used to separate personal views and 
preconceptions from the phenomenon under study (Jootun et al., 2009: 43). 
 
4.7 Limitations of the study 
The study was conducted in two different countries that added some financial 
constraints and the researcher could not stay for long periods. However, the study 
approach and methods allowed the researcher to interview a large number of 
participants and access relevant institutional documents. Another limitation is that 
about 15 participants who were interviewed at the AU and SADC were towards 
the end of their assignments and would be returning to their home countries, 
making it difficult for the researcher to conduct a data verification exercise after 
the data analysis. In order to overcome this, the study adopted a comprehensive 
framework analysis that allowed different data sources to be verified through 
access to original texts from transcripts. 
 
The researcher could not collect data from national contingents in Somalia due 
to financial and high-risk security challenges. However, the researcher had 
access to unpublished institutional documents on the field mission and 
interviewed military and civilian personnel who have participated in the Somalia 
mission. Similarly, the researcher could not collect data in Madagascar, but the 
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GIZ, SADC-NGO, SADC and AU officials with first-hand information provided all 
the required information.  
 
4.8 Conclusion 
In conclusion this chapter has discussed the research paradigm and how 
research data were collected and analysed in this study. The purpose of this 
study was to answer “how” and “why” questions and cover contextual conditions 
that affect and are affected by leadership production in AU peace interventions, 
making both the qualitative and case study approaches relevant for the research 
(Yin, 2003). A multiple case study enables the researcher to explore differences 
within and between cases, thereby allowing the research findings to be applied 
across cases (Baxter and Jack, 2008). The context in both case studies is 
different in that one case study involves deployment of troops and war fighting, 
while the other involves conflict mediation and without the use of force.  Multiple 
case studies allowed the researcher to analyse within each setting and across 
settings to understand the similarities and differences between the cases on how 
leadership is produced in AU peace interventions. It is argued that the evidence 
created from this type of study is considered robust and reliable, but on the other 
hand, it can be complex and consuming (Yin, 2003: 47; Baxter, and Jack, 2008). 
In this light, framework analysis is used in the data analysis to bring in the 
systematic and comprehensive approach of analysing large datasets within a 
limited time frame. The framework method provided clear steps to follow in th 
edata analysis and produced highly structured outputs of summarised data (Gale 
et al., 2013). Themes for interpreting or explaining aspects of data were 
developed and used for analysing the whole dataset, with several sub themes 
developing and then explained.   
 
The next chapter provides the study context in order to give relevant background. 
The chapter therefore, outlines the structure of AU and SADC and how the APSA 
provides linkages to the two organisations. Additionally, an outline of the AU 
peace operation framework is provided to establish the existing leadership 
framework with TCCs/national contingents.  
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This chapter provides the context of the AU peace interventions and leadership 
framework. The first part of the chapter provides the AU background and its 
transition from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The focus here is on the 
Pan-African renaissance which revived the idea of AU peace and security 
architecture (APSA), and the notion of ‘African solutions to African problems’ 
philosophy. Second, the chapter gives an overview of the AU peace and security 
structure and its decision-making mechanism. Third, the chapter provides a brief 
overview of SADC peace and security structures and the legal structural 
framework that connects the UN and regional peace interventions. Finally, the 
chapter concludes by providing pointers to the next chapter and the contribution 
of the study to regional peace interventions in Africa. 
 
The definition of terms in Chapters 2 and 3 provides an overview of concepts 
used in this study and how they have been defined by the UN, AU and different 
scholars. As demonstrated in the definitions, there is an ambiguity and lack of 
consensus on how the UN and AU conceptualise peace operations and 
peacekeeping. Chapter 1 has indicated that the definition of peace interventions 
used in this study is limited to two aspects: the deployment of a robust military 
force with a significant civilian component in order to stabilise war-torn societies, 
and mediation for peaceful resolution of conflicts (Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 
2005: 153; Durch, 2006: xvii; Curran and Woodhouse, 2007; UN, 2008: 18; 
Bellamy et al., 2010: 18). It has further been shown that peace operation in the 
study is used interchangeably with peace intervention and they both carry the 
connotation of peaceful resolution and use of force.  
 
AU peace and security initiatives have been guided by a notion of ‘African 
solutions to African problems’, which essentially means that the African countries 
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must own the peace processes and provide leadership in resolving conflicts 
rocking the continent (Møller, 2009; Beswick, 2010). It is important to mention 
that while this catchphrase is supported by the AU and its member states, it also 
has ambiguity in its meaning and implications for African peace processes 
(Ferim, 2013b; Černohous and Kříž, 2014; Williams and Boutellis, 2014). Critics 
have pointed out that the persistent political and economic strains on the African 
continent pose the greatest challenges to the view of ‘African solutions,’ hence, 
African problems require international solutions (Černohous, and Kříž, 2014). 
Some scholars have argued that the African continent lacks prerequisites for 
successful peace operations in the form of leading state(s) or hegemon, that is 
able to inspire others or possess some significant threat to use force in order to 
ensure compliance from conflicting parties (Ferim, 2013a: 147). These hegemons 
also ensure the availability of much needed financial and logistical support for 
peace operations. This study, however, does not discuss this ambiguity but rather 
examines how the AU institutional framework works in providing leadership for 
peace and security in the continent. The dynamic nature of peace operations and 
conflict mediation requires well defined leadership processes in guiding different 
stakeholders towards collective action in peace efforts. There is a consensus in 
the literature that the transition of OAU to AU has enabled the AU to increasingly 
respond to conflicts in the region (Dompere, 2006; Francis, 2006; Boutellis and 
Williams, 2013a; Williams and Boutellis, 2014). It is therefore important to review 
this evolution and outline the AU leadership framework. 
 
5.1 Transition from Organisation of African Unity to the African 
Union 
The establishment of the AU was initiated by African Heads of State and 
Government to expedite the process of economic and political integration in the 
continent. Significant direction in this regard was provided by the former 
President of Libya, Muammar Gaddafi. A substantial number of OAU structures 
formed the foundation of the AU. Similarly, many of the OAU’s core commitments, 
decisions and strategic frameworks continue to frame AU policies (AU Handbook, 
2016: 11). However, the AU Constitutive Act and Protocols marked a significant 
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departure from the OAU and a number of new structures have been established 
since 2002. For instance, Article 4(f) of the Constitutive Act of the AU provides 
for humanitarian intervention in a member state in the case of genocide (crimes 
against humanity). This is a significant departure from OAU’s emphasis of non-
interference.  
 
The AU transition started in the Sirte Extraordinary Session (1999) of the African 
Heads of State and Government held in Libya that decided to establish an African 
Union. This was followed by the Lome Summit (2000) in Togo which adopted the 
Constitutive Act of the Union, and the Lusaka Summit (2001) in Zambia that drew 
the road map for the implementation of the AU. Finally, the Durban Summit 
(2002) in South Africa launched the AU and convened the first Assembly of the 
Heads of State of the African Union.  
 
The dawn of new African integration established a new vision of the AU which 
was ‘an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and 
representing a dynamic force in the global arena’ (AU Vision Statement). As 
noted in the AU Vision Statement, the institution shifted its focus from the OAU’s 
main agenda which was the fight against colonialism. In this regard, there has 
been special attention to more integration, leading to economic development and 
enabling Africa to become a global partner. The focus has also been on peace 
and security and self-determination in the African development agenda. It is 
acknowledged within the AU institutional documents that such a vision is a long-
term effort with significant challenges, and therefore urges resilience and focus 
on the part of African countries. To underscore this African vision, the AU 
objectives, among others, make special mention of the following: achievement of 
greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the peoples of 
Africa;  encourage international cooperation by taking due account of the Charter 
of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; promote 
peace, security, and stability on the continent;  coordinate and harmonise the 
policies between the existing and future Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs) for the gradual attainment of the objectives of the Union (AU Handbook, 
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2016). A summary of these objectives indicates that the transition from OAU to 
the AU revitalised the Pan-African agenda and established norms and values for 
African unity. 
 
5.1.1 The Pan-African renaissance and African unity 
The Pan-Africanism or African nationalism is the rise of collective consciousness 
of the African people searching for collective solutions or responses to common 
problems facing the African continent (Murithi, 2017). Pan-Africanism is also ‘a 
struggle to reactivate the African traditional values of governance, statecraft and 
social management’ (Dompere, 2006: 7). Central themes in this notion of Pan-
Africanism are collective consciousness, unity and the commitment of African 
people to drive their own African agenda for the direct benefit of African people 
(Asante, 2010; Edozie, 2014). In Pan-African literature, regional integration is 
seen as a tool for achieving more unity, solidarity and political stability in the 
continent (Dompere, 2006; Ajayi and Oshewolo, 2013; Murithi, 2017). The role of 
international partners is also encouraged and emphasised as a vital component 
for achieving this African dream. It is noted that ‘African leaders have renewed 
their commitments to regional integration efforts to overcome the challenges that 
confront the continent and serve as the political architecture for peace, stability 
and a secured future’ (Ajayi, and Oshewolo, 2013: 3).  
 
African political history is replete with integration efforts in the fight against a 
multitude of challenges including colonisation, poverty, drought, hunger, political 
instability and violent conflicts. Pan-Africanism was the founding philosophy and 
uniting force for the OAU and later for its transformation to AU. The earlier 
dynamics that motivated regional integration in the 1960s and 1970s were, 
therefore, the struggle against colonialism and uniting Africa. However, the 
violent conflicts from the 1990s to the present day have brought several African 
countries together in order to resolve these conflicts, leading to more integration 
driven by peace and security challenges. It is noted in the preamble to the 
Constitutive Act of the AU, that the ultimate aim of economic development in 
Africa cannot be achieved in an environment scourged by violent conflicts. The 
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revival of the Pan-African renaissance leading to the creation of the AU has 
renewed the African focus on integration processes, and peace and security. 
 
5.2 Regional integration processes and leadership in Africa 
As highlighted above, the notion of regional integration in Africa is not a new 
phenomenon. Since the creation of the OAU, African leaders have attempted to 
unite the continent and advance concerted efforts towards its social and 
economic development. However, despite such efforts, limited progress has been 
made, paradoxically due to a lack of alignment, commitment and divisions among 
African leaders (Ajayi and Oshewolo, 2013; Ferim, 2013b). An agreement on a 
particular path of integration in the continent has been a bone of contention and 
a source of division among African leaders. As shown in Chapter 3, international 
relations literature has mainly defined regional integration as the process by 
which supranational institutions replace national ones, where sovereignty is 
gradually shifted from state to regional or global structures (Goldstein et al., 2008: 
354). Through this process, states achieve maximum interconnections through 
economic and political union (Nolan, 2002: 793). The African integration in this 
regard has differed.  
 
During the process leading to the establishment of the OAU, two groups emerged 
– commonly known as the Casablanca and Monrovia groups (Kloman, 1962: 387-
404). These groups had opposing roadmaps to African integration. The 
Casablanca group led by the former Ghanaian President, Kwame Nkrumah, and 
supported by Gamal Abdel-Nasser of Egypt, and Sékou Touré of Guinea, 
proposed a more integrated Africa with a supranational structure. On the other 
hand, the Monrovia group supported by Liberia, Nigeria and most Francophone 
countries, was for a gradual and less integrated OAU structure. As a result of this 
division, the OAU was created with limited or no powers at all and unable to 
undertake any significant leadership in political and economic development of the 
continent. However, there are claims in the literature that the organisation 
facilitated the drive in the fight against colonialism and achieved its objectives in 
that regard (Dompere, 2006; Gutto, 2006). Inasfar as the history of regional 
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integration and supra-nationalism in Africa is concerned, there has been limited 
sharing of powers between states and regional institutions (Olivier, 2010; Nathan, 
2012). African states, whether small or large have been unwilling to give up their 
exclusive claim of sovereignty and have reduced the powers and authority of 
regional institutions (Ajayi and Oshewolo, 2013: 7; Olivier, 2015). A significant 
number of African leaders have supported the existence of a functional body 
rather than the establishment of a supranational body (Ferim, 2013b: 151). 
 
It is also observed that African regional integration efforts have mostly been 
individually driven rather than institutionally led. For instance, Kwame Nkrumah 
of Ghana, has been credited as a notable force behind Pan-Africanism and 
integration in Africa. His ideas shaped the new thinking in African leaders and 
scholars on the possible path to unity and prosperity in Africa (Dompere, 2006; 
Addo, 2008; Asante, 2010). However, after his demise the ideas were not further 
pursued until 50 years later when the former President of Libya, Muammar 
Gaddafi, significantly influenced the Pan-African agenda and steered the 
transformation of OAU to AU. The failures of the OAU and the emergence of 
several crises in Africa in the 1990s, notably civil wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone, 
Somalia and the Rwanda genocide, coupled with the dwindling of Western 
interests in resolving African conflicts, marked a significant turn of events in 
African renaissance (Dompere, 2006; Francis, 2006; Gutto, 2006; Ajayi and 
Oshewolo, 2013). On this backdrop, African leaders felt the need to transform the 
OAU into a viable institution that could tackle these challenges. This was when 
the former Libyan President, Muammar Gaddafi, rose to the occasion and the 
Sirte Declaration of 1999 by African leaders cleared the ground for the 
establishment of the AU in 2002 as a successor to the OAU.  
 
5.3 Hegemons and leadership of peace efforts within the AU 
The review of the past African peace efforts indicates the absence of consistent 
hegemonic leadership in peace operations and mediation within the AU. African 
political history has some evidence of isolated hegemons who have taken charge 
of African peace efforts for a limited time. Such countries include Nigeria, South 
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Africa, Egypt, Algeria and Libya. Since the early 1990s Nigeria has been 
instrumental in deploying its troops for humanitarian interventions in West Africa 
under The Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group 
(ECOMOG), specifically in Liberia and Sierra Leone. There is some evidence that 
points to the significance of Nigerian deployments, for instance, in cases such as 
Guinea Bissau where Nigerian leadership was not present, and the West African 
states leading the peace interventions failed to successfully deploy and deal with 
the humanitarian crisis (Adebajo, 2002a, 2002b; Francis, 2006; Laporte and 
Mackie, 2010). The role of Nigeria in peace interventions was further driven by 
former President Obasanjo; however, the country ‘no longer seems keen to 
assume a leadership role given the grave internal problems it now has to tackle’ 
(Ajayi, and Oshewolo, 2013: 10). Similarly, South Africa since the end of 
apartheid in the mid 1990s, under the leadership of former President Nelson 
Mandela and later President Thabo Mbeki, played a significant role in providing 
leadership for peace operations and mediation, and in promoting African 
integration. South Africa led several peace interventions for several periods. For 
instance, it was the only country that deployed troops in Burundi in 2003 for a 
year under the AU while other countries that made commitments failed to deploy 
(Agoagye, 2004; Murithi, 2008). South Africa also later deployed in Darfur under 
AU.  South Africa’s deployments and peace efforts for the past 20 years 
demonstrated the country’s leadership in resolving African conflicts. However, it 
now faces significant economic challenges and seems more preoccupied in 
resolving internal problems and more interested in leadership within the 
subregional group SADC (Ferim, 2013b: 148).  
 
Ferim (2013b) further notes that despite South Africa’s significant contribution to 
the AU budget, there is a realisation that the country cannot afford to be 
everywhere in the vast continent due to economic strains.  In the cases of Egypt 
and Algeria, the countries have a geo-political dilemma and dual focus on both 
the AU and Arab League due to their affiliations to both organisations. Despite 
being part of the largest financial contributors to the AU budget, they have not 
assumed any significant leadership in African peace interventions. Moreover, 
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since the Arab Spring, Egypt has had significant challenges internally and has 
been more preoccupied with its own political instability and security. Similarly, 
Libya since the death of President Muammar Gaddafi, has been rocked with 
significant instability. As a result of this, the country cannot afford to proactively 
engage itself in African peace efforts. Additionally, it was only President Gaddafi 
who had a special interest in African renaissance and shifted his focus from the 
Arab League to the African Union and the same may not apply to new Libyan 
leaders (Sturman, 2003). 
 
In the absence of hegemons to steer peace interventions in Africa, the AU and 
subregional organisations, such as the SADC and others, have collectively been 
engaged in peace operations and conflict mediation. To achieve this, member 
states pool their resources and personnel, in addition to international donors, to 
enable the AU and RECs to conduct peace operations. Significant interactions 
among the AU, RECs and international partners are seen as a prerequisite for 
smooth coordination and conduct of peace operations. Additionally, clear 
leadership in these interactions is vital for peace operations and joint mediations 
to be conducted smoothly. This research explores how these interactions occur 
and how leadership is produced within the AU peace interventions. The diversity 
of the African continent, coupled with economic underdevelopment and little 
integration, has to some extent paradoxically influenced African leaders to 
support the philosophy of ‘African solutions to African problems,’ since there is 
no blueprint that can be followed in mitigating African problems. Conceptually the 
idea of African solutions has significant connotations of African leadership in 
peace efforts. 
 
5.4 African solutions to African problems?  
The notion of ‘African solutions to African problems’ has for the past 10 years 
gained momentum among African leaders and scholars. This notion has a 
dichotomy of meanings. It has come in response to what is considered Western 
or foreign intervention in the internal affairs of African countries, while at the same 
time African states require Western financial resources to deal with African 
  105 
problems. On the other hand, it has come as a response to devise ways of dealing 
with ever increasing insecurity in Africa, due to fading interest in Western 
countries to intervene in these conflicts (Møller, 2009; Beswick, 2010). The 
notable case is the Rwanda genocide in which the international community failed 
to intervene, despite having credible information on the impending horrific 
massacre of the Tutsi minority group (Corey and Joireman, 2004: 73-89).  It is 
argued in this case that if African leaders had been proactive and intervened in 
Rwanda using African troops, this deplorable incident could have been avoided 
(Beswick, 2010; Bachmann, 2011). Hence, there is a need to have an African 
capability to intervene without waiting for international assistance. On the other 
hand, the notion of African solutions suggests a resurrection of African 
renaissance to fight against the tyranny of Western imperialism (Dompere, 2006). 
At the same time, it also indicates a commitment by African leaders to retake 
control of the continent and be instrumental in influencing the socio-political and 
economic affairs of the region (Kaye, 2011; Ferim, 2013b: 143; Hansen, 2013). 
In this light, the AU has viewed its peace interventions as the apogee of ‘African 
solutions to African problems’. The peace interventions have provided the 
symbolic signpost of African decolonisation and self-determination. 
 
Inconsistently, the slogan has also been used to insulate African leaders from the 
consequences of bad governance (Mills, 2012); for instance, the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) interventions following cases of human rights abuse and 
genocidal tendencies during Kenyan electoral violence in 2008; Ivory Coast 
electoral violence in 2010; and targeted violence in Darfur – Sudan from 2003.  
The intervention of the ICC has led some African countries including Kenya, 
Burundi, and Sudan to give notice of withdrawal from the court and evoke the 
slogan of ‘African solutions’ to devise African mechanisms of dealing with African 
problems (Mills, 2012; Keppler, 2012). Some African leaders have argued that 
ICC interventions are only targeting African leaders and are argued to be 
prognoses of neo-colonialism that must be resisted by African countries (Clarke, 
2009; Kaye, 2011; Hansen, 2013; Tiemessen, 2014). It is against this backdrop 
that African leaders have condemned Western intervention in African politics. For 
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instance, African leaders through the AU heavily condemned the French 
intervention in 2011 in the Ivory Coast that led to the overthrow of President 
Laurent Gbagbo and his subsequent charges and convictions by the ICC. In the 
same year the intervention by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in 
Libya in 2011 that led to the disposition and extermination of President Muammar 
Gaddafi received heavy criticism from the AU. These Western interventions have 
increased efforts within the AU to collectively resolve African security challenges. 
 
The proximity to conflict argument has also promoted the notion of African 
leadership. As shown in Chapter 3, it is argued that regional and subregional 
actors often have a better understanding of the conflict dynamics in their regions, 
as they share the same cultures and understandings and are therefore more able 
to resolve the conflicts in the given region (Bellamy and Williams, 2005; Williams, 
2009a; Angelov, 2010; Gelot, 2012). Additionally, they are more likely to commit 
themselves to the resolution of the given conflicts since they are directly affected 
by the conflicts in the form of cross border criminal activities and flow of refugees 
(Olonisakin, 2000; Francis, 2006). Hence, the assumption is that Africans must 
provide the leadership in resolving their problems. Former South African 
President Thabo Mbeki indicated that ‘it’s critically important that the African 
continent should deal with these conflict situations… We have not asked for 
anybody outside of the African continent to deploy troops in Darfur. It’s an African 
responsibility, and we can do it’ (Rice, 2005: B4). Similarly, President Paul 
Kagame of Rwanda in talks with former American President George W Bush in 
2008 indicated that ‘the best approach is . . . to help Africans develop their 
capacity to deal with these [security] problems’ (Williams, 2008a: 311). Relatedly, 
the former African Union Commissioner Alpha Oumar Konare at the UN Security 
Council debate on peace and security in Africa suggested that ‘it was important 
to build African capacities, because the responsibility is, first and foremost, our 
own’ (UN doc. S/PV.5868 2008: 34, cited in Williams, 2008a: 311). It is against 
this backdrop that the notion of African solutions incorporates international 
cooperation and promotes African interactions with global partners. However, 
there is a gap in knowledge on the extent and nature of leadership when 
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conducting peace operations and mediation within the African regional setting. 
There are numerous partners that provide support to AU peace interventions; 
however, this study focuses on national contingents/TCCs and SADC as they 
represent key subregional actors. To understand the overall context of the study, 
the following section outlines the AU peace and security structures for decision 
making processes in peace operations and mediation. 
 
5.5 African Union structures for peace and security 
The AU has developed several structures that promote peace and security in the 
continent. These include: The AU Assembly; Executive Council; The 
Commission; The Permanent Representatives' Committee; Pan-
African Parliament; Peace and Security Council (PSC). The basic pictorial 
representation is shown in Figure 5.1. 
 
 
Figure 5.1 AU Peace and security structure 
Source: The author 
The Assembly is composed of Heads of State and Government or their duly 
accredited representatives. The Assembly of Heads of State and Government is 
the supreme organ of the Union. It is also the ultimate authority for the PSC and 
decides on peace operations deployments (AU Handbook 2016: 16). The 
Executive Council is composed of Ministers or Authorities designated by the 
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Executive Council is responsible to the Assembly and it also forms the middle 
layer of the PSC. The AU Commission is composed of the Chairperson, the 
Deputy Chairperson, eight Commissioners and staff members. Within the eight 
commissions there is a portfolio for peace and security. The AU Commission is 
the key organ playing a central role in the day-to-day management of the AU. 
Among others, it also represents the Union and defends its interests; elaborates 
draft common positions of the Union; prepares strategic plans and strategies for 
the consideration of the Executive Council; and elaborates, promotes, 
coordinates and harmonises the programmes and policies of the Union with those 
of the RECs (AU Handbook 2016: 68-70). The Permanent Representatives' 
Committee is composed of Permanent Representatives of Member States 
accredited to the Union. These are usually ambassadors from the member states 
of the AU. The Permanent Representatives Committee is charged with the 
responsibility of preparing the work of the Executive Council and it is the lowest 
level of the PSC (AU Handbook 2016:30).  
 
The AU has a Pan-African Parliament (PAP) whose aim is to ensure the full 
participation of African peoples in governance, development and economic 
integration of the continent.  PAP representatives are elected by the legislatures 
of AU member states, rather than directly by citizens. The ultimate aim is for the 
Parliament to be an institution with full legislative powers. However, PAP is not 
as fully functional as intended, and only has consultative and advisory powers 
within the AU (AU Handbook 2016: 86). Within all the components of the AU, the 
PSC is the key institution that provides leadership and coordinates continental 
conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms.  
 
5.5.1 African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) 
The APSA is a key framework of the AU mechanism for promoting peace, security 
and stability in the African continent (core AU objectives under article 3 of its 
Constitutive Act). Figure 5.2 shows the APSA structure: 
 
 
  109 
 
Figure 5.2 African Peace and Security Architecture Framework 
Source: The European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) 
According to the AU Handbook (2014: 28) APSA has several key elements, 
including the: PSC which is the main pillar of APSA and a standing decision-
making organ of the AU on matters of peace and security; Continental Early 
Warning System (which monitors and reports on emerging crises); Panel of the 
Wise (which is a consultative body established to provide advice); African 
Standby Force which is mainly a regional mechanism structure intended to 
provide rapid deployment peacekeeping forces for the AU; Peace Fund (which is 
intended to fund peacekeeping and peace support operations). The various 
African peace and security mechanisms work in tandem with the peace and 
security structures of the RECs30 and RMs set up to support regional peace and 
security (AU Handbook, 2014).  
 
The AU has several subregional groups, some of which have developed their 
own subregional peace and security arrangements. These include: Arab 
Maghreb Union (UMA); Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); 
                                                      
30 See more at: http://www.au.int/en/organs/recs#sthash.2JCLvX1G.dpuf  
Some materials have been removed due to 3rd party 
copyright. The unabridged version can be viewed in 
Lancester Library - Coventry University.
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Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD); the East African Community 
(EAC); Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of 
Central African States (ECCAS). In addition, there is the Eastern Africa Standby 
Force Coordination Mechanism (EASFCOM) and North African Regional 
Capability (NARC) (AU Handbook 2016). The Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa is mainly a trade related regional organisation, although it has at 
times been involved in conflict mediation; however, it is not regarded as an APSA 
pillar. The RECs are shown in Figure 5.3. 
Figure 5.3: AU Regional Economic Communities 
Source: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 
Some materials have been removed due to 3rd party copyright. The unabridged 
version can be viewed in Lancester Library - Coventry University.
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5.6 Peace and Security Council (PSC) 
The PSC as the main pillar of APSA is the standing organ of the AU for the 
prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. APSA, as shown above, is 
the umbrella term for AU mechanisms for promoting peace, security and stability 
in Africa (AU Handbook 2016: 50-54). The PSC operates hierarchically at summit 
(assembly), ministers’ and ambassadors’ levels, as shown in Figure 5.4: 
 
Figure 5.4 AU Peace and Security Council 
Source: The author 
The PSC was established to be a collective security and ‘early warning’ 
arrangement with the ability to facilitate timely and efficient responses to conflict 
and crisis situations. The PSC’s core functions are to conduct early warning and 
preventive diplomacy, facilitate peace-making, establish peace operations and, 
in certain circumstances, recommend intervention in member states to promote 
peace, security and stability. The PSC also works in support of peace building 
and post-conflict reconstruction as well as humanitarian action and disaster 
management. 
The PSC was established by the AU Assembly and is legally mandated by the 
Constitutive Act (2003) together with Article 2 of the 2002 Protocol Relating to the 
Establishment of the PSC of the AU. Under article 7 of the Protocol, the PSC’s 
key powers include to: anticipate and prevent disputes and conflicts, as well as 
policies, which may lead to genocide and crimes against humanity; undertake 
Some materials have been removed due to 3rd 
party copyright. The unabridged version can be 
viewed in Lancester Library - Coventry 
University.
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peace-making, peace building and peace-support missions; recommend 
intervention in a member state in respect of grave circumstances, namely war 
crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity; implement the AU’s common 
defence policy; ensure implementation of key conventions and instruments to 
combat international terrorism; promote coordination between RMs and the AU 
regarding peace, security and stability in Africa; and support and facilitate 
humanitarian action in situations of armed conflicts or major natural disasters. 
5.6.1 Structure of PSC 
The PSC has 15 members. All are elected by the AU Executive Council and 
endorsed by the Assembly. Five members are elected for three-year terms and 
10 for two-year terms. Members are elected according to the principle of equitable 
regional representation and national rotation. National rotation is agreed within 
the regional groups. Regional representation is usually: Central Africa: three 
seats; Eastern Africa: three seats; Northern Africa: two seats; Southern Africa: 
three seats; Western Africa: four seats (AU Handbook, 2016). 
 
Article 5(2) of the PSC Protocol lists responsibilities for members that include: 
contribution to the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in Africa; 
participation in conflict resolution, peace-making and peace building at regional 
and continental levels; willingness and ability to take up responsibility for regional 
and continental conflict resolution initiatives; contribution to the Peace Fund 
and/or Special Fund; respect for constitutional governance, the rule of law and 
human rights; and commitment to AU financial obligations. The PSC Secretariat, 
established under article 10(4) of the PSC Protocol, provides direct operational 
support and operates within the AU Commission’s Peace and Security 
Department.  
 
The PSC meets in continuous session and all members are required to keep a 
permanent presence at AU Headquarters (AU Handbook, 2016). Meetings are 
held at three levels: permanent representatives, Ministers, and Heads of State 
and Government. Article 8(2) of the PSC Protocol requires Permanent 
Representatives to meet at least twice a month, and Ministers and Heads of State 
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and Government at least once a year. Article 8(6) provides that the Chair shall 
be held in turn by the members, in the English alphabetical order of country 
names, for one calendar month. PSC meetings include closed sessions, open 
meetings and informal consultations. PSC decisions are guided by consensus. 
Where consensus is not possible, decisions on procedural matters are taken by 
a simple majority; and on substantive matters, by a two-thirds majority (PSC 
Protocol, article 8(13)). To avoid any conflict of interest within its membership, 
Article 8(9) of the Protocol states that a member that is party to a conflict or 
situation under consideration by the PSC may not participate in the discussion 
and decision-making process relating to that conflict or situation. Figure 5.5, 
shows the organisational chart of the peace and security department that 
implements PSC decisions.  
 
Figure 5.5 AU Peace and Security Department  
Source: Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program 
Some materials have been removed due to 3rd party copyright. The unabridged 
version can be viewed in Lancester Library - Coventry University.
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5.6.2 The Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) / African Standby Force 
Continental Planning Element (ASF CPE) 
The AU Commission’s PSOD, alternatively referred to as the African Standby 
Force Continental Planning Element, was set up pursuant to the provisions of 
Article 13 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security 
Council (2002), and also Article 3.4 (a) and Article 18 of the Policy Framework on 
the Establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee 
(2004). PSOD provides the operational leadership of peace operations and 
reports to the PSC. 
5.6.3 Functions of the PSOD 
The functions of the PSOD are to plan, launch, sustain, monitor and liquidate all 
peace operations authorised by the PSC and/or the Assembly of Heads of State 
and Government of the AU (Assembly), as appropriate. It also assists in directing 
and managing such operations. The PSOD is, as per Article 7 of the Specialised 
Technical Committee of Ministers of Defence, Safety and Security (STCDSS) 
Declaration 2010, composed of four units, namely, Policy Development Unit 
(PDU), Capability Development Unit (CDU), Plans and Operations Unit (POU), 
and Mission Support Unit (MSU). 
 
The PSOD is responsible for coordinating with the RECs, RMs in the peace 
operations under the APSA.  Among other functions, the PSOD is responsible for 
developing terms of reference and generating civilian, police and military 
personnel, equipment and assets provided by AU member states for deployment 
in AU peace operations. The department has the direct planning and coordinating 
responsibility for all transitions of peace operations from AU to joint UN and 
REC/RMs operations. Through the PSOD, the AU provides strategic oversight, 
monitoring, support, guidance and evaluation of AU approved peace operations 
to the African Union Commission (AUC). PSOD is the primary contact point of 
the AUC for the RECs/RMs and AU partners on matters related to peace 
operations. 
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5.6.4 PSOD Policy Development Unit  
The overall function of the Policy Development Unit is to develop strategic level 
policies for peace operations. It is responsible for the overall policy development 
by actively undertaking ongoing policy research, lessons learned and developing 
best practices. The Unit is therefore actively engaged in field mission visits and 
gathering of information that inform the policy development under the PSOD and 
PSC.   
 
5.6.5 PSOD Capability Development Unit 
The overall function of this unit is to develop capabilities for standby forces of AU 
peace operations. It has three cells: the training and development cell responsible 
for planning and co-ordinating continental training processes for peace 
operations; the monitoring and evaluation cell, which is responsible for the 
evaluation of ongoing AU peace operations, monitoring and evaluating the 
training impact to ensure adequacy in enhancing the implementation of the 
mandate; and the capability generation cell, which is responsible for facilitating 
and coordinating with RECs/RMs, facilitating the deployments and rotations of 
AU peace operations personnel and maintaining a database of 
forces/capabilities. Hence, the focus for the unit is on training and preparations 
for peace operations deployment. 
 
5.6.6 PSOD Plans and Operations Unit 
The overall function of this unit is to plan and manage peace operations. It has 
three cells: the planning cell whose responsibility is to identify and advise on 
areas of potential conflict/humanitarian emergencies for intervention on the 
African continent in collaboration with the Conflict Management Division or other 
relevant AUC Departments. The planning cell also serves as the focal point with 
RECs/RMs on planning of peace operations. The operations cell is responsible 
for managing the peace operation centre (PSOC) in conjunction with the 
information analysis cell, and also conducts regular inspection visits to current 
AU Missions to ensure compliance with AU procedures and policies. The 
information analysis cell is responsible for analysing daily situational and other 
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reports from the missions in order to maintain situational awareness. This 
includes providing real time situational awareness on ongoing AU missions to 
relevant AUC units, and also collating, assessing, evaluating and disseminating 
information on AU PSOs to AU stakeholders.  
 
5.6.7 PSOD Mission Support Unit  
The overall function of this unit is to provide support to ongoing peace operations. 
It has two main cells: the Integrated Support Services Cell whose responsibility 
is to develop logistical frameworks, strategic guidance and operational guidance 
on all aspects of integrated support services for the peace operations, and also 
serve as the focal point in the liquidation of ongoing peace operations; and the 
General Services Cell whose responsibility is to develop frameworks, strategic 
guidance and operational guidance on all aspects of general services including 
contracts and recruitment for the peace operations. 
 
In conclusion, the PSC has clear structures for decision making and support for 
peace interventions. It has designed a number of institutions to assist the 
implementation of its tasks in a field mission. The study, therefore, investigates 
how the AU through the PSC Protocols and instruments has guided peace 
missions in Somalia and joint mediation with SADC in Madagascar. The study 
examines the extent to which these AU structures facilitate the production of 
leadership in peace interventions. The AU peace and security architecture also 
demonstrate the significance of RMs/RECs in implementation of AU peace 
efforts.  The PSC through AU Peace Support Operations Division provides the 
interface and operational direction and coordination with RMs in conflict 
interventions. At this point, it is important to describe the SADC role in peace and 
security and how it supplements the gradual attainment of the AU objectives in 
peace efforts. 
 
5.7 Southern African Development Community background 
The SADC was established as a development coordinating conference (SADCC) 
in 1980 and transformed into a development community in 1992. SADCC and 
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Front-Line States (FLS) were created to advance the cause of national political 
liberation in Southern Africa, and to reduce dependence, particularly on the then 
apartheid South Africa31. The transformation from SADCC to SADC was 
undertaken in order to achieve more integration and economic development in 
the region. Not all countries within SADC are part of the Southern African region 
in terms of the AU’s division of the continent. In Figure 5.6 is the map of SADC. 
 
 
Figure 5.6 SADC Map 
Source: SADC 
As shown on the map, Madagascar and Tanzania are in the eastern region of the 
African continent, while the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is in the central 
region of Africa. During the creation of the OAU, states were allowed to choose 
where to belong depending on their self-perception (Cawthra, 2010: 10). Like the 
AU, the SADC is an inter-governmental organisation whose main objectives are 
                                                      
31 From 1976 independent countries in Southern Africa came together to form the Frontline 
States in order to fight against colonialism in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa and these 
countries included Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Zambia and Tanzania. 
Some materials have been removed due to 3rd party copyright. The unabridged 
version can be viewed in Lancester Library - Coventry University.
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to achieve economic development, peace and security, and alleviate poverty 
through regional integration among 15 Southern African Member States.32  
 
In the same spirit as the AU, there is greater emphasis on regional integration 
and peace and security within SADC in order for the region to achieve its 
objectives. SADC policies that form the SADC common agenda and are reflected 
in the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) and Strategic 
Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) include the following: promotion of common 
political values, systems and other shared values which are transmitted through 
institutions that are democratic, legitimate, and effective; consolidate, defend and 
maintain democracy, peace, security and stability; promotion of self-sustaining 
development on the basis of collective self-reliance, and the interdependence 
of member states. In order to achieve its objectives and support its policies, 
SADC has put up structures for integration, but the region still lacks strong 
economic, social and political ties to integrate all the countries (Cawthra, 2010: 
10). However, political, peace and security agendas provided a uniting factor for 
states within the Southern Africa region and have promoted integration. 
 
5.7.1 Structures for peace and security within the SADC 
The SADC has been involved in peace interventions and has attempted to 
resolve crises in Angola, the Democratic Republic of Cong (DRC), Lesotho, 
Madagascar and Zimbabwe. From this backdrop, SADC has established a range 
of structures for peace and security guided by several protocols and the SADC 
Treaty. The SADC Treaty is the legal document for the establishment of SADC 
and within it a series of institutional mechanisms similar to those of the AU have 
been established. Some of them include the Summit of Heads of State or 
Government; Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation; Council of 
Ministers; Standing Committee of Officials; a Secretariat; The Tribunal; and the 
                                                      
32 SADC member states are Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, 
United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
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SADC Parliament. The rudimentary picture of SADC peace and security 
architecture is shown in Figure 5.7. 
 
 
Figure 5.7 SADC Structure for peace and security 
Source: The author 
The SADC Summit is made up of all SADC Heads of State or Government and 
is managed by a troika system33. The summit at the SADC, like at the AU level, 
is responsible for the overall policy direction and makes all decisions for the 
institution. This is followed by the Council of Ministers which prepares policies for 
the summit approval and ensures their implementation. The Council consists of 
Ministers from each member state, usually from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, 
Economic Planning, or Finance and also operates on a troika basis. The SADC 
Secretariat is then responsible for strategic planning, co-ordination and 
management of SADC programmes. It is therefore, responsible for the 
implementation of policies and is headed by an Executive Secretary. 
  
The SADC Tribunal was designed to ensure adherence to, and proper 
interpretation of SADC provisions, the SADC Treaty and subsidiary instruments, 
and adjudicate upon disputes referred to it. However, after several judgement 
rulings against the Zimbabwean government, the Tribunal was de facto 
                                                      
33 SADC troika consists of a Chairperson, Incoming Chairperson and Outgoing Chairperson, 
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suspended at the 2010 SADC Summit, following the pressure from the 
Zimbabwean government (Nathan, 2013a). In 2012, the SADC Summit resolved 
that a new Tribunal mandate should be confined to interpretation of the SADC 
Treaty and Protocols relating to disputes between member states. In this case, 
the powers of the Tribunal were significantly removed by the Heads of State and 
Government within the SADC. Relatedly, established under Article 9 (2) of the 
SADC Treaty, the SADC Parliamentary Forum does not have any reporting 
relationship to Summit and other SADC Institutions, but works together with them 
on matters of common interest. Established by the SADC Summit on September 
8, 1997, the Forum consists of Presiding Officers, and a maximum of five 
representatives elected by the National Parliament of each member state. The 
Forum only provides a platform for member states’ parliamentarians to interact 
and promote best practices in democracy, human rights and other practices for 
the promotion of regional integration and cooperation (SADC, 1997). The 
weaknesses of both the SADC Tribunal and SADC Parliamentary Forum in 
determining issues of peace and security, make the organ on politics defence 
and security the only powerful institution for peace and security within the SADC. 
 
5.7.2 The SADC Organ on Politics Defence and Security (OPDS) 
The SADC OPDS (also known as the Organ) is a key institution on matters 
related to peace and security cooperation. It is equivalent to the PSC of the AU. 
It is managed on a troika basis and coordinated at the level of Summit, consisting 
of a Chairperson, Incoming Chairperson and Outgoing Chairperson, and reports 
to the SADC Summit Chairperson. It also operates at a ministerial level, usually 
foreign affairs, defence, police, intelligence and home affairs, and at the level of 
officials, mainly chiefs of defence, police and intelligence. There are two 
significant ministerial committees within the Organ and these include, the 
Interstate Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) and Interstate Politics and 
Diplomacy Committee (IPDC). The issues of peace and security are more 
predominant within the SADC, hence, ISDSC is more active in this regard.  
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The implementation of peace and security is guided by a Strategic 
Implementation Plan for the Organ (SIPO) adopted in 2004. According to Article 
2 of the SADC Protocol on the establishment of OPDS (2001), the Organ is 
responsible for promoting regional co-operation on matters related to defence 
and security, preventing, containing and resolving inter- and intra-state conflict 
through peaceful means, ‘enforcement action ... as a matter of last resort ... only 
with the authorisation of the United Nations Security Council’, promotion of 
democracy and human rights, promoting regional cooperation between police 
and state security services, encouraging the implementation of UN and other 
international treaties on arms control, disarmament and peaceful relations 
between states, and developing regional peacekeeping capacities (SADC Organ 
2001).  
 
5.8 Continental and regional integration and cooperation: UN, 
AU and SADC peace and security framework 
As discussed in Chapter 3, there are theoretical and practical differences on the 
conceptualisation of peace operations between UN and AU. The AU PSC has a 
wide range of powers for peace interventions including stabilisation of fragile 
governments, as demonstrated in the case of Somalia. In this regard, the AU 
peace operations framework allows it to take sides in supporting a particular 
conflicting party. Additionally, the AU deploys where there is no peace to keep 
(African Union, 2016). On the other hand, UN peace operations are based on 
three principles; consent, impartiality and non-use of force except in self-defence, 
and defence of the mandate.  
 
Theoretically, the UN has the global authority on peace and security and is tasked 
to develop overall peace and security policy guidelines that are adopted at the 
AU level. These policies are then passed on from the AU to RECs/RMs for further 
domestication and implementation at subregional or state level (De Sousa and 
Dias, 2013: 65). Ideally the hierarchy in this regard, determines the levels of 
responsibility. For instance, the UN and AU developed a ten-year capacity-
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building programme aimed at developing AU peace and security functions, 
including mediation and peacekeeping. This development led to the 
establishment of a UN coordinating office at the AU headquarters and annual 
coordination meetings. While the UN Security Council has a de jure decision 
making status, the AU has a role to play in determining peace processes in 
conjunction with subregional institutions. The AU and SADC have at times 
conducted peace interventions without prior authorisation of the UN. However, it 
is generally acknowledged that regional peace interventions require ‘moral 
authority’ (Dorn, 1998) or unique legitimacy (Bellamy and Williams, 2005) that the 
UN confers, or require accountability to the UN itself (Weiss, 2007).34  
 
AU and SADC cooperation is provided in the APSA framework and supported by 
several agreements between the two organisations. This cooperation is 
envisaged within the framework of working together for the common goal. While 
economic development forms a major component for integration, peace and 
security is top of the agenda within the AU-SADC cooperation and interactions. 
The principle of subsidiarity and comparative advantage has been proposed as 
the main norm for governing inter-organisational relationships within APSA, 
between the AU and subregional organisations such as SADC, and between the 
UN and AU.  According to APSA the subsidiarity principle and comparative 
advantage applies in decision-making, division of labour and burden sharing 
during peace interventions35. However, there is a lack of consensus on how these 
are to be implemented (African Union, 2010, 2014). According to SADC Protocol 
on politics, defence, and security co-operation and memorandum of 
understanding on the establishment of SADC standby brigade, the SADC summit 
is the mandating authority for peace operations within the region. However, the 
                                                      
34 Cited in Ricardo Real P. De Sousa 2013: 65 African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) 
Subsidiarity and The Horn of Africa: The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) 
Centre of African Studies (CEA)/ISCTE-IUL, University Institute of Lisbon 
35 The decision-making mechanisms are mainly connected to formal procedures that conflict- 
management decisions have to go through to safeguard institutional legitimacy. Division of labour 
refers to which functions each party executes, and it is necessarily connected to the organisations' 
capacity to perform them. As stipulated by the Charter, the UNSC can entrust in other 
organisations the execution of missions, which reinforces the perspective of division of labour 
within the Charter. Burden sharing refers mainly to the financial costs of peace and security 
initiatives and who funds them. 
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SADC recognises the AU and the UN as another layer of mandating authorities. 
Despite the principle of subsidiarity and authorisation requirement, several peace 
interventions have started since 1989 without prior UNSC and AU authorisation36. 
The SADC, although technically a subsidiary body of the AU, does have direct 
interactions with the UN under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. The UN Charter 
under Chapter VIII does not specify the nature of regional organisation, hence, 
both AU and SADC have the right to resolve conflicts under both Chapter VI and 
Chapter VII of the Charter with UN Security Council authorisation in cases where 
force is used. It is from this complex background that leadership is produced in 
the AU-SADC joint peace interventions.  
 
5.9 Conclusion 
In conclusion, this chapter has outlined the evolving nature of peace and security 
within the AU and structures that support peace interventions. The chapter has 
also introduced the regional and subregional peace and security structures that 
form the basis of the case studies in Chapters 6 and 7. The formation of 
continental and regional security structures demonstrates the importance of 
coordination; however, little is known on how leadership is produced in inter- and 
intra-organisational interactions in conducting peace interventions. The AU PSC 
as the focal point of APSA has the power to authorise or mandate peace 
operations and conflict mediation37. At the SADC level, the summit is the 
decision-making body, and coordinates with the AU PSC (that is formed in part 
                                                      
36 This was the case of Burundi in 1993 and 2003 by the OAU (Organization of African Unity) and 
AU respectively; Central Africa Republic in 2002 by CEN-SAD (later taken over by ECCAS); 
Comoros in 1997 by OAU; Democratic Republic of Congo in 1999 by OAU; Guinea Bissau in 
1998 by ECOWAS; Ivory Coast in 2003 by ECOWAS; Lesotho in 1998 by SADC; Liberia in 1990 
by ECOWAS; Rwanda in 1991 by OAU; Sierra Leone in 1991 and 1997 by ECOWAS; and Sudan 
in 2004 by AU. Even if not all interventions involved peace enforcement it is generally accepted 
that they all should have been authorised by the UNSC prior to deployment. See also Ricardo 
Real P. De Sousa (2013) African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) Subsidiarity and The 
Horn of Africa: The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Centre of African Studies 
(CEA)/ISCTE-IUL, University Institute of Lisbon. 
37 AU mandated missions are those that are conducted by the AU itself, for instance AU mission 
in Burundi 2003, AU mission in Sudan (Darfur) 2004-2007 and AU mission in Somalia 2007- to 
the present, while AU authorised missions are those authorised by the AU and may be carried 
out by subregional organisations or RMs on behalf of the AU, for example African Union Electoral 
and Security Assistance Mission to the Comoros (MAES) 2007, and the AU Observer Mission in 
Burundi: 2015. These two different missions have implications for AU leadership. 
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by SADC member states). Article 16 of the PSC Protocol and APSA explicitly 
recognises RMs as building blocks for conflict prevention and resolution in the 
African continent. However, the extent to which the AU through PSC interacts 
with SADC and national contingents remains unclear. With the operationalisation 
of APSA and ever-increasing emphasis of African solutions, it is important to 
understand how leadership is created and the extent of interactions that take 
place among the AU, SADC and national contingents in peace interventions. The 
study, therefore, contributes to leadership of regional peace operations and 
mediation by specifically investigating these two case studies. The study further 
contributes to the knowledge of contemporary conflict management in Africa. 
 
The next chapter presents research findings and analysis on AU-SADC joint 
conflict mediation in Madagascar in order to draw conclusions on how leadership 
is produced between AU and subregional organisations. The chapter also 
assesses how the two organisations coordinate and interact in regional peace 
interventions. 
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Chapter 6: African Union and Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) Joint Conflict 
Mediation in Madagascar 
 
6.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents research findings and analysis on the African Union (AU) 
and Southern African Development Community (SADC) joint conflict mediation 
in Madagascar from 2008 to 2014. The findings focus on regionalisation and 
leadership of peace interventions within the AU peace and security framework. 
Through these research findings, the chapter responds to the first two research 
questions by exploring how the AU coordinates with subregional actors in conflict 
mediation and how leadership is produced within regionalised peace in Africa. 
The research findings, therefore, highlights the extent to which the AU provides 
leadership for peace interventions in Africa and the nature of its leadership. The 
chapter further shows the shifting nature of leadership between the AU and 
regional institutions. The first part of the chapter presents research findings on 
AU-SADC mediation frameworks and discusses the hierarchy-network debate 
between these inter-organisational structures. Second, a contextual background 
of AU-SADC joint mediations in Madagascar is analysed. The third part of the 
chapter analyses AU-SADC relations and how they influenced the leadership of 
mediations in Madagascar. This is done in order to further understand the joint 
mediation dynamics between the two organisations. Fourth, the chapter 
discusses the mixed leadership dichotomy identified within the principles guiding 
the relations between AU and SADC. The chapter then provides a further 
examination of AU-SADC joint mediations, identifying challenges to the 
regionalisation of peace and security. Finally, the discussion shifts to theoretical 
implications of the research findings on regionalised peace and leadership within 
the AU, followed by a conclusion to the chapter. 
 
Through the findings and analysis of leadership, the chapter contributes to 
knowledge of AU interaction with subregional actors that form the core of APSA. 
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The discussion in this chapter provides a conceptual framework for exploring 
leadership of regional peace interventions in Africa. There is a paucity of literature 
on the leadership of regional peace operations and mediation processes in Africa, 
which this study responds to. The literature review in Chapter 2 conceptualised 
leadership in both unitary and plural forms38. The research findings and analysis 
in this chapter, examine both hierarchical and shared leadership, in regional 
peace and security governance in Africa. To assist the analysis, some elements 
of leadership theory are drawn to examine the extent to which AU leadership was 
undertaken in joint mediation with the SADC. Specifically, the chapter examines 
the two ontological and epistemological approaches to leadership theory as 
discussed in the literature review. The first approach is the leadership tripod 
(leader-follower and common goals). The second school of thought is from the 
direction-alignment-commitment standpoint. In this regard, the chapter aims to 
provide further information in understanding the leadership of the AU peace and 
security framework. A further discussion on the leadership approaches within the 
AU is provided in Chapter 8. 
 
The AU interaction with the SADC in Madagascar provides a significant basis for 
examining the APSA framework. This research, therefore, feeds into the debate 
of African peace studies in regard to regionalisation of peace and security. The 
findings are derived from interviews with senior officials at SADC and AU 
headquarters and International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) 
specialised in African peace and security, and secondary data from research 
locations. The INGOs staff work hand in hand with both AU and SADC and 
provide expertise to both organisations in matters relating to peace and security. 
The INGO respondents provided an independent perspective of understanding 
AU - SADC interactions in Madagascar joint mediations. The next section 
provides the AU - SADC mediation frameworks in regionalised peace. 
 
                                                      
38 Unitary leadership is where leadership is defined in its traditional and hierarchical manner 
where there is a leader at the top then followers and a goal to be achieved. On the other hand, 
plural leadership is where leadership is a collective action shared among participants in the 
organisation. Here there is less emphasis on hierarchy. 
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6.1 AU - SADC mediation frameworks: hierarchy versus 
network 
As highlighted in Chapter 5, APSA provides institutional frameworks and 
coordination mechanisms for peace interventions in African subregional 
localities. The continental framework is guided by the principle of subsidiarity, 
complementary and comparative advantage, where subregional actors such as 
the SADC are first responders to conflicts within their region. APSA, in 
conjunction with the PSC Protocol, the AU Constitutive Act and a Memorandum 
of Understanding between the AU and Regional Economic Communities (AU-
RECs MOU), defines regionalisation of peace and security and provides rules, 
norms and values that guide collective action in any mediation efforts in the 
continent. It is from this backdrop that APSA is not a stand-alone tool but is 
utilised in conjunction with other protocols and principles.  
 
Articles 16 and 17 of the PSC Protocol stress the need for close collaboration 
between the AU and RECs in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security 
and stability39. Additionally, Article XX (1) in the AU and RECs memorandum of 
understanding (MOU) provides for modalities for interaction and states that: 
Without prejudice to the primary role of the Union in the promotion and 
maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa, the RECs and, 
where appropriate the Coordinating Mechanisms shall be encouraged to 
anticipate and prevent conflicts within and among their Member States 
and, where conflicts do occur, to undertake peace-making and peace 
building efforts to resolve them, including through deployment of peace 
support operations. 
                                                      
39 The PSC Protocol Article 16 and Article IV (ii) of the MOU, outline the principles guiding the 
relationship between the AU and RECs, stating that; the implementation of the MOU shall be 
guided by the recognition of, and respect for, the primary responsibility of the Union in the 
maintenance and promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa, in accordance with Article 
16 of the PSC protocol. Additionally, Article IV (iv) calls for the; adherence to the principles of 
subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative advantage, in order to optimise the partnership 
between the Union, the RECs and the Coordinating Mechanisms in the promotion and 
maintenance of peace, security and stability. 
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The AU PSC, as the overall mandating authority in all regional peace 
interventions, makes decisions that can either be implemented by member states 
within RECs also referred to as RMs40  or the AU mediation structure41. It is noted, 
in these provisions, that while the AU delegates conflict management to 
subregions, it retains continental leadership in the promotion and maintenance of 
peace, security and stability. The AU-RECs MOU, Article XX (4) specifically 
states that: ‘Nothing in this Memorandum shall prevent the Union from taking 
measures to maintain or restore peace and security anywhere in the continent.’ 
From this backdrop, the AU provisions, particularly through AU-RECs MOU and 
the principles of subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative advantage, 
provide for both hierarchical and shared leadership between AU and subregional 
actors.  
 
Research findings, however, reveal a different interpretation of the AU leadership 
role in subregional peace interventions. Research participants at AU 
headquarters indicated that there is a hierarchy that puts the AU at the top as a 
continental body followed by the RECs. This assertion suggests that 
regionalisation of peace has adopted the first tripod of leader-follower and 
common goals. On the other hand, research participants from SADC and INGOs 
observed that regionalisation of peace within the AU is mainly a network rather 
than a hierarchy.  They further indicated that the AU role is to complement the 
subregional initiatives in conflict resolution. The network perspective implies the 
second leadership ontology where the focus is on DAC (Drath et al., 2008). Within 
the DAC framework, the assumption in this study is that the AU and RECs work 
together in resolving regional conflicts. A further discussion on this hierarchy-
network debate in the regionalisation of peace is done later in the chapter. The 
next section provides the contextual background of AU-SADC joint mediation in 
Madagascar. In doing this, it highlights the leadership production dynamics in 
                                                      
40 Regional economic community (REC) is used interchangeably with Regional Mechanism 
(RM) and subregions. 
41 AU Conflict mediation structure comprising of Panel of the Wise supported by the staff from 
the AU Commission. 
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regionalised peace interventions and further examines the hierarchy-network 
nexus between the AU and SADC.  
 
6.2 Contextual background of AU-SADC joint mediations in 
Madagascar 
The AU-SADC joint conflict mediation in Madagascar started following the coup 
on 17 March 2009. Madagascar was suspended from AU membership on 20th 
March 2009 and from SADC on 30th March 2009. Both AU and SADC deployed 
their mediation envoys to resolve the conflict. Prior to the coup, the UN was 
already in Madagascar mediating the conflict between the Ravalomanana and 
Rajoelina camps42. The UN mediations were supported by the Malagasy Council 
of Christian Churches (FFKM), AU and the Organisation Internationale de la 
Francophonie (OIF) special envoys. However, this mediation was unsuccessful 
partly because of divisions within the FFKM, and UN mediations were abandoned 
in February 2009 (Lanz and Gasser, 2013: 11). The next UN mediation attempts 
took place after the coup and included the special envoys from SADC, AU, OIF 
and four political camps of Rajoelina, Ravalomanana and two former presidents, 
Didier Ratsiraka and Albert Zafy. This mediation attempt failed again due to 
divisions within international mediators, specifically due to the SADC stance of 
returning Ravalomanana to power (Witt, 2017).  
 
Following two unsuccessful UN mediation attempts, the AU PSC established an 
International Contact Group that included representatives of the UN, EU, AU, 
SADC, OIF, Indian Ocean Commission, Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA), permanent members of the UN Security Council and 
African countries with seats in the Council. This time the AU took over the 
leadership of the mediation process from the UN. The processes that led the UN 
to hand over leadership to the AU are not known. It is, however, important to note 
that there is an established hierarchical relationship between the UN and AU 
provided in the UN Charter and acknowledged in the AU PSC Protocol. During 
                                                      
42 Ravalomanana was forced to resign and Rajoelina was declared President of Madagascar by 
the military. 
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the second round of talks under the AU leadership, the Transitional Charter was 
drafted and signed although the conflicting parties remained divided on their roles 
in the transitional government of Madagascar. Following the SADC Summit 
recommendations on 21 June 2009, former Mozambican President, Joaquim 
Chissano, was appointed as the SADC mediator. He became the most senior 
official among the special envoys in Madagascar and assumed the leadership of 
the mediation process43. However, research participants observed that there was 
a lack of consultation between the SADC and the AU at the highest levels, and 
the AU insisted that the talks would be carried out under its leadership. The SADC 
takeover of mediation from the AU was a contested issue and is further discussed 
below on ontological factors in regionalised peace interventions.   
 
In spite of the AU-SADC leadership tensions, peace talks continued, supported 
by the Joint Mediation Team with representatives from UN, AU, SADC and OIF. 
On 9 August 2009, the Malagasy parties signed a power-sharing deal under the 
leadership of President Chissano during the Maputo Agreement and included a 
15-month transitional period followed by elections. The Maputo Agreement also 
included the formation of a government of national unity with a president, prime 
minister, deputy prime ministers and two legislative bodies. The allocation of the 
presidency during the transition period became a contentious issue and was only 
resolved on 6 November 2009, when the parties signed the Addis Ababa 
Additional Act, that made Rajoelina Transitional President alongside two Co-
presidents from the other political camps.  
 
Research findings however, reveal that the AU and SADC had different 
approaches to the aftermath of the Addis Ababa agreement. On 9 November 
2009, the AU PSC released a communiqué calling for the establishment of a 
follow-on mechanism for the implementation of the Maputo and Addis Ababa 
                                                      
43 The original four special envoys representing various organisations in Madagascar before 
former President Chissano were: Tiébilé Dramé (UN), Ablassé Ouédraogo (AU), Edem Kodjo 
(Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie, OIF), and Themba Absalom Dlamini (SADC). 
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agreements (AU 2009, para. 6), indicating the end of the mediation process. 
While on the other hand, President Chissano organised another meeting between 
the parties in Maputo in December 2009, which Rajoelina never attended and 
soon after retracted from the Maputo Agreement. The Joint Mediation Team was 
later dissolved in February 2010, signifying the stalled mediation attempts. 
However, SADC through President Chissano, remained the official mediator in 
Madagascar.  
 
What followed was a different and parallel mediation attempt from France and 
South Africa leading to a bilateral initiative launched in Pretoria in April 2010. The 
France-South Africa initiative produced nominal results and essentially 
undermined the official mediation, specifically due to France’s position, that ‘was 
perceived as opposing the mediation effort conducted by Chissano’ (ICG 2010a, 
16; Nathan, 2013b; Lanz and Gasser, 2013).  International Crisis Group reports 
in 2010 reported that France favoured Rajoelina over Ravalomanana44. 
Ravalomanana introduced English as the official language, replacing French, and 
expelled the French Ambassador in 2008. Rajoelina was an obvious favourite of 
the French (ICG 2010b, 6-7; Dewar et la., 2013; Lanz and Gasser, 2013). Hence, 
research findings reveal that France did not fully support Chissano’s mediation, 
presumably because of Ravalomanana’s SADC connections and SADC’s initial 
support for Ravalomanana that would undermine their ally, Rajoelina. The 
research findings show the role of external partners in AU peace interventions 
and how they influence the production of leadership in African peace efforts. For 
instance, policy analysts at SADC headquarters in responding to the external 
influence in Malagasy mediations indicated that there was a significant French 
influence in the negotiations, and similar observations were made by GIZ 
programme officers. The following extract from SADC policy officer explains the 
depth of French influence: 
 
                                                      
44 Ravalomanana had moved the country closer to SADC and challenged the interests of 
French entrepreneurs in Madagascar. 
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France is usually behind Francophone policies and actions. Madagascar 
mediation processes proved that. The proliferation of initiatives in 
Madagascar showed that France, through Francophone and the Indian 
Ocean group and its embassy was very active in driving the mediation 
initiatives, to the extent that SADC was not pleased… there were individual 
French interests in the negotiations and mediations (Extract 2A). 
 
The research findings indicate the French influence in the AU and SADC 
leadership of peace interventions in Madagascar. A further discussion on the 
French role in Madagascar mediations is undertaken later in the chapter.  
 
After the failure of France-South Africa parallel mediations, the SADC continued 
the peace process in Madagascar. South Africa through the SADC and acting as 
the chair of the SADC Organ on politics and defence, played a vital role and on 
17th September 2011 persuaded the parties to sign a roadmap to peace, that 
provided for the unconditional return of Ravalomanana and the holding of 
presidential and parliamentary elections in 2013. Although this was not fully 
implemented, it signified the South African influence within the SADC.  Research 
participants indicated that despite the South African and Chissano initiatives, the 
SADC mediations stalled, and the AU then played a pivotal role in the resumption 
of the mediations. A further examination of the AU influence in joint mediations is 
given below. In order to broaden the understanding of AU-SADC mediation 
structures and the hierarchy-network debate in Madagascar mediations, the next 
section examines the ontological factors that influenced the leadership dynamics 
between the two organisations. 
6.3 Ontological factors in AU-SADC relations in Madagascar 
There are several significant ontological factors that must be considered in 
understanding AU-SADC interactions in Madagascar mediations. Both AU and 
SADC were conceived in the 1960s and 1970s respectively, primarily as forums 
for African liberation from colonialism and economic building blocks towards the 
economic integration of Africa. In response to political instability and the eruption 
of conflicts in various African regions, subregional organisations including SADC 
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have over time, assumed the political function of preventing and resolving 
conflicts in their respective regions independently. It is from this backdrop that 
the AU, in liaison with RECs conceptualised APSA, where subregions were 
placed as building blocks for the peace and security framework. Research 
findings reveal that the historical policies of regional autonomy have persisted 
even after the adoption of the PSC Protocol and APSA. Research participants 
observed that the SADC, using its independent political system and regional 
sovereignty, took over leadership from the AU in Madagascar. Participants also 
observed that the AU-SADC leadership contestations in joint mediation cannot 
be separated from their political history. Research data indicate that their 
orientation differences are significantly attributed to the mismatch of the founding 
treaties of both organisations. The GIZ programme officer during interviews 
articulated the different origins of the AU and SADC that continues to hinder the 
cooperation between these two organisations in the following extract:  
 
SADC was formed by its own treaty that is different from the constitutive 
act of the AU, and these documents do not mutually reinforce each other 
in terms of how the regional organisations should work with the continental 
organisation, and AU leadership becomes very difficult. But if we have an 
amendment where the constitutive act and the SADC treaty recognise the 
different roles of these organisations … then cooperation becomes easier 
… as it is now, we have two organisations (SADC and AU) that are totally 
different, mutually exclusive, they don’t reinforce each other, and no one 
can see that purposeful and collective togetherness from one another 
(Extract 2B). 
 
The findings  reinforce other scholars’ arguments that historical origins of policies 
and organisations have an impact on future developments of institutions (Peters, 
2012). Although several attempts have been made to bridge the AU-SADC gap 
through the AU-RECs MOU, APSA and the PSC Protocol, research findings 
reveal the widening gap in the AU-SADC approach to peace and security 
leadership within the SADC region. This research has shown that SADC has 
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maintained its independence in the decision making and leadership of peace 
efforts within its jurisdiction. Interview data further indicate that AU leadership 
over SADC peace and security processes is further challenged by SADC 
adherence to regional sovereignty. As highlighted above, research participants 
critically observed that SADC has mostly defined itself as a distinctive region 
whose nature of politics is different from other African regions45, and holds the 
notion of sovereignty and territorial integrity so dearly. The politician at the AU 
emphasised that the SADC sovereignty significantly reduces the coordination 
with the AU and articulated that: 
 
The issue of peculiarity is real in SADC, and the political liberation 
movement has not filtered out, but it’s going through a transformation. This 
is a region that is young in terms of independence compared to other 
regions, so you will find that SADC leaders still hold on to their freedom 
and self-determination very dearly. There is little that is ceded to the AU, 
so that the region can be in tune with what the AU decides (Extract 2C). 
 
The conception of SADC sovereignty, self-determination and decolonisation 
discourse was repeatedly highlighted by the GIZ programme officer and appears 
to have played a role in the AU-SADC contestation of Madagascar mediations. It 
was observed that SADC has always been very sensitive when conflict mediation 
initiatives are led by Francophone countries, as they are perceived as a colonial 
projection of France. This revelation is precisely expressed in the following 
extract by GIZ programme officer: 
 
When some AU initiatives have Western powers behind them, SADC has 
always been less supportive. For instance, SADC was suspicious of AU 
leadership in Madagascar because the Chairperson of AU Commission 
was from a Francophone country and France was also playing an active 
role in Madagascar (Extract 2D). 
                                                      
45 The comparative politics is mainly done with Francophone West African states, where the 
French colonial influence is still visible. 
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The Anglophone – Francophone divide highlighted in this extract provides 
another viewpoint of Africa’s colonial legacy and geopolitics that influences the 
leadership and regionalisation of peace within the AU and SADC relations. The 
role of colonial or super power countries in African regional peace interventions 
is further discussed below. The next section discusses the AU-SADC leadership 
dichotomy within the principles of subsidiarity and complementarity in 
Madagascar as outlined in the AU PSC Protocol and APSA.  
 
6.4 Mixed leadership dichotomy within the principle of 
subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative advantage 
As highlighted above, leadership between the AU and SADC in Madagascar was 
construed from the conceptualisation of subsidiarity principles. The consensus 
among research participants was that the guiding principle in subsidiarity and 
comparative advantage is based on the capability of either the AU or subregional 
groups in resolving a given conflict in the regions. In light of this, the organisation 
that is well placed and has a better advantage in finding a solution should lead 
the peace processes complemented by others. The direct interpretation of this 
finding is that leadership is contextual within the AU. Although there are 
provisions for hierarchical leadership in AU-RECs relationships, leadership is 
determined by the capability factors of the AU and subregions. The challenge, 
however, lies in the definition of capabilities and leadership boundaries within the 
subsidiarity principle. Research findings reveal that there was no agreement on 
who decided or determined the merits and capabilities of either the AU or SADC 
in mediating the Madagascar conflict. During the discussion with the AU policy 
officer, it was stated that ideally using;  
 
The principle of subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative 
advantage, AU determines whether the sub regions are better placed to 
find a solution to the conflict in their region, but where AU has a big 
advantage to address the conflict then the sub regions support AU 
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initiatives…but SADC was contesting AU leadership in Madagascar 
(Extract 2E).  
 
The discussion with SADC policy officers revealed that in Madagascar, the SADC 
standpoint was that the principle of subsidiarity, complementarity and 
comparative advantage, gave it an initial leadership role in Madagascar before 
the AU involvement. On the other hand, the AU politicians and policy officers 
observed that the AU has the primary role in African peace processes as 
highlighted above in the PSC and MOU provisions. Indicating the existence of a 
hierarchy that is undermined by SADC. It is important to note that the SADC 
contestation is not uncommon in regionalised peace processes within the AU46. 
Lack of clarity on hierarchical leadership boundaries within the principle of 
subsidiarity challenged the regionalisation of peace interventions, as evidenced 
in AU-SADC joint mediations in Madagascar. On the other hand, the power-
sharing within AU peace interventions has implications for the different 
assumptions of shared leadership scholarship (Denis, Langley and Sergi, 2012). 
Interview data in this case study indicate significant power dynamics and 
influence coming from ‘assumed followers or executors’ (SADC). The political 
dynamics inherent in the AU-SADC inter-organisational background, illustrate 
that influence-sharing may not be an AU choice but a de facto condition of 
regionalised peace interventions (Pearce and Sims, 2002; Day et al., 2004; 
Pearce, 2004; Pearce and Manz, 2005; Day, Gronn and Salas, 2006; Morgeson 
et al., 2010). 
Although Article 16 of PSC Protocol and Article XX (4) of AU-RECs MOU 
establishes a hierarchy between the AU and RECs47, interviews reveal that 
                                                      
46 Research participants mentioned the cases of East African Community (EAC) interventions in 
the ongoing Burundi crisis, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) intervention 
in Mali, Central African Republic in 2012-2013 crisis, and the AU with ECAS and SADC 
intervention in the Madagascar conflict. 
47 AU leadership is clearly defined in the PSC Protocol Article 16 and further reinforced in Article 
IV (ii) of the MOU, outlining the principles guiding the relationship between the AU and RECs, 
stating that; the implementation of the MOU shall be guided by the recognition of, and respect for, 
the primary responsibility of the Union in the maintenance and promotion of peace, security and 
stability in Africa, in accordance with Article 16 of the PSC protocol. Additionally, Article IV (iv) 
calls for the; adherence to the principles of subsidiarity47, complementarity and comparative 
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subregions are autonomous. The SADC-NGOs programme officer further 
observed the obscure leadership hierarchy between the AU and SADC in that; 
… the relationship between AU and SADC (subregional organisations) is 
not vertical or horizontal, but the AU coordinates with subregional 
organisations, AU does not coordinate the RECs (Extract 2F). 
 
The SADC autonomy in Madagascar joint mediations, as highlighted in the above 
extract, reveals the limitations of the AU hierarchical leadership in subregional 
peace interventions. It is from this background that leadership within AU and 
subregional security governance inclines towards a shared or collaborative set-
up than hierarchy. Indicating the shifting nature of influence between the AU and 
SADC. The SADC autonomy provides little basis for analysing leadership in a 
leader-follower framework, unless the principle of subsidiarity is further clarified, 
and leadership boundaries defined. The next section provides a thorough 
examination of research data in AU-SADC linkages in Madagascar. 
6.5 Regionalisation in context: an examination of AU- SADC 
joint mediations 
Although the APSA and PSC Protocol provide linkages between the AU and 
SADC, research findings reveal that there is a loose connection between the AU 
and SADC mediation structures. For instance, research participants observed 
that after the Madagascar coup in 2009, both the AU and SADC appointed special 
envoys to Madagascar without consulting each other. Additionally, as shown 
above, the appointment of former President Chissano to lead the SADC 
delegation and subsequent leadership takeover was unilaterally done by the 
SADC summit without consulting the AU PSC. Research participants further 
observed that the relations between these mediation bodies were not formalised 
                                                      
advantage, in order to optimise the partnership between the Union, the RECs and the 
Coordinating Mechanisms in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability. 
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during the conflict mediation in Madagascar and are yet to be formalised48. The 
disconnect between AU and SADC mediation structures is further articulated in 
the following extract by SADC policy officer: 
 
 AU doesn’t have a formal mediation arrangement with SADC. There is 
nothing driven by the AU in order to deal with mediation of conflicts in 
SADC region, … joint mediations between AU and SADC were ad hoc 
arrangements... (Extract 2G) 
The research findings above indicate a significant gap between what is envisaged 
in the AU provisions, specifically Article 16 of the PSC Protocol, AU-RECs MOU 
and APSA. What is implied in these provisions, is a continuous interaction, 
communication and consultation between the AU and SADC, leading to a well-
structured and coordinated approach to conflict interventions. Lack of formal 
arrangements in joint mediations, however, indicates little basis for accountability 
between the two organisations and subsequently little networking and 
communication. There was a consensus among SADC-NGOs programme 
officers and SADC policy officers that the SADC Summit is independent from the 
AU and only informs the AU PSC or AU Commission on issues relating to peace 
and security within the region. The SADC independence is demonstrated in the 
following interview extract from SADC policy officer : 
 
… SADC Secretariat and mediation support unit takes instructions from 
SADC Summit, and it is not known how SADC Summit relates with AU.  
SADC is autonomous, it has never taken instructions from the AU... The 
AU-SADC relationship is quite loose, SADC Summit is in control and 
decides what is to be done in the region… (Extract 2H). 
This research finding has implications on the nature and extent of leadership the 
AU provides in subregional peace interventions. The findings point to an obscure 
                                                      
48 During the time of my field research – August 2016 – the AU and SADC mediation structures 
were not yet synchronised and coordinated; however, there were proposals to discuss how 
such formalisation can be undertaken.  
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hierarchical relationship between the AU and SADC. Although the SADC is an 
AU pillar, it has not ceded any powers to the Union for peace and security.  
 
Leadership of mediations in Madagascar was to some extent shared between the 
AU and SADC. In this instance, leadership of regionalised conflict mediations 
became a collective contribution, suggesting a shift in the unit of analysis from 
unitary to group leadership (Denis et al., 2012). It is important to note that shared 
leadership requires collaboration and division of labour, specialisation of 
expertise, and differentiated roles (to avoiding overlap and confusion), and 
complementarity (Hodgson et al., 1965 cited in Denis et al., 2012: 232). The case 
of AU-SADC joint mediation, however, demonstrates that there was little 
collaboration and division of labour between the two organisations, as shown in 
the following extract by a politician at the AU: 
 
SADC during one AU summit in Addis Ababa in 2010, made a very strong 
declaration against the AU initial leadership in Madagascar and influenced 
a decision of the Assembly of the African Union, to declare that only SADC 
will be the mediator of the Malagasy conflict, given its proximity to the 
conflict (Extract 2I) 
 
The extract above questions the implementation of AU PSC protocols that 
envisaged the AU-RECs cooperation. Article 7(j) of the PSC Protocol states that 
the PSC is tasked to “promote close harmonization, co-ordination and co-
operation between Regional Mechanisms and the Union in the promotion and 
maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa”. Although the PSC Protocol 
and APSA promote cooperation with subregional groups, these findings reveal 
that there are more competing logics in the relationship. The competition 
indicates that the parties to the joint mediation were not complementing each 
other, hence there was no division of labour. What is clear is that these structures 
are in constant competition with each other in undertaking dispute settlements 
instead of sharing expertise. Research findings indicate shortfalls for effective 
shared leadership between the AU and SADC. In this case, there was a 
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fundamental ambiguity regarding leadership boundaries and roles of the AU and 
SADC as a regional economic community. The extracts above have also 
revealed the lack of formal linkages between the AU and SADC mediation 
structures. This lack of synchronisation implies that there are no differentiated 
roles to avoid overlap in the framework of mediations. 
 
6.6 Further challenges to the regionalisation of peace and 
security 
Research findings reveal that despite the operationalisation of APSA, significant 
challenges remain in the coordination of regional peace interventions. The 
Madagascar case study, as outlined in the contextual background above, 
demonstrates a multiplicity of mediators that were fragmented. Multiple mediators 
can have a positive impact when they have the cohesion and well-coordinated 
approach to peace processes (Augsburger, 1992). The case of Madagascar, 
however, demonstrated that not all cases of multiple mediation are successful. 
The regional approach to conflict mediation was further compounded by two other 
factors: firstly, the overlap of subregional organisations and lack of consultation 
among these subregional groupings; secondly, the role of external actors, 
specifically France.   
 
6.6.1 Subregional overlap in Madagascar’s peace processes 
Research data indicate that African regionalisation of peace and security is 
further challenged by the uncoordinated overlap of subregional economic and 
political groupings. Although the African continent is divided into security zones 
as shown in Figure 6.1.  
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Figure 6.1 African peace and security zones 
Source: African Peace and Security Architecture Handbook; 2014, Friedrich-
Ebert-Stiftung (FES), Addis Ababa Office and the African Union (AU). 
The case of Madagascar demonstrates that these regions are unregulated by the 
AU. Research participants pointed out that regional arrangements in North and 
Central Africa are underdeveloped, while those in West, South and East Africa 
are more advanced in terms of peace and security structures and cohesion 
amongst themselves. As a result of this, it is significantly difficult for the AU to 
have a well-balanced conflict response and support in all regions of the African 
continent. The GIZ programme officer observed that because the RECs are at 
different stages of development, it is difficult to synchronise their activities in 
conflict interventions and ensure that the AU has a balanced response and 
Some materials have been removed due to 3rd party copyright. The 
unabridged version can be viewed in Lancester Library - Coventry 
University.
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supports all subregions. The GIZ programme officer observation is well 
articulated in the following extract: 
 
RECs/ RMs are in different stages of development and at the same time, 
they do not pull in the same direction, all the time in adhering to African 
Union decisions (Extract 2J). 
 
It is further observed in this research that while the AU and SADC have well-
developed independent structures for mediations, they faced additional 
coordination challenges with other political and economic groupings affiliated to 
Madagascar. These included for example, the International Organisation of la 
Francophonie and the Indian Ocean Commission. These organisations are 
outside the influence of the SADC and it is not known if the AU coordinates with 
them. The challenge of multiple membership or the ‘spaghetti bowl’49 
membership of AU RECs, is illustrated in Figure 6.2.  
 
Contrary to the seemingly clear picture of African security zones provided in 
Figure 6.1, Figure 6.2 illustrates the complexity of the regional leadership of 
conflict interventions facing the AU.  
  
                                                      
49 A term borrowed from the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, Africa Program: 
2008, in describing African member states membership in various RECs. 
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Figure 6.2 African Regional Economic Communities 
Source: Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, Africa Program: 
200850  
                                                      
50 AMU: Arab Maghreb Union; CEMAC: Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa; 
CEN-SAD: Community of Sahel-Saharan States; CEPGL: Economic Community of the Great 
Lakes Countries; COMESA: Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa; EAC: East African 
Some materials have been removed due to 3rd party copyright. The unabridged 
version can be viewed in Lancester Library - Coventry University.
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What is evident in Figure 6.2 is the overlap and confusion of roles and functions 
of these regional affiliations in peace and security. Research findings show that 
the multiple membership of Madagascar challenged both the AU and SADC 
leadership in mediating the Malagasy conflict. This was mainly due to lack of 
differentiated roles, consultation and division of labour amongst mediation teams. 
The findings reveal that lack of leadership boundaries and coordination within 
multiple members resulted in an unstructured approach to mediation and created 
competition among mediating teams. The ambiguity in the leadership boundaries  
is further illustrated in the following extract by SADC policy officer: 
 
Madagascar having multiple membership of AU, SADC, International 
Organisation of la Francophonie, and Indian Ocean Commission created 
significant problems as to which organisation should lead the negotiations. 
Although there was an International Contact Group and a joint mediation 
team, there was competition amongst mediation teams (Extract 2K).  
 
The SADC-NGOs programme officers also confirmed that both the International 
Organisation of la Francophonie and the Indian Ocean Commission are 
independent and not accountable to the AU or SADC.  In other words, they have 
little or no connections with the SADC and AU. Research participants observed 
that there were no interactions between these two organisations with the AU or 
SADC prior to the mediation processes in Madagascar. This research reveals 
that the AU is challenged in reorganising these RECs and in providing policy 
guidance on when and how they should work together in conflict mediations and 
security. The growing proliferation and diversification of security partners in 
regionalised peace appears to be unregulated or uncoordinated by the AU as the 
continental body. The case of Madagascar also demonstrates the role of external 
                                                      
Com- munity; ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States; ECCAS: Economic 
Community of Central African States; IGAD: Inter-Governmental Authority for Development; IOC: 
Indian Ocean Commission; MRU: Mano River Union; SACU: Southern African Customs Union; 
SADC: Southern African Development Community; WAEMU: West Africa Economic and 
Monetary Union  
 
  146 
powerful actors in African regional peace interventions that require further 
analysis. 
 
6.6.2 The impact of external actors in Madagascar mediation  
African subregional groups and member states have distinctive socio-political 
and structural differences that originate from their colonial legacy. A plethora of 
research suggests a Francophone/Anglophone divide in these African 
subregional organisations (Ekeh, 1975; Hull and Derblom, 2009; Witt, 2017). 
Several studies have also shown the persistent French influence in their former 
colonies in post-colonial Africa (Ekeh, 1975; Gregory, 2000; Ashcroft, Griffiths 
and Tiffin, 2006; Adebajo, 2002b). This research further supports earlier studies 
and illustrates that the French colonial influence in Madagascar has not filtered 
out. This assertion is supported by research participants who observed that 
Madagascar colonial connections with France provided another challenge to AU-
SADC leadership of the mediation processes. Research data indicate that France 
played a vital role in influencing the conflicting parties, and ideally promoted its 
own national interests during the mediation processes. The following extract from 
SADC policy officer further demonstrates the extent of French influence in the 
Malagasy mediations: 
Madagascar’s colonial connection with France is still active and France 
was influential in the negotiation processes. There were problems as to 
which affiliation should lead the mediation and SADC felt that it was 
overshadowed by the International Organisation of la Francophonie and 
France (Extract 2L). 
 
For instance, one SADC official mentioned that SADC peace processes stalled 
because Rajoelina was affiliated to France and could leave SADC mediation 
processes for Paris. This demonstrates that French interests overshadowed 
regional efforts to resolve the conflict in Madagascar. Research participants 
indicated that French mediators organised inconsistent parallel mediation 
structures at the French Embassy in Antananarivo, Madagascar, while the 
regional mediations were on going. This uncoordinated approach allowed 
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conflicting parties, mainly the Rajoelina and Ravalomanana camps, to exploit the 
situation and play mediators off against each other, further complicating the 
mediation processes. It is important to note that French interests and the conduct 
of Madagascar mediations was against African regional interests in resolving the 
conflict. On the other hand, it is not known how the AU played its role in ensuring 
that African interests were upheld in the regional peace efforts. While hosting a 
French mediation can be a sovereign decision of Madagascar through their 
bilateral arrangements, it is argued that Madagascar’s transitional government 
was fragmented and had no capacity to consent bilateral agreements with 
France. 
 
It is argued in this study, that the lack of consultations between France and 
African regional actors (AU and SADC) added another layer to leadership 
challenges and regionalised peace interventions. These findings reveal gaps in 
the AU peace and security governance that require more attention and a policy 
review. It was, however, noted that despite the regionalisation challenges in 
peace interventions, the AU and SADC worked together and resolved the conflict 
in Madagascar. The next section explores the dynamics leading to the conflict 
resolution in Madagascar.  
 
6.7 AU-SADC complementary leadership in joint mediation 
While previous sections have highlighted the challenges in regionalised peace 
interventions in Madagascar, this section examines the complementary 
leadership between the AU and SADC. The research findings have shown that 
after the leadership wrangle, the SADC established itself as a sole regional 
mediator while the AU stayed on the sidelines. The peace processes, however, 
stalled when Rajoelina withdrew from the SADC mediations. Research 
participants observed that the original intent of the PSC Protocol, APSA and AU-
RECs MOU seem to have worked in facilitating the resolution of the conflict when 
the AU was invited back to mediations by the SADC. The complementarity of 
leadership between the AU and SADC  is demonstrated in the following extract 
by the AU policy officer:  
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During the SADC led mediations in Madagascar, SADC was stuck in 2011 
and invited AU to come in and assist. At this point, AU coordinated with 
SADC and resolved the stalemate. From this point forward there was no 
longer a competition; it was a synergy between these two organisations 
…. SADC led mediator was consulting the AU PSC … and the AU Peace 
and Security Commissioner visited the SADC mediator – former President 
of Mozambique, President Chissano in Maputo (Extract 2M). 
 
On the other hand, programme officers from ISS and GIZ observed that while the 
SADC contested AU leadership, it failed to bring all conflicting parties together 
and required a continental authority provided by the AU. In this light, the AU is 
considered to have more legitimacy when it comes to subregional peace 
interventions. It was observed by research participants that the continental status 
provides the AU with a more visible global recognition than the SADC and also 
managed to bring all conflicting parties together in Madagascar. This analysis of 
the AU position is evident by the compliance of conflicting parties in Madagascar, 
specifically the Rajoelina camp. On the other hand, we see a more noticeable 
implementation of the principle of subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative 
advantage highlighted above. From this backdrop, the AU is considered to be 
better placed to provide leadership with support from sub regional institutions. 
This study reveals that the AU complemented SADC efforts and filled the 
leadership gaps. The NGO research participants further observed that the AU 
has experienced more resistance when a subregional group is not given an 
opportunity to take the lead in mediations51. These findings demonstrate that 
when a comprehensive collaboration and consultation is achieved between the 
AU and SADC, the regional peace efforts become successful in resolving 
conflicts. 
 
                                                      
51 Research participants also gave an example of interactions between AU and East African 
Community (EAC) in tackling the Burundi crisis in 2015. 
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It is noted in the research findings that, while the SADC was leading the peace 
processes, AU maintained its liaison office in Madagascar and this office became 
more prominent after the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2013. 
Research participants indicated that the AU liaison office played a significant role 
in the post-conflict transition period in the country. On the other hand, the SADC 
mediation support unit left Madagascar soon after the elections. The importance 
of maintaining an SADC mediation support office in Madagascar in the aftermath 
of the elections was emphasised by research participants as one of the most 
important steps towards peace building in the country. Participants emphasised 
the significance of the SADC presence in supporting Malagasy peace building 
structures after presidential elections. It is important to note that Madagascar has 
had repeated a turbulent political environment soon after elections and since its 
first democratic elections in 1992. In this regard, the AU had a clear 
understanding of the country’s political history and was determined to follow 
through the peace process road map. The following extract from the SADC-
NGOs programme officer indicates that the AU reassumed the overall leadership 
of Madagascar peace process after the SADC departure: 
 
The establishment of the AU liaison office played a critical role in ensuring 
that the peace process in Madagascar is adhered to. The AU liaison office 
was playing more leading role than SADC itself, of course there is no doubt 
that SADC has been communicating constantly with the AU officers and 
authorities in Madagascar; but in terms of the actual implementation of the 
peace roadmap, it was the AU liaison office that was responsible… and 
there is no reference to AU working strongly together with SADC at this 
level (Extract 2N). 
 
The SADC withdrawal and the AU takeover in the Madagascar peace processes 
present a further significant ad hoc perspective of regionalisation and leadership 
of peace interventions in Africa. In this instance, it appears that the 
complementarity and division of labour between the two organisations only lasted 
until the presidential elections. The brief coordination between the two 
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organisations confirms the earlier finding that regionalisation of peace between 
AU and SADC is less structured and operates on ad hoc arrangements. The next 
section discusses the research findings and their theoretical implications for the 
regionalisation of peace and construction of leadership within the AU. 
 
6.8 Theoretical implications of regionalised peace and 
construction of leadership within the African Union 
The research findings above provide significant knowledge on the regionalisation 
and leadership of peace interventions within the AU.  This section dwells on how 
leadership is produced and conceptualised within the regionalised peace.  
 
Research findings above have demonstrated that the implementation of regional 
peace and security governance is mainly within the shared leadership 
scholarship rather than the leader-follower and goal relationship. The case of AU-
SADC joint mediation illustrates the variation of four different forms of shared 
leadership that adopt the direction-alignment-commitment (DAC) model (Drath et 
al., 2008). These strands focus on sharing leadership in groups, pooling 
leadership at the top of organisations, spreading leadership across boundaries 
over time, and producing leadership through interaction (Pearce, and Conger, 
2003; Pearce, 2004; Denis, Langley, and Rouleau, 2007; Mayrowetz, 2008; 
Davis, and Eisenhardt, 2011; Denis et al., 2012). These four strands will now be 
explored. 
 
6.8.1 Sharing leadership in groups within Madagascar peace processes 
As outlined in Chapter 2, shared leadership mainly focuses on experiences and 
effects, rather than processing theories of leadership (Denis et al., 2012: 214). 
Shared leadership scholarship has a functionalist orientation, where the main 
objective is to find alternative sources of leadership that lead to organisational 
performance (Glynn and Raffaelli, 2009). While most literature in shared 
leadership pays little attention to significant power-sharing dynamics between 
hierarchical leaders and assumed followers, the case of AU-SADC relations 
illustrates inherent power struggles in this form of leadership.  
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Research results show the existence of both positive and negative forms of 
competitive coexistence in leadership production between the AU and SADC. 
The positive competitive coexistence is demonstrated by agreements between 
the AU and SADC after a period of contestation, leading to coordinated and 
complementary mediation in Madagascar. On the other hand, the negative 
competitive coexistence is shown by the blocking power relationship between the 
AU and SADC (Zounmenou, 2009; Park, 2014). Prior to the conflict settlement in 
Madagascar, the SADC and AU were engaged in a contestation of leadership 
that delayed the mediation processes. In this light, the study demonstrates that 
AU hierarchical leadership in regionalised peace is contested, hence, the key 
assumption in shared leadership that leaders determine the sharing of influence 
is lacking in the AU peace interventions. On the other hand, there is evidence of 
a developing coordination mechanism between the AU and SADC in joint conflict 
mediation in Madagascar, but with little alignment on the course of action. From 
this backdrop, the research shows the emerging regional and subregional 
commitment in peace interventions.  
 
Other studies have argued for a specific series of conditions necessary for shared 
leadership to develop. These requirements include issue urgency, commitment, 
task interdependence, creativity and the degree of task complexity (Pearce, 
2004; Pearce and Manz, 2005). The instability in Madagascar following the coup 
and near collapse of state institutions created the issue urgency, requiring 
regional commitment to mediations and task interdependence provided in the 
African peace architecture. It is, however, noted that the conditions for shared 
leadership were limited due to the regional leadership scramble. In this light, 
leadership sharing between the AU and SADC commenced when the SADC 
invited the AU to the mediations in 2011 and lasted until the presidential elections 
in 2013. 
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6.8.2 African Union as a functionalist leader supported by subregional groups 
The design of AU and RECs as outlined in Chapters 5 and highlighted above 
indicates that AU is supported by subregional (RECs) pillars. This set-up 
indicates that AU decisions are implemented by the subregional organisations 
although RECs have their own leadership arrangement that is autonomous to 
AU. Within this framework RECs support AU leadership. What is implied, 
however, is that both leadership and authority is formally divided between the AU 
and RECs through the principles of subsidiarity and complementarity. Leadership 
in this case can be recognised through their collective contribution. Scholars in 
this strand of shared leadership have argued that successful collaboration and 
division of labour depends on specialisation of expertise, differentiated roles (to 
avoid overlap and confusion), and complementarity (Hodgson et al., 1965 cited 
in Denis et al., 2012: 232). Additionally, for successful shared leadership to exist, 
there must be shared cognition, trust, convergence around common goals, and 
directions among group leaders (Alvarez and Svejenova, 2005). It is noted in the 
literature that leadership does not operate in a vacuum, and competing logics are 
more likely to occur in co-leadership (Fjellvaer, 2010). Fjellvaer suggests that in 
order to mitigate these competing logics, extensive collaboration and participation 
of co-leaders is required. Lepsius (2016: 13-14) argues that trust in institutions 
orients or constrains the behaviour of actors and guides them towards collective 
action.  The central argument from Lepsius is that trust development increases 
the predictability of outcomes in individual or organisational relations. However, 
the trust building process requires repeated fulfilment of expectations (Lepsius, 
2016). The research results show that shared cognition, trust and collaboration 
has not yet developed in the AU-SADC relations, as demonstrated in 
Madagascar.  
 
The significant power play between the AU and SADC in Madagascar indicates 
a lack of shared cognition and trust between the two organisations. This is 
demonstrated by SADC regional sovereignty claims and suspicions of Western 
interventions in Madagascar. It is noted in the research results that the division 
in the approach of the AU and SADC mediating teams created a subsequent 
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division in the conflicting parties in Madagascar. For instance, the SADC 
standpoint of restoring Ravalomanana as the President of Madagascar, and an 
unclear AU position undermined the unified approach to mediation. In this light, 
research findings demonstrate shortfalls for effective shared leadership as 
identified by Hodgson et al. (1965), Alvarez and Svejenova (2005) and Fjellvaer 
(2010). The fundamental ambiguity on leadership boundaries and roles between 
the AU and subregional actors within the principle of subsidiarity and comparative 
advantage has an impact on the type of leadership produced between AU and 
SADC. As a result of this ambiguity, roles are not lucidly separated for successful 
collaboration and division of labour. Although similar mediation structures at AU 
and SADC are promoted within APSA, there is less harmonisation of conflict 
mediation initiatives. The case of joint mediation in Madagascar indicates that 
these initiatives between the AU and SADC are still evolving and affect how 
leadership is produced. 
 
The unclear roles within the AU leadership framework are further exacerbated by 
the “spaghetti bowl” membership of Madagascar. The multiple membership of 
Madagascar to other subregional alliances apart from the AU and SADC, has 
added another layer of confusion in coordinating joint mediations. It is evident in 
the research findings that the multiple membership is not managed by the AU 
and there is no hierarchy among the subregional groupings. Additionally, there 
are no indications of pooling leadership to the top among these other regional 
associations in the spaghetti bowl. From this backdrop, research findings show a 
lack of coordination among multiple mediating teams in Madagascar, resulting in 
an unstructured approach to mediation. The lack of AU influence in the spaghetti 
bowl alliances implies that, while the AU peace architecture was designed to pool 
leadership to the top, the subregional associations have restricted this effort. As 
suggested by Fjellvaer (2010), this research shows that extensive partnership 
and consultation is required to overcome the rift between the AU and SADC 
(RECs).  What is evident from the research findings is that essential conditions 
for pooling leadership to the top are lacking in the AU framework of leadership. 
On the other hand, the research reveals the contextual and interactional nature 
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of leadership in AU peace interventions. The next section interrogates the nature 
of AU leadership further by focusing on the third strand of shared leadership. 
 
6.8.3 Spreading leadership across organisational boundaries 
As shown in Chapter 2, the work of Huxham and Vangen (2000a, 2000b), has 
analysed how shared leadership works in inter-organisational collaborations. 
Moving back to this research and guided by the work of other scholars in multi-
sector collaborations (Latour, 1987, 2005; Crosby and Bryson, 2005; Bryson et 
al., 2009), the question of leadership roles and boundaries within AU peace and 
security architecture remains the point of focus.  
 
The Madagascar case study has demonstrated the complexity of roles, authority 
and leadership boundaries of multiple mediating teams and stakeholders. The 
interviews reveal that the AU leadership structure is not well supported by 
participants within the continental peace and security governance. The design of 
APSA, as shown in Chapter 5, was aimed at constructing a predictable course of 
action to be taken by the AU PSC in conjunction with subregional groups or 
RECs. The complexity of the Madagascar mediation mission, therefore, required 
basic routines, such as command and control and reporting routines, to be 
followed to help pull different mediating teams together. This case study, 
however, indicates that inter-organisational collaborations were challenged 
among the AU, SADC and other mediating teams. The extensive partnership and 
collaboration was lacking, since there was no indication of prior consultations 
between the AU and SADC to agree on the agenda and division of roles in 
mediation. In this light, the leadership mechanisms for collaboration, such as 
routine processes and agenda setting among participants to a collective, are 
lacking in the AU-SADC mediation framework. This indicates that regional 
strategies for power sharing have not yet developed, thus challenging the 
harmonisation of peace and security agenda in the continent.  
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6.8.4 Leadership through interaction; discursive leadership in AU-SADC peace 
interventions 
This strand, as discussed in the literature review, provides another 
conceptualisation of leadership that is relevant to this research. This strand is 
used to explore how leadership is constructed and implemented within the AU.  
As indicated earlier, the strand originates from a socio-constructivist 
epistemology, where leadership is viewed as a social phenomenon and a 
collective process. Scholars in this strand argue that formal structures and 
processes play a role in leadership, but interaction of actors matters (Lichtenstein 
et al., 2006; Lichtenstein and Plowman, 2009). In this process participants or 
individuals influence and create leadership but are not “containers” of leadership 
(Denis et al., 2012: 254). Leadership in this case is disconnected from individual 
traits, but located in practices, and constructed through communication (Pearce 
and Conger, 2003; Raelin, 2005; Crevani et al., 2010; Uhl-Bien, 2011). What is 
defined as leadership in this scholarship is the participation and collective 
formation of goals, rather than exercising control and authority (Denis et al., 2012: 
256-9). Hence, the influence of power and individuals is reduced, because 
leadership is collectively constructed in the situation, and regarded as a product 
of participants’ local interactions (Drath et al., 2008; Denis et al., 2012). 
The discursive leadership, as outlined above, has obvious flaws, as it fails to 
appreciate the reality and influence of power in political environments (Locke, 
2003). Additionally, it assumes consensus among participants, and plays down 
any conflicts or personal/national interests (Locke, 2003; Reid and Karambayya, 
2009). While the concept has these weaknesses, its power is in the analytical 
framework of leadership. Leadership through interaction is based on lived 
experiences, participants’ interactions and their outcomes. This 
conceptualisation of leadership provides an alternative view of analysing 
leadership in organisations where the “leader-follower-goal” tripod framework 
does not exist. It also utilises some elements of the direction-alignment-
commitment framework proposed by Drath et al. (2008). From this backdrop, this 
study uses the discursive conceptualisation of leadership to analyse AU 
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leadership in peace interventions, while paying attention to power and conflicts 
in shared leadership. 
 
In this case study, the conflictual interactions between the AU and SADC 
determined an overall leadership outcome within the joint mediation framework. 
Leadership in this case was continually shifting to match given situations, from 
the AU to SADC and back to the AU. As shown in the AU and SADC relations, 
leadership is not a top-down or bottom-up linearity but seems to be a 
phenomenon that occurred when both the AU and SADC started to interact. 
Research results show that discursive leadership in Madagascar produced an 
overall positive outcome, in terms of conflict settlement, leading to general 
elections in the country. The AU and SADC managed to bring conflicting parties 
together in Madagascar and implemented a road map to peace that concluded 
with democratic elections in 2013. The collaborations produced and shaped 
leadership outcomes. From this backdrop, this study argues that leadership 
within the AU is constructed and deconstructed or transformed by the AU and 
SADC in a context of competitive coexistence. Consequently, leadership within 
the AU can be understood as a processual phenomenon that is shaped by 
multiple actors interacting in the context of APSA. In light of this, AU leadership 
is not given but is constructed through interactions with subregional actors. It is, 
however, important to highlight that the leadership processes within AU are 
continuously being negotiated in conflictual interactions with subregional actors 
and ad hoc in nature. Additionally, the hierarchy that exists between the UN and 
the AU is absent between the AU and SADC/RECs. 
 
6.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the regionalisation of peace and leadership within the 
AU, through an investigation involving fieldwork and elite level interviews, to 
SADC and AU’s interaction in the Madagascan political crisis and joint mediation 
post-2009. Through this examination, the chapter has addressed the first and 
second research questions, examining the extent of AU leadership in 
regionalised peace interventions and how its leadership is produced. The 
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regionalisation of peace in Africa remains complex and influenced by several 
interrelated factors. The roles and functions between AU and SADC in the 
implementation of APSA are unclear and subject to conflicting interpretations and 
leadership outcomes. While SADC is a building block of the AU peace and 
security framework, it has its own leadership mechanism that does not 
necessarily report to the AU. Although the AU has encouraged subregional 
organisations such as SADC to develop their own mediation structures, the 
research findings show that continental and regional mediation structures are not 
harmonised but evolving. The absence of established links between AU and 
SADC mediation structures resulted in ad hoc joint mediations that were 
challenged at the beginning of the mediations but developed over time. The 
research findings in this case study are in agreement with a few scholars, who 
acknowledged the possibility of rivalry in co-leadership (Heenan and Bennis, 
1999; Spillane, 2006; Reid, and Karambayya, 2009), while others have argued 
that “shared” or “distributed” leadership can bring more chaos than solutions to 
collective action (Locke, 2003). It is, however, important to study the experiences 
of shared leadership in African peace interventions due to inherent dependency 
on collective action within APSA.  
 
The chapter has shown that the basic principles and protocols guiding African 
security governance require well-defined boundaries of roles and authority. For 
instance, the implementation of the principles of subsidiarity, complementarity 
and comparative advantage, has produced conflicting narratives on leadership of 
subregional mediations. From this backdrop, the research has established that 
AU leadership in the regionalisation of peace requires comprehensive 
consultation with subregional groupings. At the same time, subregions have 
legitimacy limitations that require AU complementarity. This chapter has shown 
that the maintenance and promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa is a 
collective and shared undertaking that is continuously negotiated. In this light, the 
extent of the AU leadership is defined by the continental legitimacy and the 
platform it provides for other sub regional and international actors to function. In 
other words, the AU contributes to leadership of peace interventions and 
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complements other partners. This chapter has shown that, although international 
actors like France and individual African states and regional institutions have 
substantial influence in African peace interventions, they require the AU platform 
to effectively participate in resolving African conflicts. Despite the regionalisation 
challenges, this chapter has demonstrated that AU continental status provides 
legitimacy and capability for resolving African conflicts. This is demonstrated by 
the pivotal role played by the AU in the road map to peace in Madagascar. On 
the other hand, AU influence in leading peace efforts is limited by regional and 
external partners, indicating the need for comprehensive coordination and 
consultations in regional peace interventions. This chapter has shown that the 
African political history and geopolitics is too complex for the AU to lead peace 
efforts without the involvement of sub regional institutions and international 
partners. The SADC adherence to regional sovereignty and Francophone 
colonial legacy in Africa continues to limit the extent of the AU leadership. 
 
The second research question has been addressed by analysing how leadership 
is produced within the AU peace and security governance. The chapter has 
demonstrated that AU leadership is constructed through interactions with 
subregional partners. In light of this, the conceptualisation of leadership shifts 
from the AU as a unit of analysis to a regional collective outcome. The chapter 
has shown that leadership within the AU peace interventions is processual and 
malleable. This study, therefore, adds another layer to understanding leadership 
in AU peace and security governance. The chapter has also established that the 
AU lacks the necessary prerequisites for successful shared leadership. For 
instance, shared cognition, trust, and convergence around common goals, 
coupled with clear division of labour/tasks is lacking within the AU peace and 
security governance. Further research in this regard could focus on how the AU 
can establish trust with subregional organisations and build a peace and security 
network with clear roles and authority. 
While the design and implementation of APSA has significant emphasis on AU 
collaboration with RECs, the research shows significant inter organisational 
disconnect in the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa.  The chapter 
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has explored how the coordination did not initially occur in the Madagascar joint 
mediations but was developed over time during the prolonged negotiations 
process. The next chapter explores the AU’s leadership in peace operations in 
Somalia. This case study provides another angle to analysing leadership in AU 
peace interventions authorised by the AU PSC and conducted under the 
auspices of the AU. Unlike the Madagascar case, the Somalia peace intervention 
is a war fighting mission with significant implications for leadership. 
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Chapter 7: Leadership dynamics in the African Union 
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) 
 
7.0 Introduction 
The chapter presents research findings and analysis of African Union (AU) 
leadership in Somalia peace operations from 2007 to 2016. These peace 
operations are the first AU peace interventions in an active war fighting zone. 
This chapter will examine the extent of AU leadership and how it was produced 
in this new undertaking. It is argued elsewhere that clarity of leadership is crucial 
for successful peace operations (UN HIPPO Report 2015: para 268). The 
research findings and analysis examine how the AU has interacted with troop 
contributing countries (TCCs) and national contingents in the peace mission. 
Additionally, it examines the relevance of the AU peace and security architecture 
(APSA), AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) and standard operating 
procedures (SOPs) for AMISOM and how they have facilitated leadership in the 
mission area.  
 
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, it provides a contextual background and 
analysis of AU deployment in Somalia. Then it presents research findings on AU 
leadership frameworks within the Somalia peace operations. After this, the 
chapter presents and analyses the interaction among AU, national contingents 
and TCCs in AMISOM. Then the chapter analyses the role of external partners 
in AMISOM. The chapter also examines the AU functionalism in regional peace 
operations. Finally, the chapter discusses the theoretical implications of AMISOM 
leadership to AU peace and security framework. 
 
The analysis of the research findings utilises some elements of leadership theory 
and examines the relations between AU and TCCs. The leadership ontological 
framework adopted in Chapter 6 is also used in this chapter. The focus, therefore, 
is on examining the usefulness of the leader-follower-goal tripod and the 
direction-alignment-commitment framework in regional peace operations. The 
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origins and mission planning of the AU peace operations in Somalia provide 
another angle to analysing the regionalisation of peace in Africa. The findings are 
derived from interviews with senior officials and diplomats based at the AU and 
SADC headquarters and International Non-Governmental Organisations 
(INGOs) in Ethiopia and Botswana, and secondary data from the research 
locations, as shown in Chapter 4.  
 
7.1 Brief contextual background of Somalia conflicts and AU 
deployment in Somalia 
The power vacuum created by the disposition of President Barre in 1991 plunged 
Somalia into chaos with several disparate groups scrambling for power. One of 
such power brokers was the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). The Islamic Courts 
began operating in Somalia in early 1994, providing law and order, basic services 
to the people, as well as a degree of security for commerce within certain zones 
(Marchal, 2004; Barnes and Hassan, 2007; Carter and Guard, 2015). The Courts’ 
influence diminished in 1998 and revived again in 2003 under the leadership of 
Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. UIC political ideology was based on a ‘broad 
mosque’, combining people from moderate and fundamentalist ends of the 
Islamic spectrum (Williams, 2009b: 515). By mid-2006 Islamic Courts emerged 
as the overall authority in Mogadishu after expelling the Alliance for Restoration 
of Peace and Counter-Terrorism forces. It is noted elsewhere that this Alliance 
was essentially a union of warlords backed by the United States of America in its 
‘anti-Islamic terrorists’ policy (Marchal, 2004; Williams, 2009b). The disposition of 
the Alliance was, therefore, a significant drawback to the United States (US) 
campaign against terror; and the US in conjunction with Ethiopian troops expelled 
the UIC (Samatar, 2007; Olsen, 2014; Hesse, 2015, 2016; Carter and Guard, 
2015). The UIC was overthrown, although other scholars have argued that it had 
made some positive impact on the Somali security and political environment, in 
that;  
 
‘[B]etween June and December 2006, Mogadishu was reunited [by the 
UIC] for the first time in nearly 16 years and relative peace and security 
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prevailed. The sea- and airports were reopened, rubbish and roadblocks 
were cleared from the streets, squatters were evicted from government 
buildings, and the city enjoyed a degree of stability unparalleled for well 
over a decade’ (Williams, 2009: 516b; see also Olsen 2014; Healy, 2008).  
 
It should also be noted here that the US and Ethiopian campaigns against UIC 
were conducted before the al-Shabaab militants emerged52. The removal of UIC 
in 2006 was quickly replaced by an internationally constructed Transitional 
Federal Government of Somalia (TFG)53 which had operated outside Somalia 
since 2004 (Healy, 2008; Bamfo, 2010; Carter, and Guard, 2015; Hesse, 2015, 
2016). A donor driven TFG first operated in Kenya in 2004 and was moved to 
Baidoa in Somalia in 2006. It is noted elsewhere that ‘instead of bringing peace 
and stability to Somalia, the installation of the TFG in Mogadishu brought a 
significant deterioration in the security situation and a renewed phase of warfare’ 
(Williams, 2009b: 521). It is this renewed warfare that prompted the formation of 
AMISOM. In the next section the discussion dwells on subregional attempts to 
resolve the Somali crisis prior to AU deployment.  
 
7.1.1 Implementations of African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) 
mechanism in Somalia  
Prior to AMISOM deployment, several attempts were made by the 
Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD)54 to resolve the conflicts in 
Somalia. IGAD, as one of the building blocks of APSA had the initial mandate for 
interventions in Somalia. In January 2005 IGAD, through the active leadership of 
Uganda, proposed the deployment of a 10,500-strong peace support mission to 
Somalia to facilitate the establishment of TFG. However, ‘IGAD failed to generate 
                                                      
52 Al-Shabaab meaning ‘the youth’ is a terrorist and militant group formed from the remnants of 
the UIC after the UIC was routed by the Ethiopian troops in the Somalian capital Mogadishu. In 
2012, it pledged allegiance to the militant Islamist organization Al-Qaeda. They became an 
established terrorist group that fought against AMISOM and Ethiopian troops in Mogadishu; 
hence the overall mandate of AMISOM is the removal of Al Shabaab from Somalia. 
53 The international community created the TFG through various Somali peace conferences to 
bring peace in Somalia. 
54 The regional grouping which brings together countries from the Horn and Eastern Africa. IGAD 
member states are Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda. 
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many peacekeepers because most of its member states had their own vested 
interests in Somalia’s conflict and hence were not regarded as neutral by most 
Somalis’ (Williams, 2009b: 515; Bamfo, 2010; Hesse, 2015, 2016; Healy, 2008). 
During research interviews the AU military and policy officers also highlighted the 
challenges in the implementation of APSA, and one policy officer stated that: 
 
AMISOM was supposed to be led by the sub region in the Horn and 
Eastern Africa, IGAD. But because of the complex historical politics 
around it, especially with the neighbouring countries of Somalia, especially 
Ethiopia and Kenya, IGAD failed to deploy in Somalia (Extract 1A). 
 
It is important to note that, despite the establishment of regional mechanisms 
within the APSA framework, the case of Somalia provided significant political 
challenges that prevented the regional structure (IGAD) to deploy its peace 
mission to Somalia. In other words, the geopolitical rivalries within IGAD 
especially between Somalia and Ethiopia prevented the regional institution from 
leading the peace intervention.  This failure by IGAD, therefore, challenges the 
common understanding that countries close to the conflict have significant 
advantages in resolving conflicts within their region.55  It was from this backdrop 
that the AU peace operation was formed and UN Security Council resolution 1725 
(6 December 2006) authorised IGAD and AU member states to establish a 
protection and training mission in Somalia with a mandate to secure and maintain 
the peace, as described in Table 7.1.  
 
7.1.2 IGAD and AU mandate in Somalia  
Table 7.1 provides the initial mandate for IGAD and AU member states authorised 
by the UN Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations. 
                                                      
55 The concept of proximity to conflicts has been discussed by many scholars and forms the 
basic conceptualisation of APSA. Within this concept, it is assumed that countries close to the 
conflict have a better understanding of the conflict and are therefore better placed to resolve the 
conflicts. 
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Table 7.0.1 Initial IGAD and AU mandate 
• monitor the progress of, and ensure the safe passage of those involved in, the 
political dialogue between the UIC and the TFG authorities;   
• ensure free movement and safe passage of all those involved with the dialogue 
process; 
• maintain and monitor security in Baidoa (where the TFG was based);  
• protect members of the TFG as well as their key infrastructure; and 
• train the TFG’s security forces and help re-establish the national security forces 
of Somalia. 
Source: UN Security Council S/RES/1725 (2006) 
 
While the initial AU-IGAD mandate was brief and focused on establishing a 
conducive environment for launching the Transitional Government of Somalia, 
Table 7.2 shows how the mission has expanded. Additionally, it outlines the 
complexity of the mission in terms of achievable goals and how to measure them. 
 
7.1.3 AMISOM Mandate (2016-2017)  
AMISOM mandates have been renewed yearly and approved by the UN Security 
Council since 2007. Figure 7.2 is the recent mandate and has a wide range of 
activities.  
 
Table 7.0.2 AMISOM Mandate 2017 
• Reduce the threat posed by Al Shabaab and other armed opposition 
groups. 
• Provide security in order to enable the political process at all levels as 
well as stabilisation efforts, reconciliation and peacebuilding in Somalia. 
• Enable the gradual handing over of security responsibilities from 
AMISOM to the Somali security forces contingent on the abilities of the 
Somali security forces. 
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• To continue to conduct offensive operations against Al Shabaab and 
other armed opposition groups. 
• To maintain a presence in the sectors set out in the AMISOM Concept 
of Operations in order to establish conditions for effective and legitimate 
governance across Somalia, in coordination with the Somali security 
forces. 
• To assist with the free movement, safe passage and protection of all 
those involved with the peace and reconciliation process in Somalia and 
ensure the security of the electoral process in Somalia as a key 
requirement. 
• To secure key supply routes including to areas recovered from Al 
Shabaab, in particular those essential to improving the humanitarian 
situation, and those critical for logistical support to AMISOM, 
underscoring that the delivery of logistics remains a joint responsibility 
between the United Nations and AU. 
• To conduct joint operations with the Somali security forces, within its 
capabilities, in coordination with other parties, as part of the 
implementation of the Somali national security plans and to contribute 
to the wider effort of training and mentoring of the security forces of the 
FGS. 
• To contribute, within its capabilities as may be requested, to the creation 
of the necessary security conditions for the provision of humanitarian 
assistance. 
• To engage with communities in recovered areas, and promote 
understanding between AMISOM and local populations, within its 
capabilities, which will allow for longer term stabilisation by the United 
Nations Country Team and other actors. 
• To provide and assist, as appropriate, protection to the Somali 
authorities to help them carry out their functions of government, and 
security for key infrastructures. 
• To protect its personnel, facilities, installations, equipment and mission, 
and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, 
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as well as of United Nations personnel carrying out functions mandated 
by the Security Council. 
• To receive on a transitory basis, defectors, as appropriate, and in 
coordination with the United Nations. 
 
Source: UN Security Council S/RES/2297 (2016) 
 
As highlighted above, the mandates and tasks assigned to AMISOM encompass 
a wide range of activities that are not clearly defined and, therefore, it is difficult 
to assess their impact on the peace processes. While the discussion of the 
AMISOM mandate in this study does not engage in analysing the success or 
failure of the mission, it highlights the complexity of the mission and its leadership. 
The AMISOM mandate provides the framework in which the AU actors operate 
and interact with each other, thereby establishing the leadership boundaries of 
the peace mission. The AMISOM mandate is further discussed later in the 
chapter. The next section presents and analyses the formation of AMISOM and 
its leadership framework. 
 
7.2 AMISOM formation and leadership framework 
It is important to describe the formation of AMISOM, as the formation of policies 
has been identified as having a significant effect on their chances of success or 
failure (Skocpol, 1992; Pierson, 1996; Pierson and Skocpol, 2002; Peters, 2012). 
It is, therefore, important to describe and analyse the formation of AMISOM. This 
section first provides the composition of AMISOM and its leadership framework. 
Secondly, the discussion dwells on the SOPs of the mission. The SOPs provide 
the framework of interactions, chain of command and expected behaviour of 
participants in the peace mission. In this light, the SOP is used as a key document 
that establishes AU leadership in the Somalia peace processes. The SOP is not 
a stand-alone document but considered together with the PSC protocol and the 
Constitutive Act of the AU. It is noted in Chapter 5 that the transformation of OAU 
to AU was primarily done to foster sustainable peace and security on the African 
continent. While the contextual background above has highlighted the impact and 
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consequences of the bilateral agreements between the US and Ethiopia in 
Somalia interventions, the research findings reveal the significance of the AU in 
the peace processes.   
 
The AU PSC as the mandating authority of AU peace interventions is the 
established overall leader of peace operations in AMISOM. As shown in Chapter 
5, the line of authority devolves along the AU Commission Chairperson to the 
Commissioner for Peace and Security, then to the Peace Support Operations 
Division (PSOD) which has the operational control and supports all peace support 
operations. The AMISOM field mission in Somalia is headed by a Special 
Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission (SRCC), 
appointed by the AU Commission. The mission has three components: military, 
police and civilian. The military component is the biggest of the three components 
of the AU mission in the country with 22,126 troops and is headed by the Force 
Commander who is appointed by the AU Commission and comes from TCCs on 
a rotational basis.  Drawn from the overall mandate of the mission, the military 
component is tasked to stabilize the country and create the necessary conditions 
for the conduct of humanitarian activities. The research findings and analysis in 
this chapter focus on the military component of AMISOM since it is the biggest 
and most influential actor in the peace mission. The findings explore the 
interactions among the TCCs, national contingents and AU actors (PSC, SRCC, 
Force Commander and PSOD). 
 
7.2.1 AMISOM troop contributing countries 
AMISOM TCCs include Ethiopia, Kenya, Burundi, Djibouti, Sierra Leone and 
Uganda. Uganda was the first to deploy troops under AMISOM in Somalia in 
March 2007. The Ugandan contingent remains the largest contingent in AMISOM 
with 6,223 troops.56 The Burundi contingent was the second to deploy in 
Mogadishu in December 2007 and is the second largest with 5,432 troops.57 In 
December 2011, Djibouti became the third country to contribute to AMISOM and 
                                                      
56 Available at http://amisom-au.org/uganda-updf/. Accessed on 04 May 2017. 
57 Available at http://amisom-au.org/burundi/. Accessed on 04 May 2017. 
  169 
has a contingent of 960 troops.58 Sierra Leone deployed its 850 troops under 
AMISOM in April 2013. However, Sierra Leone had deployed its first police 
officers within AMISOM to Mogadishu in 2010.59 It is important to note that apart 
from Sierra Leone, all troops in AMISOM are from the regional organisation IGAD, 
indicating a sub-regional commitment to the peace operations in the region. 
However, the four big African economies (South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria and 
Egypt) with much more advanced military capabilities are not part of the troop 
contributors to this AU mission.60  
 
Ethiopia and Kenya had unilateral military interventions in Somalia prior to their 
AU re-hatting, hence, this requires some brief background information. It is 
highlighted above that the expulsion of the UIC in Mogadishu fuelled the cause 
of jihadist insurgents (al-Shabaab) and increased the instability in Somalia 
(Williams, 2009b; Menkhaus, 2008, 2009 Bamfo, 2010; Hesse, 2015). The al-
Shabaab fighters who withdrew from Mogadishu in 2011, increased their 
presence and activities along the Somali border with Kenya. Hence, the al-
Shabaab terrorist activities destabilised the Kenyan national security and tourism 
industry due to kidnappings of tourists and aid workers (Carter and Guard, 2015: 
53). Consequently, the Kenyan government made the decision to unilaterally 
intervene in Somalia with the aim of pushing the al-Shabaab fighters away from 
its border. On 16 October 2011, Kenya Defence Forces moved into Southern 
Somalia to pursue the insurgent group. One month later, the Kenyan government 
entered into negotiations with the AU to re-hat its forces under the African Union 
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).61 On 22 February 2012, Kenyan troops were 
formally integrated into AMISOM after the United Nations Security Council 
passed Resolution 2036 and they are deployed in a sector along the Kenyan 
common border with Somalia. Likewise, after the Ethiopian initial intervention in 
                                                      
58 Available at http://amisom-au.org/djibouti/. Accessed on 04 May 2017. 
59 Available at http://amisom-au.org/sierra-leone-police/. Accessed on 04 May 2017. 
60 These four countries are regarded as the hegemonies of Africa and biggest financial 
contributors to the AU budget. South Africa and Nigeria have been influential in peacekeeping 
and deployment of their troops in Darfur, Burundi, DRC, Sierra Leone and Liberia under AU, 
ECOWAS and UN. 
61 Available at http://amisom-au.org/kenya-kdf/. Accessed on 04 May 2017. 
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2006, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia officially re-hatted to become 
a TCC to the AMISOM on 1 January 2014 and the Ethiopia National Defence 
Forces have provided 4395 uniformed personnel located in a region that covers 
the most part of their common border with Somalia, including part of Mogadishu.62 
It is important to note that the integration of Kenyan and Ethiopian troops into the 
AU has had an impact on the leadership of AMISON. A discussion on the 
implications of Kenyan and Ethiopian re-hatting to become AU troops is done 
later in the chapter. 
 
7.2.2 AMISOM Police Contributing Countries. 
The police component in AMISOM currently has 386 police officers that include: 
103 Individual Police Officers (IPO) from Uganda, Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, 
and Niger, 280 Formed Police Unit (FPU) from Nigeria and Uganda, and 3 Senior 
Leadership Team (SLT) officers from South Africa, Uganda and Nigeria63.  The 
component is headed by a Police Commissioner who is recruited through 
competitive processes from different AU member states. The AMISOM Police 
component has the mandate to train, mentor, monitor and advise the Somali 
Police Force (SPF) with the aim of transforming it into a credible and effective 
organisation adhering to strict international standards, such as human rights 
observation, crime prevention strategies, community policing, search procedures 
and investigations.64 AMISOM police have a significant role in ensuring that the 
Somali National Security and Stabilisation Plan is locally owned through training 
and capacity building of the Somali Police. The FPUs conduct joint patrols with 
the SPF in Mogadishu, assisting in Public Order Management and provision of 
VIP escorts as well as providing protection to the AU. IPOs are co-located with 
the SPF in as many police stations as possible. Over 4000 Somali Police officers 
have been trained in different categories of police work by AMISOM Police and 
its partners.65 In order to further provide the AU leadership framework, the next 
section explores the significance of SOPs within AMISOM. 
                                                      
62 Available at http://amisom-au.org/ethiopia-endf/. Accessed on 04 May 2017. 
63 These data are current as at December 2017. 
64 Available at http://amisom-au.org/mission-profile/amisom-police/. Accessed on 04 May 2017. 
65 Available at http://amisom-au.org/mission-profile/amisom-police/. Accessed on 04 May 2017. 
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7.2.3 AMISOM Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)  
One of the essential guiding documents that establish routines and facilitate 
leadership in peace operations is the SOPs. The procedures formalise the 
interactional framework of the actors and leadership of the peace mission. 
Formulation of a code of conduct is part of the planning process and vital for any 
peace operation (UN, 2015). The mission planning also includes a range of 
activities such as the nature of the mission, command and control, designing 
achievable mandates, acquiring resources (logistical, personnel and financial), 
forging partnerships, and assessment of own capabilities (UN, 2015).   
 
The AU SOP for AMISOM defines leadership and provides rules, norms and 
values that guide collective action in the peace operations. The role of norms and 
values in constraining behaviour of participants has been widely acknowledged 
(March and Olsen, 1983; 2006). An analysis on the role of norms and values in 
guiding AU peace operations is done later in the chapter. It is acknowledged in 
this study that SOPs are considered together with the Memorandum of 
Understanding of AMISOM. The purpose of AMISOM SOPs is:  
 
i. To familiarise the defence forces of TCCs with the AU mechanism for 
conflict prevention, management and resolution. 
ii. To provide guidance to planners and leaders, both civilian and military, as 
well as their staff, on the planning and conduct of AU PSOs. 
iii. To facilitate the standardisation of peace support procedures in AU PSO 
arenas, and in consistency with UN peace support procedures. 
iv. To facilitate PSO training by member states. 
 
AU AMISOM SOP para 1003 defines the AU command and employment of 
national contingents in peace operations and indicates that any issues pertaining 
to the employment of national contingents would be resolved through mutual 
consultations between TCCs and the AU. However, the AU retains the freedom 
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of action in utilising the operational capabilities of the forces assigned to the 
Union, in fulfilling the mandate authorised by the PSC. Within this para, the AU 
Head of Mission (HoM) is accorded the necessary flexibility and freedom of 
manoeuvre to deploy national contingents for the operational effectiveness of the 
mission. The AMISOM SOP specifically mentions that if any TCCs have 
reservations on the use of their forces in certain situations and ways, they must 
make this known at the outset when the troops are being offered to avoid 
compromising the safety and security of other contingents and the success of the 
mission as a whole. 
 
Para 1016 provides that the overall political direction and control of the activities 
of the mission should be exercised and coordinated by an AU Special 
Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission (SRCC), who would be 
designated by the Chairperson of the AU Commission as the HoM. All heads of 
major components, such as military, police and civilian, should report to the 
SRCC. In order to provide clarity in the chain of command, para 1017 provides 
that, notwithstanding the designation of an SRCC, operational control of the 
military and civilian police components of AMISOM is vested in the Force 
Commander and Police Commissioner, respectively, who would be appointed by 
the AU Commission Chairperson. By deploying their troops to AU missions, 
TCCs transfer operational authority and control of their troops to the AU and are 
only involved in administrative matters of national contingent (AU SOP para 17 
and 20). The AU, however, encourages mutual professional consultations with 
subregional organisations as stipulated in APSA, with regard to command, 
control and decision-making (AU SOP para 10).  While TCCs are encouraged to 
maintain their administrative channel of communications with their contingents 
and personnel; they are prohibited to issue any instructions to their military 
personnel, that are contrary to AU plans, policies, and implementation of their 
mandated tasks (AU SOP para 1013). This para provides clear instructions to 
national authorities of TCCs on the leadership of their troops that are committed 
to AU PSOs. 
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The research findings below, provide significant information on AU leadership 
through the implementation of the SOP in AMISOM. At this point this chapter 
shifts to research findings on the formation of the peace mission in Somalia and 
underlying structural interactions of actors underpinning AMISOM.  
 
7.3 Underlying dynamics in AMISOM formation 
The above description of the AMISOM SOP has established the AU hierarchical 
leadership in the peace operations and leadership structures that support the 
mission. While AMISOM is an AU mission, research findings reveal several 
factors that require further analysis in examining the extent of AU leadership. The 
interview extracts from research participants and secondary data provided below, 
show a significant gap in mission planning and consultations during the initial 
stages of AMISOM. As indicated above, the formation of peace missions requires 
significant consultations with TCCs and other stakeholders; however, the 
research findings reveal that the AU failed to conduct comprehensive 
consultations prior to its deployment in Somalia. For instance, during research 
interviews, the AU military officer indicated that: 
 
During discussions on the deployment of AMISOM most member states of 
the AU expressed concerns about funding of the mission, logistics and 
dangerous conflict environment in Somalia; but Ethiopian government 
representatives were pushing so much and Ethiopian troops were already 
in Somalia by this time. As a result, most African member states were not 
interested to contribute troops to AMISOM, and some countries that 
originally committed some troops never deployed. (Extract 1B). 
 
It is noted in this extract that Ethiopian influence contributed to the lack of 
meaningful consultations in the formative stages of the mission. The extract 
shows the single state impact in the AU decision making processes in peace 
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intervention.66 Additionally, the lack of extensive consultations implicitly 
discouraged other potential TCCs. Other scholars have also argued that PSC 
internal procedures were not followed due to the active participation of Ethiopia 
in the AMISOM formation (Williams, 2009b: 517). PSC Protocol Article 8.9 states 
that: 
 
 ‘Any Member of the Peace and Security Council which is party to a conflict 
under consideration by the Peace and Security Council shall not 
participate either in the discussion or the decision-making process relating 
to that conflict or situation. Such Member shall be invited to present its 
case to the Peace and Security Council as appropriate, and shall, 
thereafter, withdraw from proceedings.’ 
 
It is argued that Ethiopia was a party to the conflict due to its unilateral 
intervention in Somalia, hence was not supposed to be part of the PSC 
deliberations on AMISOM deployment. The research findings reveal that the 
failure by the PSC to follow its own protocols was influenced by external powers, 
specifically the role of the US in Somalia. The contextual background above has 
shown that Ethiopian interventions were supported by the US. It is therefore, 
important to examine the role of external partners in the AU leadership of peace 
interventions. 
 
7.4 The role of external partners in AMISOM  
Research findings reveal that the origins of AMISOM have strong links to external 
powers outside Africa that influenced a few African member states to support the 
mission. While external assistance is important for the implementation of African 
peace architecture, the findings reveal that there was less consultation on the 
implementation of AMISOM. Although the stability of Somalia was the agenda of 
the AU PSC, the findings reveal that the AU failed to balance the external 
                                                      
66 It is important to note that Ethiopia is not considered as one of the hegemonic powers within 
the AU but holds significant influence within IGAD and is the hosting nation for the AU Secretariat. 
Additionally, its bilateral agreement with the United States added extra negotiating powers at the 
AU platform. 
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initiatives and mission planning. Additionally, there was less consideration of the 
Somali security and political environment. It is highlighted above that the 
dangerous security environment in Somalia required comprehensive logistical 
support and military fire support weapons; however, such concerns were not fully 
addressed. On the other hand, research participants observed that the US war 
on terror ignored the role played by the UIC in Somalia. The role United States in 
Somalia is similar to French involvement in Madagascar mediation and 
demonstrates the influential role of external influence in AU leadership of peace 
interventions.  The AU policy officer observed that:  
 
African Union deployment in Somalia came in because … Somalia was 
considered a haven for terrorists, … and this coincided with the United 
States war on terror… it was the United States, through their war on terror 
that played a crucial role in the origins of AMISOM. By 2006 the Islamic 
Courts had already taken control of Somalia, and there was no more 
fighting, they were very powerful, and were in charge. Instead of engaging 
them…the Americans saw an extension of the al Qaeda… funded the 
Ethiopians, provided them military support to remove Islamic Courts from 
power. (Extract 1C).  
The AU politicians further noted the significant impact of  the bilateral agreements 
between the US and Ethiopia on the AU decision making processes in the peace 
intervention in Somalia. Although bilateral agreements are a sovereign 
undertaking, it is shown that its outcome influenced the AU to take over Somalia 
peace interventions. The AU politician indicated that the formation of AMISOM 
was engineered by the United States in that:  
 
The African Union PSC was basically commandeered to meet and decide 
so that AMISOM should reflect that it is coming from African member 
states.… when AU officials were trying to move from embassy to embassy 
in Addis Ababa, country to country looking for troops to deploy in AMISOM, 
they were not successful … You need to ask yourself a question; Why is 
it that almost 10 years down the line, no one else wants to bring troops to 
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AMISOM, except those five troop contributing countries?... (Extract 1D).  
 
These observations indicate a significant exogenous influence on the AMISOM 
formative stages, and at the same time question the powers and leadership of 
the AU PSC. The extracts further reveal the inability of the AU to generate enough 
troops for this peace intervention. These observations seem to explain the 
absence of the top four African larger economies with better equipped militaries.67 
These research findings reveal the implications of external influence on AU 
leadership in peace interventions. Additionally, the findings reveal the level of 
support coming from the AU member states to the peace mission, in that only a 
few members contributed troops to AMISOM. The next section examines the 
interactions between AU leadership and national contingents in AMISOM.  
7.5 AU interaction with national contingents and troop 
contributing countries in AMISOM 
This section focusses on the implementation of the AU mission as stipulated in 
the AU SOP above. Leadership is examined by exploring how the hierarchical 
directives were implemented by national contingents in the mission area. The UN 
High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) report (2015)68 
convincingly argues that uniformed peacekeepers must have a common mindset 
and commitment to deliver on an agreed operational concept.  The UN HIPPO 
report specifically mentions the implementation of the intent of the Force 
Commander and meaningful and inclusive consultation with troop and police 
contributing countries. The case of AMISOM, however, reveals challenges in the 
AU leadership structure and implementation of the Force Commander’s intent. 
The AU policy officers and ISS programme officers observed that the Force 
Commanders appointed by the AU have little influence in the command and 
control of the peace intervention mission. For instance, the AU policy officer 
pointed out that:  
                                                      
67 These countries are South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Egypt 
68 This is the report presented to the Secretary-General on 16 June 2015 by the High-Level 
Independent Panel on Peace Operations. Available at https://peaceoperationsreview.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/08/HIPPO_Report_1_June_2015.pdf. Accessed on 25 December, 2017 
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The Force Commander has no powers over national contingents in 
AMISOM and that is why the AU was forced to create the Military 
Operation Coordinating Committee (MOCC)69. The MOCC is actually 
making military decisions for AMISOM. The committee has taken up the 
functions of the Force Commander to the extent that Sector Commanders 
take orders from the MOCC not the Force Commander. In fact, it has taken 
over the responsibility of not only the military component, but it is also 
making decisions on behalf of the Head of Mission, the Commission, and 
the PSC, ... (Extract 1E). 
 
These findings reveal that the AU leadership structures are challenged by 
national contingents and is replaced by the trop contributing countries structures. 
It is important to note that the MOCC was an ad hoc leadership structure not 
provided in the AU PSC protocol or any guiding document of peace operations. 
The military interviewees indicated that the formal AU military advisory committee 
in peace operations is the Military Staff Committee, made up of senior military 
officers from the member states of the PSC not the TCCs.  
 
This failure to use established structures by the AU has implications for how 
leadership is produced within the AU in directing and aligning participants in 
peace interventions. The AU leadership, in this instance, can be argued to have 
little or no alignment.  On the one hand, this indicates a problematic situation. 
The creation of the MOCC indicates a lack of trust in the institution, thereby 
endangering the AU’s power to orient or constrain behaviour of actors and guide 
them towards collective action (Lepsius, 2016: 13-14). The repeated failure by 
the AU PSC to enforce the implementation of SOPs contributed to the loss of 
institutional trust. As noted by Alvarez and Svejenova (2005), trust is a 
prerequisite for effective leadership. Moreover, the creation of the MOCC also 
highlights the AU’s failure in controlling troops in Somalia. Research participants 
observed that the major challenge was that Sector Commanders (from national 
                                                      
69 The MOCC is made up of military chiefs from Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs). 
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contingents) were not taking orders from the Force Commander but their national 
capitals, contrary to established SOPs. From this backdrop, the AU PSC had 
challenges in implementing the SOP and constraining the behaviour of national 
contingents for collective action. On the other hand, while the formation of MOCC 
may indicate AU’s leadership challenges, it also shows the flexibility of its peace 
architecture and ability to adapt to a changing security environment. Analysis of 
the flexibility of the AU leadership framework is provided later in the chapter.  
 
As shown above, research findings reveal that the AU PSC has ceded more 
powers to the few TCCs. Research participants from ISS and the AU indicated 
that MOCC has effectively established itself as a de facto leadership structure of 
the peace intervention. For instance, it was further observed by the AU politician 
that: 
 
The MOCC influenced the AU PSC through the AU Commission to appoint 
Force Commanders from troop contributing countries on a rotational 
basis… Basically, TCCs blackmailed the AU Commission throughout the 
whole process of selecting Force Commanders in AMISOM. (Extract 1F) 
 
This extract indicates that the MOCC took control of the peace mission in Somalia 
and the AU was used as the medium of the operation. Research participants at 
the AU observed that the formal recruitment procedure for Force Commanders is 
through a competitive process from all AU member states. However, this was not 
adhered to because the TCCs in Somalia warned the AU not to advertise the 
Force Commander’s position. It is noted above that the Police Commissioner in 
AMISOM is recruited through competitive processes from different AU member 
states and the composition of the police component is relatively diverse.  
 
It is also important to note that the research findings on AMISOM leadership are 
in contrast to broader norms which govern peace operations. Here, the UN 
  179 
recommendations provided in the HIPPO report (2015)70 stress the need for a 
shared understanding of the situation and common goals among the mandating 
authority in peace operations, mission leadership, and troop and police 
contributing countries. The report further indicates that leadership in peace 
operations is smooth when uniformed peacekeepers have a common mindset 
and commitment to deliver the agreed operational concept from the Force 
Commander. It is important to note that the military goals are not independent but 
are subordinate to the overall mission mandate and objectives in peace 
operations. In the case of AMISOM there are indications of less cohesiveness 
and lack of extensive consultation in the mission. It was acknowledged by 
research participants that flawless linkages between the mission leadership and 
national contingents are vital in driving and maintaining a proactive political and 
operational posture of a peace operation mission in AMISOM.  
 
While hierarchical leadership is promoted in the working relations between the 
Force Commander and Sector Commanders, research participants observed that 
co-leadership is also encouraged within AMISOM. Force Commanders are 
encouraged to consult with Sector Commanders to make sure that whatever is 
done in terms of mission operation is planned jointly. Although this is done, 
military officers and politicians from the AU critically observed that there are 
underlying national interests that override the Force Commander’s intent and 
employment of national contingents, hence the need to balance the mission 
mandate and national interest in the Somalia peace mission. The AU military 
officer in highlighting the complex leadership dynamics in AMISOM observed 
that: 
 
Command and control in Somalia is difficult, … because national 
                                                      
70 The High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) report, reflects the 
acknowledgement of the changing dynamics of conflict in the world that necessitates a revision 
of the UN’s tools in order for the organisation to maintain its relevance and ability to meet these 
challenges. The report involved extensive consultation between the UN and AU. The report 
reviewed the AU peace operations missions including AMISOM and made recommendations on 
how to conduct peace operations. 
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contingents are under command of the Force Commander, but are also 
bearing national interests. (Extract 1G). 
 
The extract above indicates the prevailing leadership challenges from the onset 
of the peace intervention in Somalia. It is evident from AMISOM’s background 
that the mission was influenced by significant national interests of the US, 
Ethiopia and Kenya and this significantly affected the AU mission leadership. As 
a result of this, the AU hierarchy established in the mission SOPs had been 
undermined and replaced with the TCCs through the MOCC. This is contrary to 
UN peace operations, where national contingents are at the bottom of the chain 
of command (Findlay, 2002: 12). The AU leadership challenge is also linked to 
its failure to generate enough troops for AMISOM. Research participants 
observed that the lack of member states contributing troops to Somalia forced 
the AU to re-hat Ethiopian and Kenyan troops in Somalia. Consequently, TCCs 
had more leverage to the mission leadership. As a result of this, the would-be 
followers had more powers that prevented the AU from taking decisive measures 
in ensuring adherence to SOPs.  
 
Other research participants observed that AU leadership in AMISOM is 
challenged due to the war/fighting nature of the peace operation where stakes 
are high. It is acknowledged elsewhere that when the use of force is involved in 
peace missions there is a greater tendency to seek instructions from national 
capitals by contingent commanders (Findlay, 2002: 13). Additionally, the use of 
regional forces further challenged the management of the mission in Somalia. 
During the discussions with the AU military and policy officers on the use of 
regional troops in Somalia, one military officer observed that:  
 
Command and control of troops has been one of the central problems of 
AU peace operations because AU conducts war fighting missions. These 
are high intensity operations where risks are very high. … AU is also 
struggling in terms of command and control because the forces are 
regional, and they are close to their national capitals, at the same time 
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they have to fight in very difficult situations that involve high casualties. So, 
in most things they report to their national capitals before they seek the 
guidance of the Force Commander. This is the biggest challenge in the 
AU mission in Somalia. (Extract 1H). 
 
The extract above shows the complex nature of AU peace operations and the 
implications of using regional troops in high intensity operations. The need for 
comprehensive planning and consultations was widely emphasised by research 
participants. On the other hand, the findings acknowledge the consequences of 
hasty decisions in the mission planning. It is highlighted above that most AU 
member states expressed concern on the dangerous security environment in 
Somalia and the need for comprehensive logistical and military support. 
However, such concerns were largely ignored and some member states that had 
pledged to contribute their troops never deployed71. Poor planning can be the 
underlying cause of the challenged leadership of the AU mission in Somalia. 
Earlier studies have indicated the need for a well-coordinated overall mission 
plan, in consultation with troop contributors before any deployment.72  
 
The AMISOM analysis agrees with other studies that indicates that the use of 
regional forces in peace operations is not a panacea for African solutions. The 
research findings reveal that Sector Commanders from national contingents, 
when ordered by the Force Commander to destroy insurgents/terrorist camps, 
could first report to their national capitals for authorisation. The research further 
reveals that peace operations in Somalia have significant political implications in 
TCCs. Research participants observed that being close to the conflict zone, 
casualty figures are easily leaked, and citizens are now demanding accountability 
                                                      
71 Some of these member states that never deployed after the initial commitment are Nigeria, 
Guinea, Tanzania and Malawi. Tanzania offered to train Somalia forces but not to deploy 
peacekeepers 
72 See a report from Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (Germany), Life and Peace Institute (Sweden), 
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) and United Nations Department of Peace-
keeping Operations, Lessons Learned Unit, ‘Comprehensive report on lessons-learned from 
United Nations Operation in Somalia April 1992-March 1995’, Swedish Government, Stockholm, 
Dec. 1995, p. 7. 
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and information on peace interventions, especially where casualty levels are 
high. This finding is illustrated by the following extract from the AU politician: 
… Leaders from democratic countries are losing domestic legitimacy due 
to high casualties in Somalia. … political leadership in all troop contributing 
countries in AMISOM have been going through a crisis of legitimacy back 
home because of the troops they are using in Somalia. That is why some 
of them want to pull out of Somalia. (Extract 1J). 
 
Research findings demonstrate that the nature of AU peace operations in 
Somalia are complex and required wider and extensive consultations in both the 
AU and national capitals for local support. At the same time, the findings further 
reveal the need for tight coordination and cooperation within the mission when 
the use of force is involved; however, this was lacking in AMISOM. Research 
participants also indicated that the funding of AMISOM is another bottleneck to 
AU leadership. The next section, therefore, discusses the mission planning, 
focusing on the funding of AMISOM. 
 
7.6 AU leadership and funding of AMISOM  
The research findings reveal the linkages between funding and leadership of the 
AU peace operations in Somalia. Research participants observed that the power 
of the purse is influential to the development of AU peace operations. The 
research shows that the UN and European Union (EU) have been instrumental 
in sustaining the AU mission in Somalia.  It is noted that the UN provides logistical 
support to more than 20,000 AU personnel in AMISOM (UN HIPPO report 
2015:74). The United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) is responsible 
for logistical and administrative support to AMISOM. A former UN and AU official 
during the interviews observed that AU financial challenges in peace operations 
are enormous and indicated that: 
The other challenges to AU leadership in AMISOM are financial and 
logistical issues. … about 98 percent of the AU missions are funded by 
partners. (Extract 1K). 
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The UN support to AU operations is provided in UN - AU partnership and 
illustrated in AMISOM. The UN commitment for stronger corporation with the AU 
as envisaged in the UN Charter, Chapter VIII, has mainly supported the AU 
deployment in Somalia (UNSC/2015/229). The prominence of the UN over 
regional arrangements is well acknowledged in the UN Charter. Apart from the 
logistical support, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General 
(SRSG) for Somalia heads the political mission of Somalia. Research 
participants, however, observed that the coordination between the UN and AU 
on political missions is not clear, since the AU also has a Special Representative 
of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission (SRCC). In this light, both 
the UN and AU have political missions in Somalia and it is not known if there is 
any division of labour or how their mandates are synchronised. A former UN and 
AU official, however, indicated the significant UN impact in AMISOM in that: 
The UN influence on AU leadership in AMISOM can be seen at three 
different levels. The political level, between the UN Security Council and 
the AU Peace and Security Council. The second level is the level of the 
peace operation mission itself, that is between AMISOM and the UN 
mission in Somalia. And the third level, is the supporting level, because 
AMISOM logistical support is from the UN. (Extract 1L). 
 
It is clear from the research findings that the UN provides necessary conditions 
for the AU to conduct its peace operations. It is also important to note that AU 
dependency on the UN and EU in AMISOM has implications for its leadership in 
the mission area. For instance, the EU pays for troop allowances and the number 
of troops in AMISOM is, therefore, determined by the EU budget. This implies 
that the AU can only deploy the number of troops that the EU can pay for. To 
underscore the AU funding dependency, the ISS programme officer observed 
that: 
 
AMISOM has exclusive dependency on external partners, especially EU 
and UN and other bilateral partners. EU is currently cutting its contributions 
to AMISOM. All this creates challenges to AU leadership because when 
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you are leading a mission you need to provide necessary resources and 
then you can exercise authority. (Extract 1M). 
 
The old adage that ‘he who pays the piper calls the tune’ is more relevant to 
AMISOM leadership. The AU leadership in AMISOM is therefore, dependent on 
the UN, EU and other external partners who provides financial and logistical 
support. In this instance, AU leadership is constituted by a collective and not 
specifically hierarchical through the AU. Despite the funding shortfalls, the AU 
provides a specific, functionalist role to regional peace interventions. The 
discussion on AU relevance to regional peace interventions in Africa is given 
below. 
 
7.7 AU functionalism in regional peace operations 
The study reveals the functionalist role provided by the AU in collective regional 
peace efforts. The research findings show that despite the significant leadership 
challenges, the AU provides regional legitimacy and ability to garner global 
support for peace operations in Africa. It is important to note that AU deployment 
came in due to IGAD’s failed attempt to deploy its subregional force in Somalia.  
The AU is mentioned in UN literature as an important partner in regional peace 
operations. Research participants acknowledged that despite the challenges, the 
mission has made considerable peace progress in Somalia. The AMISOM 
military component has been instrumental in helping Somali National Security 
Forces push the Al Qaeda-affiliated terror group, Al Shabaab, out of much of 
southern Somalia, including most major towns and cities.73 It is noted that through 
the AU peace mission, Somalia has achieved a relatively secure environment in 
Mogadishu and other parts of Somalia, although, Al Shabaab still poses 
significant security threats (Williams, 2014a).  
 
AMISOM has also demonstrated the AU’s resolve in tackling new security 
challenges that the UN cannot respond to, for example, terrorism. The following 
                                                      
73 See http://amisom-au.org/mission-profile/military-component/. Accessed on 03 May 2017. 
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interview extract from the AU policy officer points to the AU’s significant 
contribution to the achievement of relative peace in Somalia, compared to 
previous international peace interventions: 
 
Previous international interventions in Somalia have had more resources 
and equipment. They involved much more advanced militaries but failed 
to do what the under-resourced AMISOM has done. Somalia mission is 
also evidence of the evolving nature of peace operations that responds to 
new security challenges like terrorism and this is what the UN is not able 
to do. The African Union is generating new ideas of peace operations and 
has the willingness to see its implementation. (Extract 1N). 
 
The AU perspective on the progress of the peace intervention in Somalia 
indicates that despite the challenges in the leadership, there are positive 
contributions made towards continental peace and stability. In agreement with 
this observation AU policy and military officers noted that the AU peace operation 
cannot be underestimated, considering the relative peace in Somalia. In 
reference to previous interventions, the AU policy officer noted that:  
 
UN was in Somali through the mandates of UNOSOM I, UNOSOM II 
between 1992 and 1995 and they had 58,000 troops, more than twice what 
the AU has. But they left the country in haste, they actually ran away from 
Somalia. United States was in that country in 1992-3 and was 
embarrassed, but now there is relative stability in Somalia. (Extract 1P). 
 
From this backdrop, the research findings acknowledge the positive impact of the 
AU operation in Somalia. In this light, the AU has demonstrated its relevance in 
continental peace and stability operations. The paradox, however, is in the nature 
of leadership provided by the AU. At this point, it is important to further examine 
how leadership was produced and implemented in AMISOM. The next section 
discusses the theoretical implications of leadership within AU peace operations.  
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7.8 Theoretical implications of AMISOM leadership on African 
Union 
The AU norms and values in leadership production are established in AMISOM 
SOPs (March and Olsen, 1983, 2006). The SOPs outline the routines and sets 
out the logic of appropriateness for collective action in AU peace operations 
(March and Olsen, 2004). 
 
The SOP further provides interrelated rules on reporting procedures and conduct 
of national contingents, defines who has the authority, and lays out routines that 
define appropriate actions in terms of relations between roles and situations 
(March and Olsen, 1989: 21-6). The preamble to the AMISOM SOP states that 
“the purpose of SOPs is to provide authority, power and guidelines within 
AMISOM mission area and to provide uniform standing operating procedures to 
be followed by all.” The research results, however, show that norms and values 
established within the AMISOM SOP were not institutionalised in national 
contingents and TCCs and could not constrain their behaviour. It is important to 
note that institutionalisation of SOPs takes place through interactions of 
participants. In the case of AMISOM, the values and norms that facilitate 
collective action through organising, enabling, and restraining of actors have not 
yet developed. The research results show limited socialisation of actors in 
mission planning and subsequent implementation. Consequently, there is 
minimal internalisation of norms and values to constrain actors from pursuing 
divergent goals.  
 
On the other hand, the evidence from the research shows significant realist 
perspectives in collective action. The research shows persistent national interests 
in the mission formation and leadership. In this light, the study acknowledges the 
existence of rational action in TCCs and a weak normative framework in the 
guarding behaviour of actors within AU peace interventions. 
 
The significance of consultations among peace operations’ participants and 
stakeholders has been emphasised by others (Findlay, 2002; Durch, 2006; 
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Bellamy, 2009). The AMISOM SOP is exclusive on consultations and para 1003, 
in defining AU command and employment of national contingents, emphasises 
mutual consultations between TCCs and the AU. Similarly, Para 1010 of the SOP 
encourages mutual professional consultations with subregional organisations. 
Although consultations are emphasised in AMISOM, the research findings show 
that the nature of consultations and power sharing between AU and TCCs is 
limited.  
 
Additionally, the findings provide puzzling theoretical implications that deviate 
from the broader framework of leadership theories. For instance, there is a 
reversal of hierarchy, where TCCs have more significant powers than the 
mandating authority. In the first instance, the AU established the leader-follower-
goal tripod and set out parameters of expected behaviour of national contingents 
that are committed to the AU peace operations through the SOP. The assumption 
here is that TCCs are rational actors who would maximise their own interests; 
hence, the AU created rules to ensure that national contingents operate within 
the same framework and achieve the collective outcome of the mission. The 
research, however, shows that these rules were not complied with. For instance, 
national contingents were not taking orders from Force Commanders but their 
respective home countries, contrary to what is provided in the SOP74.  
 
What is evident in the case study is that the AU lacked the sanctioning power to 
avoid unnecessary divergence. In this case, AU lost its power to orient or 
constrain the behaviour of actors. Group actors (TCCs) in AMISOM had national 
interests they wanted to fulfil through their collective action; sanctioning power 
was, therefore, crucial to enforce the validity of AU SOPs. It has been argued by 
Lepsius and others that the nature and size of sanctions are crucial for 
                                                      
74 Para 1020 of the AMISOM SOP states that; when national units/contingents and 
MILOBs/CIVPOL come under the control of an AU designated commander, the transfer of 
Operational Authority must be completed immediately. Generally, this process would take place 
when national military personnel and units arrive in the mission area. If required, the transfer of 
authority may be completed at a unit’s home station (before deployment in the area of operations), 
or at an intermediate staging base, as dictated by operational exigencies.  
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compliance. The bigger the sanctions, in terms of losing morale or material results 
for not belonging to a given group, the higher the validity of the rules and 
regulations (Lepsius, 2016: 37). It has been highlighted above that the AU 
struggled to generate enough troops for AMISOM and could hardly pay them; 
hence, the few TCCs had a high leverage and grabbed any powers they could 
from the AU. In this light, there was no significant power sharing or shared 
leadership. The absence of any sanctioning powers from the AU PSC indicated 
that there were fewer incentives for national contingents or TCCs to 
institutionalise the SOP within AMISOM. At the same time the failure of the AU to 
control national contingents in AMISOM led to an unsuccessful trust building 
process of the AU leadership structure. However, the case of AMISOM 
demonstrates that leadership within AU peace operations is constructed and de-
constructed by participants in peace interventions.  
 
7.8.1 Construction of leadership in AMISOM 
The spontaneous emergence of the MOCC in AMISOM can be perceived as both 
anarchic and paradoxically constructive leadership. What is evident is that the 
formation of MOCC was unplanned but developed as a result of resistance from 
“would-be followers”. Research findings show that MOCC was an ad hoc 
arrangement and not provided for in any AU guiding documents on peace and 
security. These findings bring back the following question: How is leadership 
produced in AU peace and security governance?  This research shows that there 
is an excessive mismatch between what is envisaged by the AU in APSA (in 
terms of its powers) and compliance by would-be followers or subregional 
partners. In other words, the implementation of AU mandates using the hierarchy 
is challenged. From this background, this chapter argues that AU leadership can 
be conceptualised in shared leadership terms, where the AU plays a functionalist 
role of acquiring international support and legitimacy for African peace 
operations. It is important, however, to note that research findings show a 
dysfunctional shared leadership, where sharing leadership is not a prerogative of 
hierarchical leaders. Although the AU leadership roles were stipulated in the 
SOPs, their implementation was obstructed.  
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However, there is evidence showing significant mutual direction and agreement 
from all parties in ending violent conflicts but with nominal alignment and varied 
commitment. In light of this, the study reveals the need for more attention on 
extensive consultation and communication before the deployment of any AU 
peace operations. It has been shown above that consultations on mission 
planning were not exhaustive. Member states could not agree on how to navigate 
the dangerous security environment in Somalia and required logistical support. 
As a result of this, few countries deployed, and AU faced leadership challenges 
from TCCs. 
 
The findings also reveal that AU conceptualisation of leadership is malleable, 
where leadership is constructed and not given (Pearce and Conger, 2003; Raelin, 
2005; Crevani et al., 2010; Uhl-Bien, 2011). In AMISOM, leadership is constituted 
as an outcome of interactions where AU is not an independent unit of analysis in 
leadership, but a participant in the interaction with TCCs and external partners. 
The creation of the MOCC in AMISOM can be viewed as an outcome of 
leadership where participants are engaged in conflictual interaction and produce 
new forms of leadership. In this regard, leadership is seen as a process and a 
consequence of group actors in their interactions. Leadership takes shape 
through interactions of the AU and national contingents/TCCs in AU peace 
operations. In this view, the AU, through interactions with stakeholders 
constructed a form of shared leadership where the leader in the “leader-follower-
goal” tripod framework was replaced with a less structured form of leadership. 
From this backdrop, the chapter argues that AMISOM leadership was both 
constructed and deconstructed or transformed by actors in a context of 
interactions. The MOCC decisions were more complied with by national 
contingents and promoted coordination and cooperation in the mission area. At 
the same time, the MOCC operated within the AU structure in order to maintain 
its legitimacy and relevance in peace efforts. This chapter, therefore, shows that 
AU leadership structures are malleable, where processual and ad hoc outcomes 
are likely to guide collective action in the AU regionalisation of peace and security. 
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7.9 Conclusion 
The chapter has shown that the APSA, PSC protocol and SOPs established the 
values, norms, rules and expected appropriate behaviour for peace operations 
actors. Additionally, these structures provide the AU’s hierarchical leadership of 
peace and security, in relation to subregional organisations such as IGAD or 
SADC. Although the AU promotes extensive consultations with stakeholders in 
the formation of any peace operation, research findings show that this was not 
done extensively in the mission planning of AMISOM. As a result of this lack of 
proper planning, the mission leadership faced challenges in aligning the mission 
mandate and national interests of TCCs. The chapter has demonstrated the 
necessity for open and constructive deliberations in the formative stages of AU 
peace operations. These discussions are vital considering that these operations 
are significantly different from those of the UN, in that they involve actual war 
fighting and terrorism. In this light, AU operations require high level commitment 
to the mission chain of command, as the stakes are considerably high. 
Furthermore, they require unreserved commitment from TCCs on the utilisation 
of their national contingents. The case of AMISOM has further demonstrated that 
the leadership of the AU in peace operations is fluid and constructed through 
interactions of AU member states and external actors.  
 
The chapter also shows that values and norms need to be institutionalised in 
order to constrain the behaviour of participants in AU peace operations. It is 
established in this chapter that the values and norms guiding the African peace 
operations have not been fully institutionalised within member states and 
subregional organisations. It is apparent that the AU leadership has not been 
given the powers to align all subregions and member states, towards its goals of 
unified and regionalised peace. On the other hand, the research findings also 
appear to show that the overall assumption of using regional forces in a particular 
conflict zone is problematic and cannot be generalised. AMISOM deployment has 
shown that the political and national interests of neighbouring countries have a 
greater influence on the AU peace and security architecture leadership. In this 
light, the extent of the AU leadership is limited in peace operations. Similar to the 
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conclusions drawn in chapter 6, the AMISOM deployment has demonstrated that 
the AU has mainly provided the platform for sub regional actors to launch peace 
interventions. The chapter has shown multiple levels of influence that undermined 
the AU leadership in AMISOM. First, the chapter has shown the Ethiopian 
government leading the peace intervention through bilateral agreements with 
United States. Second, it has shown the MOCC (a coalition of troop contributing 
countries) leading the operations on ad hoc basis. Thirdly, it is shown that the 
international donor partners like the EU and the United Nations having multiple 
influence through donor support. Consequently, the AU is seen as a participant 
among different players in its own peace interventions and contributes to 
leadership rather than providing leadership on its own. Despite the AU leadership 
challenges, this chapter has demonstrated that the AU continental status 
provides the necessary legitimacy for global support in African regional peace 
interventions. Additionally, the relative peace achieved in Somalia indicates the 
relevance of the AU in regional peace interventions and its contribution to peace. 
Significantly, the chapter has highlighted the importance of comprehensive 
coordination and consultations with regional and external partners in regional 
peace interventions. As shown in chapter 6, this chapter also highlights the 
limited AU influence in leading peace efforts due to geopolitical complexities and 
external influence. From this backdrop, research findings and analysis in the 
chapter provide insights on what leadership looks like and how it is produced in 
AU peace operations. 
 
The AMISOM and Madagascar case studies have brought important questions 
on leadership in the AU peace interventions from mediation to peace operations. 
There are striking similarities on how subregional actors relate to the AU PSC as 
the mandating and authorising entity of AU missions in both conflict mediations 
and peace operations. In both case studies leadership boundaries are not clear 
and affect subsequent leadership outcomes where the AU leadership hierarchy 
is contested, and direction, alignment and commitment are not well balanced for 
collective action. 
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The next chapter discusses the research findings in relation to the overall 
research questions. The chapter goes further to reflect on how the research 
findings interact with liberal and cosmopolitan peacekeeping theories. Through 
this discussion, the chapter responds to the last two research questions. 
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Chapter 8: Discussion of research findings 
 
8.0 Introduction 
This chapter responds to the overall research question of how leadership is 
produced in AU peace operations and conflict mediation, through a discussion of 
the research findings. The discussion reflects on the social construction of 
leadership within the AU peace interventions75 and the extent to which 
regionalisation of peace has developed in the continent76. The interactions in 
conflict mediation in Madagascar and the peace operation in Somalia offer wide-
ranging viewpoints when analysing African regional peace efforts. The study 
provides fascinating insights into the leadership and coordination of regionalised 
peace interventions. It is shown that the conceptualisation of leadership, in these 
case studies, departs from the traditional definition of leadership. The findings 
therefore, call for a debate on how leadership can be defined and understood in 
regional peace interventions in Africa. Additionally, the research findings offer an 
opportunity in which leadership of regionalised peace can start to be located and 
analysed in the African context. The research findings in both case studies 
demonstrate that leadership is defined beyond the tripod ontology, but also in 
terms of direction, alignment and commitment due to the absence of a clear 
hierarchy between the AU and subregional actors. The case of Madagascar and 
AMISOM shows high levels of direction and commitment from both AU and 
subregions in resolving conflicts. However, their interactions indicate low levels 
of alignment in pursuing the goals. It is demonstrated that a less structured 
approach in Madagascar produced a leadership framework that was not aligned 
until the AU was invited back into mediations by the SADC. Similarly, until the 
formation of the MOCC, leadership within AMISOM was not aligned. The 
                                                      
75 As explained in Chapter 1, ‘peace interventions’ in this study is used to cover both conflict 
mediation and peace operations, i.e. peaceful settlement of disputes and the threat or use of 
force.  
76 As pointed out in Chapter 3, the term ‘regionalisation of peace’ has been used to describe the 
decentralisation of peace interventions in the AU, as provided by the APSA. Where subregional 
organisations are the AU framework for peace interventions but are also involved in peace 
interventions independently. 
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discussion in this chapter also focuses on the collaboration and coordination of 
peace interventions within the AU peace architecture.  
 
The first part of the chapter discusses the AU leadership approach to peace 
interventions and examines situations in which the AU has successfully 
negotiated its leadership. The dominating theme in the discussion is on the social 
construction of leadership and how notions of power are separated from 
leadership. At this point, the chapter highlights the role of subregional actors77 in 
the construction of AU leadership. The significance of leadership boundaries 
between the AU and subregional actors is also highlighted. The second part of 
this chapter discusses the regionalisation of peace, by looking at how different 
theories apply to African peace interventions. In this light, the discussion is on the 
relevance of cosmopolitan peacekeeping and liberal peace theories and how they 
connect with the leadership of the AU peace interventions. The theoretical 
discussion provides new knowledge on the limits of these theories in explaining 
African peace interventions. At the same time, the discussion sheds light on how 
AU peace interventions promote various versions of peace – specifically, 
negative and positive peace. Finally, the chapter discusses the implications for 
the regionalisation of peace and security in Africa, by focusing on what the study 
has exposed about the opportunities and limitations of AU peace interventions.  
 
8.1 Social construction of leadership within the African Union 
peace interventions 
The need for further research on regional level analysis of peace interventions 
has been stressed by several scholars (Katzenstein, 2000; Tavares, 2008; 
Bellamy and Williams, 2010; Bhattacharyya, 2010; Schulz and Söderbaum, 2010; 
Taylor, 2011; Rein, 2015). The discussion in this chapter, therefore, contributes 
to knowledge on how subregional actors and the AU navigate their roles in peace 
interventions. The APSA has provided a deeper sense of participation and 
decentralisation of peace interventions within the AU. From this backdrop, 
                                                      
77 It has been highlighted that the term ‘subregional actors’ refers to AU member states and 
subregional organisations such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC). 
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subregional actors play a vital role in orienting peace interventions. The presence 
of numerous regional actors in AU peace architecture indicates that the AU 
leadership framework has to accommodate diverse political interests. Before 
engaging the discussion on the construction of leadership within the AU, it is 
important to review the AU approach to peace interventions.  
 
Chapters 6 and 7 show that hard power is at the foundation of the AU approach 
to peace interventions. This is demonstrated in a propensity for the AU to prefer 
models of coercion as opposed to persuasions (negotiations) as leadership 
models78. Although peaceful conflict mediations have been attempted, the use of 
force or threat of using force and sanctions has dominated the AU peace 
interventions; for instance, the initial reaction of both the AU and SADC in 
resolving conflicts has been the imposition of sanctions and threat of military 
intervention in both Somalia and Madagascar. In this light, the AU has 
fundamentally relied on its member states for the implementation of coercive 
measures; hence, a hegemonic approach to peace interventions has mainly been 
implemented by a collection of member states. The production of leadership is 
therefore, located in AU interactions with subregional actors as hard power tools.  
 
The study reveals that while conventional hegemonic perspectives are important 
in understanding AU approaches to peace interventions, they are not sufficient to 
explain the leadership dynamics that take place within the AU. Hegemonic 
leadership theories, as discussed in Chapter 2, have usually focused on 
dominating member states that can fund regional interventions and serve as a 
focal point (Mattli, 1999a, 1999b). However, scholars in African international 
relations have argued that Africa lacks such pivotal states (Hill, 2011; Nathan, 
2012; Flemes and Lobell, 2015); for example, all TCCs in AMISOM are not 
continental pivotal states or aspiring hegemons. This development demonstrates 
that Africa’s leadership of peace interventions is not mainly explained through 
hegemonic theories, although there is a significant footprint of external powers. It 
is rather a collection of economically weak states that are progressively shaping 
                                                      
78 For a focus on the role of coercion, influence, authority, and manipulation, see Chapter 2. 
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the future of African peace interventions and playing a vital role in peace 
interventions through the AU platform. It is at this point that AU leadership is 
constructed to rally subregional actors for interventions (Burns, 1978; Nye, 
2010b, 2011). From this backdrop, the interaction that takes place between the 
AU and subregional actors determines the leadership of African peace 
interventions. 
 
The nature of leadership in AU peace interventions is complex. It has been shown 
in previous chapters that a conceptual focus on shared leadership provides a 
useful way of analysing the tension among African regional actors in peace 
interventions. A flexible understanding of shared leadership is necessary when it 
comes to the way the AU negotiates its peace efforts with implementing 
subregional partners. The AU leadership is, therefore, not structural in terms of 
power but situated in complex interactions among subregional participants. In this 
light, leadership is socially constructed through interactions between the AU and 
subregional actors. There is evidence in this research that AU leadership has 
worked where there is an agreement between AU PSC and subregional actors 
on shared leadership roles to peace interventions. It is important to note that 
shared leadership roles have mainly demanded AU flexibility in its protocols that 
establish hierarchical leadership; for instance, the establishment of a military 
operations coordination committee in the AMISOM and SADC leadership 
takeover in Madagascar. It is worth pointing out that the developments leading to 
shared leadership roles have mainly emerged through gradual interaction 
processes between the AU and subregional actors. There is significant evidence 
in this study indicating initial contentious interactions between the AU and 
subregional actors. However, through continuous interactions there have been 
compromise and progressive developments towards collaborative conflict 
resolution.  
 
The study shows a degree of intersubjectivity among the AU and subregional 
actors on their roles within the AU peace architecture. Specifically, there is a 
common understanding that the principle of subsidiarity offers some level of 
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latitude on subregional discretion in peace interventions. From this backdrop, 
there are two dimensions of shared leadership that require further analysis. The 
first of these examines ‘how much freedom of action exists? (this is related to 
how much subjective freedom of action is being exercised by subregional actors 
in this study)’ and ‘what kind of freedom of action exists?’ (referring to what 
subregional actors are doing with that freedom of subjectivity79). The second 
dimension of leadership is contextual and examines the kind of political 
conditions that are shaping shared leadership within the AU. In this second 
dimension, the focus is on both the historical background of regional actors and 
background of peace interventions that are undertaken. It is demonstrated in 
Chapters 6 and 7 that the political context in which regional interventions take 
place become both enabling factors and constraints to shared leadership. The 
second dimension of shared leadership therefore, examines the political factors 
that allocate particular roles to subregional actors.  
 
8.2 The state of leadership in AU peace interventions 
In discussing the first dimension of how much subjective freedom of action is 
being exercised by subregional actors (SADC and TCCs), it is important to 
understand the underlying assumptions. The presumption in the first dimension 
of shared leadership is the existence of rules and procedures that regulate the 
relationship among actors that share leadership (Park, 2014). In this study this 
assumption is typified by the AU protocols that provide a framework of rules and 
procedures under which African peace efforts are coordinated. In this light, the 
chapter will be answering the research question on how the AU peace and 
security structures facilitate the regionalisation of peace interventions, by looking 
at the extent to which the AU structure of rules and procedures has worked in 
coordinating peace interventions. In answering this question, the discussion 
needs to navigate around the thin line that separates leadership from power.  
 
                                                      
79 This analytical approach has been used by Colin Wight (2006) and William Brown (2012) in 
discussing agency in international politics. 
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The conventional leadership scholarship argues for the existence of sanctions or 
threat of sanctions attached to leadership in order to seek compliance to rules 
and procedures (Drezner, 1999, 2000; McGillivray and Stam, 2004). In this light, 
the AU as an intergovernmental coalition of states has the powers of inclusion or 
exclusion in its peace interventions. In other words, according to the AU SOPs 
for its peace operations, a member state that is noncompliant with the rules and 
procedures can be withdrawn from the peace mission80. However, this research 
shows that the AU has significant weaknesses in enforcing its rules and 
procedures and realizing compliance of subregional actors. In the case of 
Somalia, the AU lacks the command structures necessary to manage large scale 
war fighting military operations. As a result of this command and control 
deficiency, ad hoc leadership structures have emerged to fill up the gap. One 
example is the MOCC in Somalia. Consequently, the ‘how much freedom of 
action’ question becomes problematic as the ad hoc leadership structures 
replace the AU leadership framework.  
 
This study demonstrates that ad hoc structures for peace interventions 
supersede the AU PSC leadership. The research findings reveal that subjective 
freedom of action being exercised by subregional actors is unregulated by the 
AU. In other words, there is no boundary that defines where subregional actors’ 
leadership roles start and end. The question of leadership boundaries is central 
to the ‘how much’ question of subjective action (Nabers, 2008a, 2008b; Hill, 2011; 
Helms, 2014; Park, 2014). It demonstrates that the leadership boundary 
problems emanate from what constitutes subsidiarity in regional peace 
interventions. There is a consensus in the research findings that the vaguely 
defined subsidiarity principle, coupled with the AU weakness in forging a 
comprehensive coordination with subregional actors, has led to unlimited 
freedom of action among subregional actors in peace interventions.  
 
                                                      
80 This provision is stated in the AU SOPs to ensure command and control of the peace missions, 
in which AU is both the mandating and implementing authority. 
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As a result of this, the ‘what kind of freedom of action’ question becomes 
problematic as well. The challenge of answering both the ‘how much’ and ‘what 
kind’ questions is the evidence that there is less structure in AU leadership roles, 
despite the existence of APSA. Consequently, leadership becomes a discursive 
outcome among the AU and subregional actors (Wendt, 1992, 1994, 1995; 
Dunne, 1995a, 1995b, 1998; Nabers, 2008a), where the AU negotiates with 
subregional actors on how African peace interventions should proceed. From this 
backdrop, regional interactions become sources of leadership and legitimacy for 
peace intervention (Viera and Alden, 2011). It is important to note that regional 
influence is fundamental in leadership and attainment of goals (Hogan et al., 
1994; Northhouse, 1997; Yukl, 2006).  
 
The study shows that the leadership perspectives within the AU go beyond the 
tripod ontology and include a DAC framework. The contested hierarchy in AU 
peace interventions indicates that the tripod conceptualisation of leadership is not 
enough in understanding how leadership works in the AU context. A further 
discussion on regional dynamics that affect AU hierarchical leadership in peace 
interventions is provided below.  
 
Moving on to the second dimension of shared leadership, the research has 
demonstrated that the regionalisation of peace interventions is shaped by the 
overall common interests and values in ending violent conflicts in Africa. Bull has 
argued that common interests and common values define a common set of rules 
in the working of common institutions (1995). Chapter 3 has also shown the role 
of norms and values in guiding collective action (Wendt 1992, 1994, 1995; 
Dunne, 1995a, 1998). The research has exposed that, while the AU agenda on 
peace interventions is promoted, the regional and subregional interests are in 
conflict on how peace interventions are implemented81. The evidence in this 
research shows that the norms and values of the AU in peace interventions have 
                                                      
81 The AU common interests, as shown in previous chapters, focus on African unity and achieving 
a conflict-free Africa, where social and economic development can thrive and allow Africa to play 
its role in global affairs. The quest for Africa’s self-determination in its own affairs is aggressively 
pursued, where the AU provides the leadership framework. 
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not yet been institutionalised in order to condition the behaviour of participants 
and guide them towards collective action (Peters, 2012). The interactions among 
the AU and subregional actors have not yet developed to establish a common 
agenda for collective action (Nabers, 2008b; Destradi, 2010). From this backdrop, 
the common set of rules and norms guiding the conduct of peace interventions 
does not necessarily resolve collective action problems among regional actors 
(Buzan, 2004).  
 
The political nature of AU regional interventions has been analysed in Chapters 
6 and 7. It is shown that subregional autonomy determines the level of AU 
influence within which collaborative efforts take place. Network analysis therefore 
provides another way of understanding AU leadership (Rosamond, 2005). Where 
the AU provides a framework for interaction upon which security governance is 
facilitated (Breslin et al., 2003; Rosamond, 2005), it is shown that subregional 
actors use the AU platform as a launch pad for continental and subregional peace 
interventions. In this light, the conceptualisation of AU leadership is seen as a 
network that provides relatively stable relationships that are non-hierarchical and 
interdependent with subregional organisations (Breslin et al., 2003). The AU 
provides linkages among a variety of subregional actors who share common 
interests with regard to peace interventions. The research results acknowledge 
the broadening understanding within the AU that co-operation is the best way to 
achieve common goals in African peace interventions (Börzel, 1997; Wunderlich, 
2008). Leadership then becomes a complex and multi-faceted process involving 
both formal and informal networks of subregional actors (Bressand and 
Nicolaïdis, 1990). Hence, within the AU leadership there is the existence of 
multiple centres of influence; interaction of multiple actors; formal and informal 
structures of leadership; and a collective purpose (Webber et al., 2004: 4-8). The 
multiple centres of influence are both internal and external to the AU. The 
increasingly complex and decentralized policy-making processes in peace 
interventions show that emerging subregional partners are taking up new 
leadership roles within the AU peace architecture. The interactions of subregional 
actors with the AU are providing continuous opportunities for socialisation and 
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networking that is allowing participants in peace interventions to develop shared 
ideas and a common understanding on the legitimate scope of action within each 
intervention82. In this light, AU leadership is shaped by subregional actors who 
have a specific interest in particular peace interventions and are in a position to 
influence the AU decision-making process in one way or another. This is in 
addition to external centres of influence – a topic which will be discussed further 
in this chapter. 
 
This research also shows that AU leadership is shaped by political and conflict 
dynamics. For instance, it was only when SADC hit a deadlock in the mediations 
in Madagascar, that it stopped exercising its subsidiarity claims and requested 
AU involvement. The research shows that leadership in African peace 
interventions is not necessarily given by subregional actors or a hegemonic state 
(Wiener, 1995).  It is rather produced by a widely accepted network of leaders 
through inter-subjectivity, and whose decisions are voluntarily accepted by the 
AU and subregional actors. Participation in AU peace interventions is voluntary 
and frequently shaped by states’ political interests. The AU leadership is 
therefore, seen as socio-political constructions driven by collective political 
interactions among subregional partners (Wunderlich, 2008). Although there is 
evidence of rational actions by subregional actors, there is broadening evidence 
that through interactions and socialisation, the AU and subregional actors are 
coordinating their policies to find a solution to common political problems, albeit 
at a slow pace (Wendt, 1992, 1994, 1995; Dunne, 1998). Consequently, the 
transnational linkages and networks are playing decisive factors in the AU 
leadership of peace processes. It is important, however, to note that the level of 
interaction among subregional actors and the AU has not yet developed to 
institutionalise trust (Wendt, 1994, 1995; Dunne, 1998; Peters, 2012). There is 
growing evidence that suggests a lack of trust in the AU institutional capacity to 
provide leadership in peace interventions. As a result of this, subregional actors 
through their interactions are continuously constructing ad hoc leadership 
                                                      
82 For instance, SADC and MOCC have fundamentally defined the progression of peace 
intervention in each case study in this research. 
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arrangements with the AU. Hence, there are significant challenges to AU 
leadership that require further discussion. 
 
8.3 State and regional sovereignty in AU leadership of peace 
interventions 
The case studies provide valuable insight into questions of state and regional 
sovereignty that impact on AU leadership in regional peace interventions. The 
literature review has shown a plethora of research on ingrained adherence to 
sovereignty in Africa’s international relations (Clapham, 1996; Wight, 2006 
Lipton, 2009; Taylor, 2010; Brown, 2012). From this backdrop, the AU, as an 
intergovernmental organisation, has its sovereignty originating from member 
states. Chapters 6 and 7 have shown that AU decisions are an outcome of what 
states decide. Scholars in African politics have argued that states are the 
‘foundational element’ in studying international relations of sub-Saharan Africa 
(Taylor, 2010: 8).  State sovereignty is therefore, a critical element in 
understanding the leadership dynamics within the AU in peace interventions. It is 
shown in Chapter 6 that state sovereignty is projected further to include regional 
sovereignty within SADC. Consequently, AU leadership in the SADC region 
becomes a contested and negotiated issue.  From this background it is noted that 
‘both the form and content of sovereignty, and the uses of sovereign power’ 
become crucial elements that constrain AU leadership (Brown, 2012: 1899). 
National and regional interests, coupled with bilateral agreements with external 
superpowers, further exacerbate AU leadership challenges for peace 
interventions. For instance, it is demonstrated that the USA/Ethiopia; 
France/Madagascar; and France/South Africa bilateral agreements on peace 
interventions in Somalia and Madagascar respectively had an impact on what the 
AU and subregions can do in peace efforts. The study shows that bilateral 
agreements create another form of ad hoc leadership structure that runs parallel 
to the AU or subregional framework. Consequently, there are multiple actors’ 
initiatives in the same peace intervention that are not harmonised and often 
contradict each other.  
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This study reveals a considerable gap in internal compliance with AU protocols 
in peace interventions. The scholarly debate on compliance enforcement using 
hard power and soft power is well established (Burns, 1978; Nye, 2010a, 2011; 
Helms, 2014). It is discussed above that AU interactions with subregions do not 
use hard power but a hard power approach is paradoxically used in peace 
interventions. Hence, compliance with AU protocols is dependent on a common 
understanding of participants to the peace intervention. Leadership within the AU 
is, therefore, to a large extent determined by subregional actors, and external 
participants involved in African peace interventions. Consequently, the 
adherence to the leadership norms and values of the AU by subregional actors 
is contextual. With entrenched state and regional sovereignty, it is shown that 
there is minimal internalisation of AU leadership norms and values within 
subregional actors. Member states involved in peace interventions have not yet 
genuinely aligned themselves with a common position of the AU PSC, as shown 
in the MOCC and SADC contestations. The AU PSC protocols and constitutive 
acts are therefore, not fully implemented, making it difficult for the AU PSC to 
lead peace interventions in a hierarchy.  
 
Further exploration of leadership within the AU demonstrates significant elements 
of historical legacies that affect leadership. Accounting for historical specificity is 
another analytical task in understanding AU leadership constraints. It is further 
revealed that regional sovereignty has created geopolitical tensions that limit AU 
influence in peace interventions – for instance, the SADC peculiarity and 
Francophone legacies, as demonstrated in Chapter 6. Hence, the regional 
sovereignty claims, combined with subregional geopolitics, pose significant 
challenges to AU leadership in subregional peace interventions. The study shows 
that the accumulation of the past Francophone and Anglophone divide, in 
addition to the involvement of outside superpowers, still influences the form and 
content of AU leadership in subregional peace interventions, as seen in both case 
studies. Hence, situating AU leadership in a historical perspective is necessary 
to predict how much influence can be exerted by the AU Peace and Security 
Council in a given conflict intervention. The geopolitical tensions add another 
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layer that hinders AU leadership at both a national and regional level, where 
member states in a given region continue to shape the form and content of AU 
leadership. For instance, IGAD member states in AMISOM and SADC member 
states in Madagascar played significant roles in leadership production within 
peace interventions. In these examples, the form and pattern of AU leadership is 
socially and politically determined by subregional actors through a regional 
cohesion. From this backdrop, the AU leadership is contextual, socially 
constructed, negotiated and determined by subregional actors (Bhattacharyya, 
2010; Schulz and Söderbaum, 2010; Taylor, 2011).  
 
From this backdrop, the discussion will now reflect on the different theories that 
inform peace interventions. Specifically, the study will offer its contribution to the 
discussion on cosmopolitan and liberal peace theories and how they influence 
AU peace interventions. 
 
8.4 Cosmopolitanism in AU peace interventions 
Scholars in cosmopolitan thinking have applied some principles of democracy to 
international politics in order to create a peaceful environment for all citizens of 
the globalised world (Archibugi and Held, 1995; Archibugi et al., 2011; Brown, 
2011; Archibugi, 2012). The Cosmopolitan school of thought has argued that the 
notion of human security must apply to all peoples without reference to ethnicity, 
race, culture, nationality, religion, state citizenship or gender (Brown and Held, 
2010). In addressing the issue of global peace, others have provided a framework 
on how peace at the local and national level can build to a global level through 
the development of a cosmopolitan peacekeeping framework (Woodhouse and 
Ramsbotham, 2005).  Woodhouse and Ramsbotham have looked at the need for 
necessary development and reforms at the UN for global level peacekeeping 
capabilities, followed by capacity building and empowerment at the regional 
peacekeeping coalitions, such as the EU, AU and North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO). The concept and development of regional peacekeeping 
is relatively new. The study of AU peace interventions in relation to the 
cosmopolitan peace agenda expands the view of regional peacekeeping. There 
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are significant linkages between cosmopolitan thinking and state sovereignty. 
Many cosmopolitans consider state sovereignty to be one of the most significant 
bottlenecks to the cosmopolitan agenda (Waldron, 1999; Tan, 2004; Brown, 
2011; Archibugi, 2012; Van Hooft, 2014). Other attempts to find the compatible 
functionality of the cosmopolitan thinking and the state have been done, although 
not fully developed (Ypi, 2008). Cosmopolitan scholars have argued that the 
forces of globalisation and cross-border security challenges have weakened state 
sovereignty and states are unable to manage their human security challenges 
independently without assistance from external actors (Cabrera, 2004; 
Habermas, 2006; Brown, 2011; Hayden, 2017).  
 
The argument advanced by Woodhouse and Ramsbotham is that peacekeeping 
in the international system should be conceptualised and practised through 
cosmopolitan thinking, where peacekeeping should not only focus on problem 
solving interventions but must move from the minimal requirements of ending 
violence (negative peace) to the capacity to address human security (positive 
peace) agenda (2005: 140).  The idea of cosmopolitanism, therefore, provides a 
normative framework for peacekeeping in the post-Westphalian or post-
sovereignty era of international politics. The major proposition in this regard is to 
have independent peacekeepers who are free from a state-centric control system 
and are accountable to a democratic institutional set-up at a global level (UN after 
massive reforms) or regional Level (AU) (Pichat, 2004; Bellamy et al., 2010).   
Building on the earlier discussion of AU peace interventions, this study shows an 
African political history with massive claims of sovereignty that extend to regional 
prerogatives. To what extent then are AU regional interventions a contribution to 
cosmopolitan peacekeeping? While Woodhouse and Ramsbotham provide an 
innovative way of promoting a cosmopolitan agenda in peacekeeping, the 
political landscape of the AU member states (inasfar as sovereignty is concerned) 
poses a significant bottleneck to cosmopolitanism. Additionally, the geopolitical 
tensions have created further divisions between ‘us and others’83. As a result of 
                                                      
83 For instance, the military operations coordinating committee created a monopoly of leadership 
and selection of Force Commanders where any other member state is excluded from the 
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this, the continental and subregional peace intervention framework is not 
synchronised and does not pull in the same direction all the time. In this light, the 
creation of a regional peacekeeping force that is non-state-centric is a distant 
dream for the AU. From this backdrop, leadership of peace interventions within 
the AU continues to be influenced by the African states. Hence, the study of 
cosmopolitan peace keeping within the AU requires comprehensive analysis of 
the linkages between state sovereignty and the duty to promote of human 
security. The cosmopolitan perspectives of regional peace interventions can 
therefore, be located within the nexus of the cosmopolitan agenda and the state. 
Although most scholars have argued for an antagonistic relationship between the 
two (Waldron, 1999; Tan, 2004; Archibugi, 2012), African cosmopolitan peace 
interventions can only be envisaged with the state playing important roles. It is 
important to mention that there exists some form of compatible functionality of 
the cosmopolitan thinking and the state where African peace interventions can 
start to be located (Ypi, 2008). 
While national interests of some African member states and external powers are 
apparent in AU peace interventions, this research shows a growing recognition 
that AU deployments in Somalia were ‘forces for good’ within the cosmopolitan 
peacekeeping ethic (Elliott, and Cheeseman, 2004: 24-28). AU responses to the 
ungoverned space of Somalia can be viewed as a preventive measure to threats 
of terrorism and protection of civilians. This is in agreement with Wheeler (2000), 
who argues that cosmopolitan theory explores the use of military force in saving 
strangers. The role of the US in Somalia, while serving its own interests can also 
be argued as a cosmopolitan driven agenda for the purpose of achieving peace 
elsewhere and the protection of civilians in Africa. Additionally, the UN and EU 
support for AU intervention promoted the cosmopolitan peace agenda through 
capacity building and the development of an African regional mechanism 
(Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2005). The regional peace interventions in Africa 
provide an opportunity to engage in an analysis on how African member states, 
                                                      
decision-making processes of AMISOM. Similarly, SADC dominance in Madagascar initially 
excluded the AU mediation mechanism. The exclusion was further exacerbated by the 
geopolitical tensions. 
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acting on behalf of an ‘African collectiveness’, have tried to utilise such narrative 
and space to respond to the crisis.  
This study reveals that ‘African collectiveness’ in peace interventions is mainly 
reinforced along regional lines rather than continental. Both case studies in this 
research point to an increased participation of member states within a particular 
subregional organisation. While this approach is an encouraging development, it 
has exposed significant weaknesses in dealing with conflicts at an operational 
level of cosmopolitan peacekeeping. It is acknowledged in this research that the 
AU failed to deploy a robust force that could deter belligerents in Somalia. The 
AU initial deployment in Somalia demonstrates that regional actors lack the 
capability and resources to deploy timely for peace operations. There is a 
consensus among cosmopolitan peacekeeping scholars that a robust force with 
quicker deployment times should be deployed to protect ordinary people 
(Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2005: 153, Curran and Woodhouse, 2007; 
Bellamy and Williams, 2010: 26). This research demonstrates that the massive 
financial and logistical support of regional peace operations within Africa hinders 
the deployment time and the extent of security provided to civilians. Chapter 7 
has shown that all the logistical and troop allowances in AMISOM are provided 
by the UN and EU respectively. The need for the AU to acquire requisite 
resources (financial, political, military) for effective action in regional peace 
operations has received much support from scholars (Goulding, 2002; 
Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2005; Francis, 2006; Diehl, 2014). On the other 
hand, the African initiative in Somalia through IGAD shows that African member 
states are developing a cosmopolitan thinking in ensuring the attainment of peace 
and the protection of civilians, albeit of a relatively modest kind. While capacity 
building is an important stepping-stone towards a possible cosmopolitan future in 
the AU regional peace intervention framework, this research suggests that it is 
not sufficient until the decision-making processes are reformed, where the 
continental leadership is clearly defined and synchronised with subregional 
initiatives. 
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 From this background, the analysis of leadership in the implementation of 
cosmopolitan values within the AU is important in understanding future directions 
of peace interventions in the continent. The conceptualisation of cosmopolitan 
peacekeeping is intrinsically linked to the promotion of democratic principles in 
international politics and liberal peace. In this light, the implementing tools for 
cosmopolitan agenda within the AU remains a challenge due to counterfeit 
democracies in the continent (Cheeseman and Klaas, 2018). Chapter 7 has 
shown that significant troop contributing countries in AMISON have patchy 
democratic credentials and consequently lacks the moral authority in promoting 
cosmopolitan values in the continent. It is shown above that, while most scholars 
in cosmopolitan peacekeeping view the state as a bottleneck to the 
implementation of cosmopolitan agenda, African peacekeeping can only be 
implemented by the states. From this background, the AU leadership in 
promoting cosmopolitan ethics is limited to ending violent conflicts as 
demonstrated in Somalia and Madagascar. The next section discusses the liberal 
peace values in the regional peace interventions and how liberal peace garner 
collective action among member states and promote AU leadership. 
8.5 Liberal peace in AU peace intervention 
As highlighted in the literature review, a plethora of research on liberal peace 
theory has been the most influential epistemic knowledge system guiding peace 
interventions (Doyle, 2005; Bellamy et al., 2010; Richmond and Franks, 2009; 
Jackson, 2011; Richmond, 2011; Jackson and Beswick, 2018; Chinkin and 
Kaldor, 2017). The general argument within the advocates of liberal peace is that 
a liberal state provides conditions for human security and peace operations have 
mainly been conducted to promote human rights and democratic principles in 
states that are essentially autocratic and in conflict. The fundamental aim of 
peacekeeping has been to uphold peace through the building of a liberal state 
based on an international system (Jackson and Albrecht, 2011; Jackson, 2011). 
Indeed, most peace operations have concluded with the conduct of elections and 
security sector reforms supported by the international community (Richmond, 
2011; Jackson and Beswick, 2018). The idea has been to construct a legitimate 
government in the post-conflict environment and allow a further transformation of 
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peace to human security (Chinkin and Kaldor, 2017). Some scholars have argued 
that the idea of liberal peace is a flawed logic (Rosato, 2003), while others have 
argued for a major review of conditions in which liberal peace is likely to succeed 
(Richmond, and Franks, 2009; Beswick and Jackson, 2015; Chinkin and Kaldor, 
2017). Scholars have argued that peace operations have usually limited the 
spaces for negotiated conflict resolution and are driven by liberal epistemologies 
and ontologies84. In other words, peace operations have promoted liberalism. 
Richmond and Franks, in their framework assessment for liberal peace 
transitions, have argued that the kind of liberal peace that is implemented 
determines the sustainability of peace in a post-conflict environment. The 
questions that require to be answered in this section are: What kind of liberal 
peace is promoted by the AU in its interventions? and What strategies have been 
put in place to sustain this peace? 
 
The study shows that AU entry into conflict zones has often adopted a state-
centric top-down approach of liberal peace. In other words, the research points 
to a conservative model of liberal peace that utilises the military and the 
imposition of sanctions (Richmond and Franks, 2009, Richmond, 2009). The 
regional peace interventions in Africa have been implemented in a non-traditional 
peacekeeping context where principles of consent and non-use of force could not 
work due to continuing warfare. The study shows that AU peace interventions 
have presupposed a victor’s peace that aims at defeat or mutual compromise 
between opposing sides (Richmond, 2011; Chinkin and Kaldor, 2017). Previous 
research by Chinkin and Kaldor, and Richmond has shown that the victor’s peace 
approach is usually problematic and unsustainable. Those who emerge as victors 
do not necessarily ensure human security and end up abusing their powers. 
However, it can be argued that liberal peace is a prerequisite of cosmopolitan 
development, since the state establishes the structure upon which cosmopolitan 
thinking starts to grow. As indicated above, ending violence is only the first step 
                                                      
84 Alex Bellamy, ‘The “Next Stage” in Peace Operations Theory’, in Bellamy and Paul Williams 
(eds), Peace Operations and Global Order (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 17-38, 4-5. See also 
Chinkin and Kaldor, The Liberal Peace: Peacemaking, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding from 
Part IV - Jus Post Bellum, 2017. 
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towards a cosmopolitan agenda, but the state must also move towards the 
capacity of addressing the human security (positive peace) agenda (Woodhouse 
and Ramsbotham, 2005).   
 
There is growing evidence that liberal peace thinking is taking shape in AU peace 
interventions. For instance, the imposition of the Transitional Somalia 
Government by the AU with support from the international donor community 
provides a framework in which liberal peace can start to be located in the AU 
peace interventions. The AU PSC has shown interest in promoting some 
elements of liberal peace in ungoverned Somalia. Similarly, the AU and SADC 
intervention in Madagascar was mainly motivated by the unconstitutional change 
of government, indicating some support for liberal peace. However, it is important 
to point out here that AU interventions have also been problematic. This research 
builds on others who have argued that most peace interventions have been led 
by a single state that has used a global or continental framework for legitimacy 
(Coleman, 2011; De Wet, 2014). This research also shows that regional peace 
interventions in Africa are undertaken to legitimise the aggressions of a few 
member states who have sometimes wrongfully intervened in the name of 
peacekeeping (De Wet, 2014). Additionally, the AU interventions have had a 
significant trail of external influence. The study background has shown that the 
formation of the Somali Transitional Federal Government was an international 
project that was imposed on the Somali people, suggesting the existence of 
liberal imperialism (Williams, 2009b; Duffield and Vernon, 2013). The model of 
liberal peace advanced by the AU therefore, poses big obstacles to the 
restoration of state building and a viable basis for sustainable peace through local 
ownership (Richmond, 2011). This research shows little local engagement by the 
AU in both Somalia and Madagascar. It is demonstrated in Chapters 6 and 7 that 
the AU has mainly been engaged in military operations and negotiations with 
state elites while the local peacebuilding has been left to the UN and other donors 
in Somalia. Although this development can be interpreted as a division of labour 
between the AU and international partners, it poses challenges to the African 
capacity to establish sustainable peace. Research findings indicate that although 
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the AU mission is headed by the Special Representative of the Chairperson of 
the AU, this office is merely symbolic when it comes to coordination of local 
peacebuilding and coordination with the Special Representative of the UN 
Secretary General. 
 
Another challenge of the liberal peace model of the AU is in the implementing 
actors. The argument here is that most intervening states in the AU have sketchy 
democratic credentials and significant human security challenges at home. For 
instance, Ethiopia has had long outstanding human rights violations, while 
Burundi’s constitutional crisis85 and gross violations of human rights persist. In 
other words, there are ironic circumstances surrounding African countries 
intervening and advancing liberal peace. The study therefore suggests that AU 
peace interventions have not fundamentally promoted democratic practices, such 
as the rule of law, human rights and transparency, but the attainment of negative 
peace (absence of violence). Although AU interventions have been epitomised 
by the conduct of elections, they have not institutionalised liberal principles 
(Morphet, 2000). The negative peace discourse has, therefore, profoundly 
shaped the nature of peace interventions, which is also deeply embedded in 
APSA. The asymmetric emphasis of military power to soft power indicates the 
top-down old war lens through which conflict is viewed at the AU (Chinkin and 
Kaldor, 2017). Additionally, the research shows the absence of any aspiration 
within the AU of moving the post-conflict states towards positive peace. For 
instance, soon after the democratic elections in Madagascar, SADC withdrew 
immediately followed by the AU two years later. The ability to sustain a vibrant 
peace mission with local ownership and inclusivity86 is one of the significant steps 
towards peacebuilding (Richmond, 2011; Albrecht and Jackson, 2014; Beswick 
and Jackson, 2015; Chinkin and Kaldor, 2017). From this backdrop, the AU 
peace operations depart from the overall cosmopolitan and liberal peace 
                                                      
85 It has been pointed out in Chapter 3 that the AU has unsuccessfully planned the deployment 
of a peace intervention force in Burundi since 2014; yet the country is one of the troop contributors 
in Somalia. 
86 The local ownership has mainly focused on the local civil society of the host country and 
inclusivity of all sectors of society, mainly the role of women in peacebuilding. 
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orientation of creating conditions for positive peace (Curran and Woodhouse, 
2007: 1055-6; UN, 1992: 59). This study indicates a partial and inconsistent 
application of liberal peace in AU interventions. From this backdrop, cosmopolitan 
and liberal peace values have not necessarily promoted peace interventions and 
the augmentation of the AU leadership. The next section provides the broader 
emerging picture of AU regionalisation of peace exposed through this study. 
 
8.6 The exposé of African Union regionalisation of peace 
The work of Bellamy et al. (2010) observed the lack of necessary legal structures 
guiding the relationship between the UN and regional organisations such as the 
AU and EU in regional peace interventions. This research has also exposed that 
the legal bases for cooperation between the AU and subregional actors have not 
developed any further beyond the AU PSC protocols, the AU constitutive act and 
AU-RECs memorandum of understanding. The lack of institutionalised legal 
frameworks for coordination has weakened the AU leadership and affects the 
organisation of the whole intervention framework. The ambiguity in the 
interpretation of AU protocols and principle of subsidiarity has sapped the division 
of labour in the decentralised peace intervention. Although APSA provides the 
unifying platform for regional bodies functioning at the continental, regional and 
state levels, it remains underdeveloped in forging a partnership for robust peace 
interventions in Africa. The lack of a legal framework is also demonstrated by the 
ad hoc structures that coordinate AU peace interventions. For instance, the 
leadership swap in Madagascar between AU and SADC was mainly based on 
the seniority of chief mediators rather than the subsidiarity principle87. As a result 
of this lack of clarity in the legal framework for inter-organisational interactions, 
the relations between the AU and subregional actors in peace interventions are 
weak and this prolongs the conflict settlement period. For instance, the case of 
Madagascar has demonstrated that it takes time for the AU and subregional 
partners to reach an agreement on the mediation agenda. Similar observations 
have been made in the coordination between the AU and Military Operations 
                                                      
87 See Chapter 6 on the case study background. 
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Coordinating Committee in Somalia. Hence the coordination has not yet 
developed to the envisaged relationship outlined in the UN supplement to the 
agenda for peace (1995), in which the forms of coordination include: (a) 
consultations; (b) mutual diplomatic support; (c) mutual operational support; (d) 
co-deployment of field missions; and (e) joint deployment of a mission.  
 
The research shows a lack of meaningful consultations between the AU and 
subregions. Additionally, the relationship was characterized by considerable 
conflict, mistrust, and tension. As shown in the joint mediation in Madagascar, it 
is apparent that continuous interactions are lacking between the AU and 
subregions in order to build trust and reduce the geopolitical tensions that exist 
among regional partners in peace interventions. The research shows that the 
African regional diversity was not considered in the design and implementation 
of the AU peace architecture. This regional diversity is twofold: geopolitics and 
levels of development within the subregions. The discussion above has provided 
the geopolitical account; however, research findings also reveal that subregional 
organisations are at different stages of capability development. For instance, 
SADC and IGAD do not have similar financial, logistical and operational 
capabilities for peace interventions. Hence, with the lack legal or social structures 
within APSA designed to mitigate the diversity and coordinate the regional peace 
interventions, the AU remains challenged. Furthermore, the research shows a 
lack of mutual diplomatic support within the continental and subregional 
mediation structures. For instance, the multiple mediation envoys in Madagascar 
were not reinforcing each other. The research has therefore exposed a 
problematic execution of APSA as those responsible for the framework 
implementation operate independently without a unified outlook. Hence, co-
deployment and division of labour is further challenged.  
 
Additionally, the study has shown that the relational models between the AU and 
subregional actors are neither subcontracting nor partnering, as in the UN 
framework with regional organisations (Yamashita, 2012). While the AU-SADC 
relations share some common features of partnering due to the non-existence of 
  215 
hierarchy, the research shows no evidence of sharing interconnected capabilities 
between the two organisations. In other words, there is no harmonised approach 
to regional peace interventions. Complementary and mutually reinforcing roles 
between the AU and subregional organisations are missing. The study has also 
shown that there are no linkages between the AU and other subregional political 
groupings involved in peace intervention88, making it difficult to reach a 
consensus among multiple mediators on the conflict resolution plan.    
 
Despite the AU weaknesses in navigating the regionalised peace interventions, 
this research reveals that the continental body has more legitimacy than 
subregional actors. The case studies show that the AU continental platform 
provides significant political legitimacy to peace interventions within the continent.  
It is acknowledged that the complex nature of conflicts and multiple mediators in 
Madagascar challenged SADC regional capabilities. The subregional 
organisation in this case was among other subregional political entities claiming 
legitimacy in negotiating peace processes, while the AU enjoyed the continental 
legitimacy. In this case, the AU demonstrated its potential as a major mediator 
due to its continental status and the number of member states within it. Chapter 
6 has shown that the AU involvement in mediation brought more compliance of 
conflicting parties that led to conflict settlement. Additionally, the case of 
Madagascar shows that the AU is more capable of sustaining the mediation 
mission for a longer period than SADC. Similarly, the AU managed to deploy in 
Somalia after a subregional group IGAD, failed to do so. This development 
reveals that the UN, EU and other international partners are more likely to fund 
the AU peace intervention than the subregional one. This research, therefore, 
demonstrates that the AU continental status offers more legitimacy in peace 
interventions that can be further developed. It is, therefore, important to identify 
and establish legal mechanisms and institutionalised principles on which the AU 
and subregional actors can base their relationships in peace interventions in 
Africa. Although APSA has been adopted and operationalised, the ad hoc nature 
                                                      
88  As in the case of Madagascar, these include the Indian Ocean Group, International 
organisation de la Francophonie and other regional and political organisations that are not 
affiliated to the AU. 
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of leadership structures indicates a further need for established legal structures 
that can broaden AU legitimacy in peace interventions. 
 
This study has also revealed a strong commitment to enforcing peace within the 
AU. While the AU has experienced leadership, financial and logistics challenges 
in Somalia, its deployment shows significant commitment to and development of 
the regionalisation of peace. The case of Somalia demonstrates that AU peace 
interventions are gradually undergoing a transformation and responding to 
contemporary security challenges. The AU peace operation in Somalia has been 
posited as the only realistic option of resolving conflicts where the UN has 
declined to intervene (Francis, 2006). Chapter 7 has outlined that the AU mission 
in Somalia is at times akin to a peace enforcement mission and the UN has been 
reluctant to take up such missions due to its peacekeeping doctrine. Although the 
UN provides necessary logistical and political support to the mission, AU troops 
are involved in the most challenging and non-traditional peace mission against 
armed and organised non-state actors.  
 
While the AU has taken up such assignments, the complexity of the mission 
requires extensive planning. This study reveals that the mission planning was 
hindered by lack of extensive consultations and preparation in both case studies. 
It also shows that the AU doctrine in fighting terrorists or non-state actors requires 
prerequisite capability development in terms of finance, logistics and command 
structures. Although Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the AU, gives it the right 
to intervene in its member states in ‘grave circumstances’, such as genocide and 
crimes against humanity, the capacity to do so is still lacking. It is demonstrated 
that in these high-risk operations, TCCs determine when and how their troops 
should be used, despite the established AU leadership framework. It therefore 
links with similar studies in this field which have identified that throughout the 
AU’s engagement in Somalia, peacekeepers have been ill-prepared and ill-
equipped for deployment89 (Williams, 2009b), and also agrees with the UN’s 
                                                      
89 See Williams (2009: 520) Into the Mogadishu Maelstrom: The African Union Mission in Somalia. 
The AU peacekeepers also lacked crucial pieces of equipment and material. So poorly equipped 
were the troops from Burundi that it cost about US$10 million in pre-deployment costs to get one 
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Supplement to an Agenda for Peace (para. 35), which highlights that nothing is 
‘more dangerous for a peacekeeping operation than to ask it to use force when 
its existing composition, armament, logistic support and deployment deny it the 
capacity to do so.’90 
 
At this point, this research raises some questions on the usage of regional 
mechanisms within the AU peace architecture. The following discussion, 
therefore, debate the deployment of regional forces within their regions. 
 
8.7 The antithesis of subregional mechanisms in Africa?  
The literature review in Chapter 3 discussed the advantages and disadvantages 
of regional peace interventions. This study builds on previous research and adds 
knowledge on subregional actors in peace interventions in Africa. Overall, the 
study provides mixed results that are contextual. For instance, the case of 
Madagascar has shown that South Africa’s role in mediation was more productive 
when working within the SADC framework than through a bilateral arrangement 
with France. It is demonstrated that South Africa alone, became a vital player in 
SADC mediations in Madagascar. On the other hand, the role of Ethiopia in 
Somalia exacerbated the geopolitical rivalry and contributed to a complex 
regional peace operation. Ethiopia used regional arrangements to legitimise its 
bilateral agreements with the US in a conflict that had direct relevance to the two 
countries. Similar observations have been made in Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) with Nigerian interventions in Liberia in 1990 and 
Sierra Leone in 1997 under ECOWAS (Francis, 2006), and South Africa in 
Lesotho in 1998. This study suggests therefore that the potential advantages of 
using subregional actors in peace interventions should be considered on a case 
by case basis. Specifically, a thorough understanding of the conflict dynamics is 
necessary when planning African regional peace interventions. 
 
                                                      
battalion operational (compared with approximately US$2-3 million for each Ugandan battalion). 
Cited in Paul Williams’s interview with the US State Department official, Washington, June 2009.  
90 Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, A/50/60, 3 January 1995. Paragraph 35. 
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The research also reveals growing evidence that the AU’s peace interventions 
have been more partisan than neutral. For instance, Chapter 6 has shown how 
SADC supported the incumbent president of Madagascar to retain power, a 
stance that had a significant effect on the peace processes. It is noted that the 
SADC standpoint derailed and added another layer of complexity to the mediation 
efforts and AU leadership. Similarly, AU peace operations depicted the regional 
partisan interest through the support of the Somalia Transitional Federal 
Government that was initially supported by IGAD and later by the AU. It is further 
shown that the AU intervening force was not neutral, but part of the conflicting 
parties through the re-hatting of Ethiopian and Kenyan troops. Additionally, the 
geopolitical factors and violent response by belligerents in Somalia indicate that 
the people in the region do not have a natural affinity with those in the same 
geographic area (Diehl, 2007: 541, Diehl and Balas, 2007).  
 
The study reveals the need for due consideration of geopolitical factors in a given 
African subregion when regional forces are used. The role of South Africa in 
Madagascar appears to have positively influenced SADC mediation efforts, while 
Ethiopian involvement in Somalia seem to have exacerbated the instability, 
making AU peace efforts more complex. From this backdrop, both Madagascar 
and Somalia case studies have elements of constructive and disruptive 
leadership outcomes initiated by regional actors that are close to the conflict 
zone. In this light, the research poses significant questions to the design and 
implementation of APSA that put subregional organisations (and their member 
states) as first responders to the conflict within their region. The study shows that 
APSA cannot be implemented in its entirety but through a case by case 
comprehensive political assessment of the conflict.  
 
The study further demonstrates that regional peace interventions in Africa have 
taken a different stance from the UN peace operations on neutrality. In both case 
studies the AU and subregional interventions are not neutral but support a 
particular agenda that is partisan in nature, as shown in the Somalia Transition 
Government and SADC Ravalomanana support in Madagascar.  On the other 
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hand, the AU interventions appear to be progressive and responding to the 
changing conflict environments in Africa, rather than sticking to a more traditional 
UN approach of consent, neutrality and non-use of force. 
 
8.8 Conclusion 
The chapter has demonstrated that the AU has mainly adopted a hard power 
state-centric approach to conflict resolution. The use and threat of using force 
coupled with sanctions has been the dominating discourse in peace 
interventions. However, the AU does not have the tools for implementation of its 
hard power approach and fully depends on member states and subregional 
organisations. AU leadership in this perspective is therefore negotiated and 
socially constructed through interactions. The extent of AU leadership is 
contextual and mainly shaped by subregional partners due to the lack of an 
enforceable legal framework guiding the regional peace interventions. The 
evidence suggests that the protocols signed at the AU level have not yet 
transcended into legal instruments establishing AU leadership. Hence, the limited 
and contested space given to the AU by its member states does not make for an 
effective leadership position. Consequently, the AU is still operating in restricted 
space bequeathed by its own member states and subregional organisations 
(Brown, 2012). This study, therefore, reveals the need for an established legal 
mechanism that guides the coordination of regional peace efforts between the 
AU and subregions, rather than depending on the principle of subsidiarity alone. 
It is shown that the principle of subsidiarity has largely been used to justify 
subregional ownership of peace efforts and at the same time has narrowed AU 
influence. Although there is considerable support for regional ownership of peace 
interventions (Goulding, 2002: 217), harmonisation with continental efforts is 
lacking.  
 
The chapter also shows that the leadership of AU peace interventions is best 
understood in shared terms, where the AU provides the required legitimacy and 
garners international support, and member states and subregional organisations 
provide the implementing tools in the form of troops and special mediation 
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envoys. The hierarchy provided in the AU protocols has been challenged by 
autonomous subregional organisations and high stakes missions pursued by the 
AU. As a result of this failing hierarchy, AU peace efforts have mainly been led 
by ad hoc leadership structures where authority has been shared and mostly 
monopolised by subregional actors. The study shows significant AU leadership 
challenges when the subregional network of member states is not considered to 
be part of the leadership framework for peace interventions. This finding indicates 
the need for APSA reform to incorporate clear leadership structures that take into 
account both regional and subregional structures. In this light, the research has 
shown that ad hoc leadership frameworks have been used to provide leadership 
for peace interventions.  
 
The chapter in the case of AMISOM indicates that African states with poor 
economies have committed themselves to intervene in violent conflicts, while 
those with better economies have stepped back. From this backdrop, the study 
shows partial hegemonic leadership coming from African member states in peace 
interventions. Hegemonic influences in the study are mainly emanating from 
Western Governments through bilateral agreements with TCCs. 
 
The discussion in the chapter has also examined the application of cosmopolitan 
theory in AU peace interventions from both a strategic and operational level. The 
main contribution, in this regard, is that the state is a significant enabler of a 
cosmopolitan agenda and peacekeeping in Africa. Indeed, other scholars have 
considered the idea of responsible cosmopolitan states in fostering a 
cosmopolitan outcome in international politics (Archibugi, 2008; Ypi, 2008; Brown 
and Ainley, 2009; Waldron, 2006). This chapter has demonstrated that states in 
Africa continue to have a critical level of significance in the implementation of 
peace interventions. Hence, ignoring the role of the state in Africa would render 
a cosmopolitan world a mere fantasy. It is also demonstrated that state and 
regional sovereignty is the major bottleneck to a cosmopolitan agenda in Africa. 
However, the research points to the need to find innovative ways of working with 
states in harmonising the ostensibly incompatible concepts of cosmopolitanism 
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and sovereignty in attaining both negative and positive peace. The chapter has 
also underscored the lack of resources among African states for the 
implementation of cosmopolitan peacekeeping (Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 
2005; Curran and Woodhouse, 2007; Williams, 2013b; Curran and Williams, 
2016). From this backdrop, the study points to the need for further research on 
building an African force capable of cosmopolitan peacekeeping. 
The study has also demonstrated that liberal peace theories continue to dominate 
African peace interventions; however, this remains problematic. The chapter has 
shown that the AU with assistance from the international community has 
supported the imperialist liberal approaches in Somalia. For instance, the 
internationally constructed TFG was imposed through a victor’s peace, through 
the removal of UIC and in the process excluding the local voice. Additionally, the 
implementing partners of the peace intervention have had a long, outstanding 
deficiency of liberal democracies. The approach taken by the AU in regional 
peace interventions therefore, suggests the promotion of negative peace while 
ignoring positive peace, which is the ultimate aim of both cosmopolitan and liberal 
peace. At the same time the adopted path to liberal peace is unsustainable, in 
that the victor’s peace and absence of local support usually leads to a recurrence 
of violence (Richmond, 2011; Chinkin and Kaldor, 2017). It is important to 
mention that the victor’s peace in the case of Somalia has not yet been achieved 
and remains a challenge.91 The chapter has also demonstrated that liberal peace 
promotion has mainly been pursued up to the level of conducting elections. In 
other words, a partial version of liberal theory is promoted within the AU. 
Nevertheless, the AU and subregional partners have supported liberalism in 
enforcing constitutionality where an unconstitutional change of government has 
occurred, as demonstrated in Madagascar. 
 
                                                      
91 This information was accurate during the fieldwork and at the time of writing this project. 
Continued resistance to and terrorist attacks on both AU troops and civilians continues to threaten 
the Somali peace processes. The Somali armed forces have not yet developed the capacity to 
ensure civilian protection and the Government is sustained by the international (AU) intervening 
force. 
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The next chapter concludes the entire study by focusing on what has been 
accomplished in this research and the overall implications. Additionally, the 
concluding chapter suggests areas for further research in African regional peace 
interventions. While this study has answered specific questions on the leadership 
and regionalisation of peace and security in Africa, it has also raised more 
questions that require further research in the field of regional peace and security. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
 
9.0. Introduction 
This chapter concludes the study in two parts. Firstly, it outlines what the study 
has achieved in answering the research questions and the implications of the 
research findings to theory and practice of the AU leadership in peace 
interventions. Secondly, it highlights areas for future research arising from this 
study. The chapter outlines important conclusions by showing the nature and 
extent of the AU leadership in peace interventions and how this leadership is 
constructed. The main argument is that the AU leadership is contextual, shared 
and socially constructed. It is shown in the study that the AU provides an 
important platform for global support that allows sub regional actors and 
international partners to launch regional peace interventions. In this light, the AU 
participates in shared decision-making process of peace interventions and does 
not necessarily provide hierarchical leadership. Although, there are significant 
leadership challenges within the AU, the study demonstrates that regionalised 
peace efforts have progressed over time and AU legitimacy has increased with 
the practice of peace interventions. At this point, the chapter reflects on the 
impact of liberal peace and cosmopolitan ideas in AU peace interventions. The 
chapter shows that, although liberal peace and cosmopolitan thinking promotes 
collective action and subsequent leadership of democratic values and peace, the 
AU peace interventions have been partially driven by such values.  
 
In summarising areas for further research, the study suggests ways in which the 
AU can respond to leadership challenges faced in regional peace interventions 
and how it can relate with other regional institutions. This chapter therefore, 
highlights the research contributions to knowledge and invites further debate on 
the topic of leadership and regional peace interventions within the AU. 
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9.1 Evaluation of leadership ontologies in AU peace 
interventions 
This study has made contributions to the concept of leadership in regional peace 
interventions. In particular, it demonstrates that in the context of AU peace 
interventions, there is evidence that the hierarchical leadership conceptualisation 
is insufficient in defining leadership between the AU and subregional actors. By 
defining leadership within the tenets of a hierarchy, one would argue the non-
existence of leadership in AU peace interventions due to the fluidity of influence 
between the AU and sub regional institutions. The research has shown that the 
AU hierarchy is contested by subregional actors, hence, leadership within the AU 
peace interventions is not constituted as hierarchy but shared and defined 
through the leadership outcomes of Direction, Alignment and Commitment (the 
DAC Ontology). The study has shown that the AU does not lead sub regional 
institutions but participate in the leadership by providing the legitimacy for peace 
interventions. The leadership analysis within the AU, therefore, changes from 
unitary to multiple direction of influence. The study shows that the AU operates 
in a leadership bubble among different participants that influence its decision-
making processes. It is shown that the African member states and regional 
institutions largely influence the AU Peace and Security Council decisions in the 
design and implementation of peace interventions. The extent of the AU 
leadership is, therefore, shaped by subregional and external actors. In this light, 
the research reveals that the AU leadership is defined by situational dynamics in 
specific conflicts rendering DAC ontology useful, as it emphases on leadership 
processes and outcomes (Drath et al., 2008). The study shows that the lack of 
supranational characteristics in the AU implies that its decisions are only 
implemented through intersubjectivity and negotiations with subregional actors. 
Leadership in this case becomes a product of real situations and negotiations 
between the AU and sub regional institutions. From this backdrop, although the 
AU PSC protocols and related Memorandum of Understanding with subregional 
actors stipulate AU hierarchy, the leadership of peace interventions is processual 
and not given (Pearce and Conger, 2003; Raelin, 2005; Crevani et al., 2010; Uhl-
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Bien, 2011). A further summary of the AU limited influence in leadership is 
provided below.  
 
Apart from the AU limited influence in peace interventions, the study makes 
important contributions in the theoretical underpinnings of the AU leadership. The 
study has shown that the context in which the peace interventions occur 
determines the mode of shared leadership between the continental and sub 
regional institutions. The significant role played by context allows leadership to 
start being located in shared leadership outcomes (Drath et al., 2008; Denis et 
al., 2012). There is evidence in the study that the AU and SADC have a shared 
direction and mutual agreement on their aim and vision in peace interventions. 
Specifically, they share similar goals in ending violence and creating an 
environment for economic development. On the other hand, the study reveals 
partial alignment, which affects the commitment in achieving goals.  
 
It is demonstrated in this study that the joint mediation in Madagascar, between 
the AU and SADC was initially unstructured and contested, but later transformed 
into an ad hoc leadership structure for joint mediation. On the other hand, the 
peace operation in Somalia started with a well-established AU field mission 
structure that was significantly challenged by troop contributing countries, leading 
to a similar ad hoc (MOCC) structure. From this backdrop, the study has shown 
that the AU leadership is being produced through a loose and dynamic framework 
that is continually transforming. Hence, that the extent of the AU leadership in 
contextually driven by sub regional actors and constantly shifting within the 
shared direction discourse.  
 
The study also indicates a variation of mutual commitment in achieving mission 
goals. For instance, the Madagascar case study shows gradual processes within 
SADC and AU to integrate each other’s efforts in mediations. Similarly, the 
AMISOM case shows the AU willingness to integrate the demands of national 
contingents/TCCs and, in the process, giving up its hierarchy and sharing its 
leadership in collective action. From this backdrop, the nature of leadership within 
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the AU peace interventions is located within the discursive and shared outcomes 
and not necessarily in the hierarchical leadership ontology. It is acknowledged in 
this study that the tripod ontology provides a significant framework for analysing 
leadership; however, the situational and shared leadership through the DAC 
framework is useful in the understanding of leadership outcomes within the AU. 
This conceptualisation of leadership becomes more relevant in the AU, where the 
hierarchy in contested and nearly non-existent. By locating leadership beyond 
the tripod and in the shared DAC framework, the study has made a theoretical 
contribution to the leadership of AU peace interventions.  
 
Another theoretical contribution originating from this study is that leadership in 
AU peace interventions is socially constructed through competitive coexistence 
and interactions between the AU and subregional actors (Lukes, 1974; Park, 
2006, 2014; Helms, 2014). Both the elements of positive and negative 
competitive coexistence are shown in the study. It is demonstrated that both the 
AU and subregional actors adopt blocking power strategies in an attempt to outwit 
each other and establish themselves as sole leaders in peace interventions. 
However, such strategies in both case studies become ineffective and actors are 
seen to re-strategise and establish ad hoc structures for shared leadership. The 
interactions in which regional peace interventions take place play a vital role in 
the production of leadership. The research has revealed increasing willingness 
of subregional institutions such as SADC and IGAD to operate within the AU 
legitimacy in peace interventions. Despite the subregional contestations of AU 
hierarchy, evidence in the research shows that subregions require the AU 
structure for their interventions to be effective. The need for AU legitimacy is 
shown in the SADC stalled mediations and IGAD failed attempts to deploy troops 
in Somalia. In both cases the AU involvement reveal its relevance in regional 
peace interventions.  
 
This research, therefore, demonstrates that the AU continental status offers more 
legitimacy in peace interventions that can further be developed. At the same time 
the study points to the need for more harmonisation between the continental and 
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subregional peace and security architectures. The ad hoc nature of peace 
interventions within the AU reveals a structural gap that requires more attention. 
From this backdrop, the study makes a policy contribution by illuminating the 
importance of identifying and establishing legal mechanisms on which the AU 
and subregional actors can base their relationships in peace interventions. 
Although APSA has been adopted and operationalised, the ad hoc nature of 
leadership structures and the ambiguity of subsidiarity principles, indicates the 
need for established legal structures or mechanisms that guide peace 
interventions. 
 
9.2 Gradual regionalisation of peace 
The study’s second main contribution relates to debates on the regionalisation of 
peace. The study has shown the progressive nature of regional peace 
interventions from a traditional UN peacekeeping to a broader intervention within 
the AU. The research shows that the AU is increasingly responding to conflicts 
where the UN is failing to intervene. These conflicts have relevance to 
contemporary security challenges such as terrorism and involve situations where 
consent from conflicting parties cannot be granted (Bellamy et al., 2010). 
Regional peace interventions within the AU are therefore, the only realistic way 
to respond to conflicts in the region when the UN and other international partners 
fail to do so (Francis, 2006). However, the study shows that the AU is still lacking 
the necessary tools for the job. Consequently, regionalisation of peace in Africa 
cannot be constituted without the involvement of international donors and the UN. 
From this background, the research has shown that the leadership of regional 
peace interventions within the AU is also influenced by donor dependency and 
external partners.   
 
The study therefore, provides a thread that links the ‘African Solutions’ 
connotations to a stronger international partnership. While the notion of ‘African 
Solutions’ bases its centrality on self-determination and ownership of African 
peace processes, the study reveals a significant footprint of Western powers in 
regional peace interventions. The Western influence, through bilateral 
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agreements with AU member states, adds another layer of complexity in regional 
peace interventions and AU leadership. The bilateral agreements between global 
hegemonies and AU member states are seen to be beyond the influence of the 
AU. The US and France involvement in the case studies indicates that global 
hegemonies have significant influence on the extent of AU leadership in peace 
interventions. Consequently, the AU leadership in peace interventions is both 
promoted and narrowed by external actors and exacerbated by the historic 
obsession of sovereignty among African member states. In this light, the study 
shows that the global hegemonic influences and African political history play a 
significant role in regionalised peace and African political affairs. 
 
The development of AU interventions is also evidenced by growing regional 
alliances in conflict resolution. SADC and IGAD member states (IGAD in the case 
of Somalia) have increasingly committed themselves in high stakes missions that 
have political implications and consequences in home countries. TCCs in AU 
missions continue to pay a high price for peace through the ultimate sacrifice of 
troops in dangerous environments.  This shows that the values for peace are 
gradually taking shape, albeit with limited alignment in the leadership structures, 
and inadequate consultations in mission planning. In both case studies, the study 
has shown little consultation in mission planning and its impact on goal attainment 
and peace mission leadership. From this background, the study makes a policy 
contribution by showing the need for better planning and coordination between 
the AU and subregional actors. Specifically, the need for a better understanding 
of the political environment of the mission during mission planning. The study 
therefore, reveals that the AU is undergoing a learning curve in its peace 
missions.  
 
On the other hand, the study has revealed a loose connection between the AU 
and sub regional institutions in peace interventions. While UN and AU relations 
in peace interventions are mainly guided by partnership and sub-contracting 
(Gelot, 2012; Yamashita, 2012), AU and subregional interventions are neither of 
the two. It is shown that the AU peace interventions were designed with the 
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assumption of a hierarchy, where the AU Peace and Security Council would 
assign subregional organisations to intervene and take over peace missions 
when necessary. In this light, the study reveals that there was no anticipation of 
competitive coexistence and shared leadership. Consequently, there are no 
provisions for partnering or sub-contracting within the AU and regional 
institutional framework. From this backdrop, the study highlights the need for 
further research in developing a working arrangement between the AU and 
subregional institutions in conducting peace interventions. 
 
9.3 Contributions to liberal peace and cosmopolitan 
approaches to peacekeeping 
The study has shown that AU peace interventions have not specifically aimed at 
promoting liberal state building (at least from the AU perspective) but focused on 
ending violent conflicts. Although conducting elections have been part of the 
peace process, there is no evidence of AU engagement and promotion of liberal 
values in post-conflict state building. Similarly, subregional organisations have 
not promoted liberal peace in post-conflict countries, as evidenced by the 
immediate withdrawal of SADC after elections in Madagascar. From this 
background, AU and subregional organisations have applied partial liberal peace 
in response to the unconstitutional change of government in Madagascar and 
statelessness in Somalia. The theoretical implication is that AU peace 
interventions have moved away from a general post-Westphalian and Western 
idea of changing non-liberal states to become liberalised (Jackson, 2011). 
Additionally, the AU operations have only focused on negative peace and have 
paid little attention to a positive peace that is sustainable. Most literature has 
shown that when liberal peace is well implemented by paying attention to the 
relevant context of the targeted country, there is an increased likelihood of peace 
being sustained (Paris, 2004; Jackson, 2011; Richmond, 2011; Richmond and 
Franks, 2012; Chinkin and Kaldor, 2017; Jackson and Beswick, 2018). This study 
has, therefore, shown that the AU has not operated within the liberal 
epistemological knowledge in its peace interventions. Indicating that the 
collectiveness in the promotion of human rights and democracy in responding to 
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conflicts is lacking in the AU. Additionally, there are no strategies for sustainable 
peace after interventions.  
 
On the other hand, there is evidence that the UN and international organisations 
have been influential in implementing liberal peacebuilding in Somalia, 
suggesting that African peacebuilding continues to be shaped by global partners 
who may not pay attention to the relevant African context (Albrecht and Jackson, 
2014). From this background, the study has shown that liberal values have not 
yet been institutionalised in the AU, indicating that implementing tools for liberal 
ideas from the African perspective are still missing. This study suggests a need 
to use liberal states in peace interventions and peacebuilding, while at the same 
time orienting post-conflict states towards liberal values. There is a consensus in 
the literature that liberal democratic political structures, and social and economic 
institutions promote peaceful competition and sustainable security (Doyle, 1997; 
Duffield, 2007; Beswick and Jackson, 2015). However, the liberal approach 
should not create imperial liberalism and result in autocratic post-conflict regimes 
that blur accountability (Jackson, 2011). The need to create a liberal state that is 
relevant in post-conflict environments is the work of social and policy engineers 
who pay attention to context and match it with ideas of liberal state (Jackson, 
2011; Richmond and Franks, 2012; Beswick and Jackson, 2015). Both cases in 
this study have shown a focus on a one-size-fits-all form of liberal peace where 
elections were conducted without due consideration of the post-conflict 
environment (Richmond and Franks, 2012). 
 
Within the cosmopolitan thinking, the study has shown that the AU peace 
interventions have been partially driven by cosmopolitan values. Indicating that 
the central tenets of collectivism in the promotion of human rights and democracy 
have not strengthened the AU leadership in peace interventions. On the other 
hand, the study has made its contribution to cosmopolitanism within the AU 
member states. The study outlines growing values for peace in AU peace 
interventions and this indicates a potential evolution of African peace 
interventions towards cosmopolitan thinking. African troops have been deployed 
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to save strangers, thereby signifying the beginning of cosmopolitan states and 
ethics (Wheeler, 2000). While most scholars have viewed sovereignty as a 
significant bottleneck to the cosmopolitan agenda, this study shows that African 
peace interventions cannot be separated from state roles. In this light, the 
cosmopolitan agenda can start to be located within African states. The 
developments in subregional peacekeeping forces within APSA indicate 
significant steps towards a cosmopolitan idea (Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 
2005; Curran and Woodhouse, 2007). However, there is a need for more 
research on its capability, training and utilisation, considering the African 
geopolitical structure. The research also points to a nexus between cosmopolitan 
peacekeeping and national interests that require further studies. There is a 
blurred picture in the separation of the cosmopolitan agenda and national 
interests and how they influence each other in the promotion of peace elsewhere.  
 
The next section outlines the common features of regional peace interventions 
originating from the research findings and discussion. These features provide a 
basis for future research emanating from this study.  
 
9.5 Common relevant issues deriving from the study 
The outline below provides a summary of points arising from the study. The 
summaries are given in Tables 9.1, 9.2, and 9.3:  
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Table 9.0.1 Leadership in AU peace interventions 
1. Leadership in AU peace interventions is not hierarchical but located in 
leadership outcomes (of Direction, Alignment and Commitment). 
2. Leadership is produced through collective contributions of regional and 
subregional actors using ad hoc structures. 
3. Leadership is socially constructed through interactions in competitive 
coexistence. 
4. Problematic shared leadership set-up due to ambiguous leadership 
boundaries that define roles and limits of authority between the AU and 
subregional actors. 
 
Table 9.0.2 Regionalisation of peace in the AU 
1. Evidence that the regionalisation of peace is developing within the AU. 
2. Little connection between bilateral peace intervention agreements, and 
subregional and regional interventions. Resulting in poor regional, 
subregional and international coordination. 
3. Ambiguity in the coordination principles of the AU and subregional 
actors within APSA resulting in leadership contestation.  
4. Significant AU dependency on international donor funding resulting in 
substantial Western hegemonic influences in regional peace 
interventions.  
5. Significant focus on state and subregional territorial sovereignty, 
without due consideration to capabilities and complementarity. 
 
Table 9.0.3 Liberal peace and cosmopolitan principles in the AU peace 
operation 
1. State-centric liberal peace approach with little engagement of local 
voices – leading to less sensitivity to context. 
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2. Limited promotion of liberal peace values within the AU peace 
interventions. 
3. Often a focus on one-size-fits-all forms of liberal peace – post conflict 
elections and lack of sustainable peace.  
4. Evidence of emerging cosmopolitan values and ethics within the AU.  
5. A need to strike a balance between cosmopolitan principles and state 
sovereignty. 
 
9.6 Areas for further research 
The first area for further research is on establishing legal mechanisms for 
coordination between the AU and subregional actors. The research in both cases 
has highlighted the dominance of ad hoc structures and competitive coexistence 
between the AU and subregions. What is apparent in the study is the need for 
established and predictable mechanisms for conflict resolution between the AU 
and subregions. Future research in this area could look at the nature of 
mechanisms that can bind the participants to peace interventions in Africa. Some 
studies have highlighted the need for the AU to develop supranational 
characteristics in order to enforce compliance among subregions (Olivier, 2010). 
Studies developing from this research could investigate the kind of regional and 
subregional networks or coordinating principles that can be created to ensure 
smooth and predictable coordination – paying attention to context and historical 
developments in African geopolitics. Future research could interrogate how the 
AU can integrate a legal system to provide predictable leadership outcomes in 
AU interventions.  
The clarification of roles and limits of authority could specify how regional and 
subregional actors relate to each other in intervention processes. One narrative 
that needs to be interrogated is the clarity in subsidiarity policy and rebalancing 
of state and regional sovereignty. Sovereignty is not only defined in terms of total 
freedoms but also capability and responsibility (Chandler, 2004). Significant focus 
on the state and subregional territorial sovereignty, without due consideration to 
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capabilities and complementarity, has raised questions on the leadership of 
peace interventions. Additionally, it has raised big questions on who has 
legitimacy in peace processes between the AU and subregions (RECs).  
The second area for further research is on leadership and trust building within AU 
peace operations. This study has exclusively argued that leadership within AU 
peace interventions is located in shared terms and not hierarchical. At the same 
time, the design of APSA did not anticipate the competitive coexistence and 
shared leadership. Consequently, there is a need for further studies to examine 
how shared leadership can be promoted with less conflict; how trust can be 
established in leadership production considering the DAC framework in 
leadership analysis. Future studies could focus on striking a balance between 
regional territorial sovereignty and AU legitimacy in peace interventions.  
There is significant evidence showing little connection between bilateral peace 
intervention agreements (between African member states and Western states), 
and regional and subregional interventions. Research results suggest that the AU 
has failed to link subregional and international actors, resulting in unstructured 
approaches to peace interventions that lack trust between the AU and 
subregional actors. The diversity of African subregions has created a web or 
spaghetti bowl of subregional initiatives in peace interventions that are not 
structured and lack a unified platform. Research in the area could look at how the 
AU can create unity of purpose by tapping into the specific capabilities of these 
subregions and obtaining commitment to common goals, building institutional 
trust in the AU, thereby making it the only point of contact in African peace 
interventions and creating a unified platform that can lead peace processes in the 
continent. 
The third area for further research is the task of comparing more AU interventions 
in order to expand the DAC framework. The theoretical gains made in this 
research on the DAC framework requires to be built on by taking the model 
elsewhere to see how the model can be developed further in understanding 
peace operations. Further studies could examine how the model affects the 
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quality of decision making in peace interventions and in highly structured 
organisations such as the military (in peacekeeping). 
The study has also highlighted the AU dependency on international donor funding 
and subsequent significant international influence in regional peace 
interventions. The research shows that external factors affect the production of 
leadership in AU peace interventions. Future developments in the DAC 
framework could focus on how feasible leadership structures can be created to 
incorporate international and AU interests in regional peace interventions, where 
international donors become part of the participants in leadership production.   
The fourth area for further research is on liberal peace and cosmopolitan ethics 
within the AU peace operations. The study has highlighted the limited influence 
of liberal peace values in AU peace interventions from the African perspective. 
Future research in this area could look at how AU peace interventions can 
promote liberal ideas. This study has added another voice in highlighting the 
problems with a one-size-fits-all form of liberal peace, indicating the need for 
African countries to adopt a context-specific liberal peace. In this light, future 
research could investigate the mechanisms and modalities of involving AU 
member states in the promotion of context-specific liberal peace. This research 
has also shown that the AU has adopted a state-centric approach to peace that 
has significantly excluded a local voice, thereby being less sensitive to context. 
Previous research has shown the international tendency to ignore local voices in 
peacebuilding and state building (Richmond and Franks, 2012; Albrecht and 
Jackson, 2014). Future research could therefore investigate how AU peace 
interventions can navigate the international tendency and engage local actors in 
peacebuilding and state building. 
It is concluded from this research that cosmopolitan values and ethics are limited 
but emerging in AU peace operations. Earlier research has suggested how 
cosmopolitanism can develop over time, specifically through the engagement of 
international and regional initiatives that promote peace everywhere (Wheeler, 
2000; Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2005; Kaldor and Salmon, 2006; Curran 
  237 
and Woodhouse, 2007). The AU, through subregional organisations, has 
developed regional peacekeeping forces that are placed on a rotational AU rota 
for a period of six months. While this peacekeeping force and arrangement has 
not been tested, there is evidence of cosmopolitanism developing in the 
continent. With reference to research findings in this study, future research in this 
area could investigate the feasibility of deploying an SADC peacekeeping force 
in any region of the AU, paying particular attention to geopolitics, regional 
sovereignty and colonial legacies.  
In conclusion, AU peacekeeping is outlined as the next generation both within 
policy and academic literature.  The need to understand institutional leadership 
is paramount in order to better prepare for peace interventions. Although these 
two case studies are specific to the Southern African Development Community 
and African Union mission in Somalia, the conclusions drawn are applicable to 
other subregions of the continent. Indeed, the study has highlighted similar 
leadership developments in AU relations with other subregions.  
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Annex 1: Interview Guide 
 
Interview Guide 1 (AU Fieldwork) 
 
Introduction 
This research is being conducted to investigate how leadership is produced in 
African Union (AU) peace interventions, how regional and sub regional actors 
interact with each other, and the extent of AU leadership in peace operations and 
conflict mediation.  I am conducting this research for my PhD studies at Coventry 
University in the United Kingdom. Specifically, I am interested with the opinions 
of the decision makers and high-level officials in peace and security, and I will be 
interviewing other officials as well. The questions I would like to ask you relate to 
coordination of peace interventions (conflict mediation and peace operations) 
among AU, SADC and troop contributing countries in Somalia. Everything you 
tell me will only be used for this research project and will not be shared with 
anyone outside. Also, unless you give me your express consent, your name will 
not be used, and you will not be identified with any answers you give. You have 
already consented to the interview with the consent form. Do you have any 
questions before we begin? 
 
Interview number: ______________ 
 
Opening Questions 
1. Can you tell me how AU initiates peace interventions? 
2. How does AU identify different actors to be involved in peace 
interventions? 
3. How does AU engage sub-regional organisations in peace interventions? 
4. Can you tell me the specific mode of coordination and interaction between 
AU and SADC in Madagascar joint mediation? 
 
Key questions 
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5. What circumstances made AU to decide to deploy peacekeepers in 
Somalia? 
6. What were the AU motivations for peace operation deployment in 
Somalia? 
7. How was the coordination between AU and troop contributing countries? 
8. How are decisions made in Somalia peace mission? 
9. How does the AU coordinate with the UN in the peace operation in 
Somalia? 
10. What measures are taken by the AU to ensure that troop contributing 
countries have deployed well equipped and professional peacekeepers? 
11. How was the AU coordination with IGAD (as a sub-regional organisation) 
in deploying peacekeepers in Somalia? 
12. What is your perception of AU leadership in peace operation in Somalia? 
 
Closing questions 
13. What do you think are the major challenges of the AU in providing 
continental leadership of PSOs? 
14. What do you think should be done to address these problems? 
15. What are your hopes for ‘African solutions to African problems’ with regard 
to deployment of peace missions? 
 
Concluding Remarks 
Thank you for your time and willingness to help in this research project. Your 
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Interview Guide 2 (For SADC Fieldwork) 
 
Introduction 
This research is being conducted to investigate how leadership is produced in 
African Union (AU) peace interventions, how regional and sub regional actors 
interact with each other, and the extent of AU leadership in peace operations and 
conflict mediation.  I am conducting this research for my PhD studies at Coventry 
University in the United Kingdom. Specifically, I am interested with the opinions 
of the decision makers and high-level officials in peace and security, and I will be 
interviewing other officials as well. The questions I would like to ask you relate to 
coordination of peace interventions between AU and SADC in joint mediation in 
Madagascar. Everything you tell me will only be used for this research project 
and will not be shared with anyone outside. Also, unless you give me your 
express consent, your name will not be used, and you will not be identified with 
any answers you give. You have already consented to the interview with the 
consent form. Do you have any questions before we begin? 
 
Interview number: ______________ 
 
Opening Questions 
1. Can you tell me how SADC initiates peace interventions? 
2. How does SADC engage with African Union in peace interventions? 
3. Can you tell me the specific mode of coordination and interaction between 
AU and SADC in Madagascar joint mediation? 
Key questions 
4. How was the coordination between SADC and AU mediation teams in 
Madagascar conflict? 
5. What is your perception of AU leadership in SADC mediations? 
6. How does SADC Peace and security Architecture relate to African peace 
and Security architecture with regard to mediation mechanisms? 
7. What were SADC motivations for peace intervention in Madagascar? 
8. What is your perception of the SADC mediation in Madagascar? 
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Closing questions 
9. What do you think are the major challenges in SADC - AU relation in 
continental leadership of peace interventions? 
10. What do you think should be done to address these problems? 
11. What are your hopes for ‘African solutions to African problems’ with regard 
to African peace interventions? 
 
Concluding Remarks 
Thank you for your time and willingness to help in this research project. Your 
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Annex 2: Written Survey Statements. 
 
Introduction 
This research is being conducted to investigate how leadership is produced in 
African Union (AU) peace interventions, how regional and sub regional actors 
interact with each other, and the extent of AU leadership in peace operations and 
conflict mediation.  I am conducting this research for my PhD studies at Coventry 
University in the United Kingdom. Specifically, I am interested with the opinions 
of the decision makers and high-level officials in peace and security. After this 
survey, you will be interviewed to expand on the survey’s prompts. The open-
ended qualitative responses from the interviews will be analysed to determine 
corroboration with related quantitative survey responses. 
 
Interview number: ______________ 
 
1=strongly agree 2=agree 3=disagree 4=strongly disagree (please 
circle one rating on each statement) 
 
AU is a preferred organisation                                1         2           3           4 
to conduct peace interventions 
in Africa than any regional organisation.  
AU has professionally                                             1         2           3           4 
led peace interventions so far 
AU depends on individual                                       1         2           3           4 
countries for peace interventions  
and without them no action can be taken 
AU cannot on its own conduct                                 1         2           3           4 
peace interventions in the  
continent without support from  
outside Africa 
AU has clear leadership in                                       1         2           3           4 
continental peace interventions 
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AU has clear policies and                                         1         2           3           4 
procedures in conducting  
peace interventions 
AU easily solicit troops from                                1         2           3           4 
Troop Contributing Countries for PSO 
AU has authority over the  
conduct of                                                            1         2           3           4 
peace interventions in  
sub regional 
 arrangements like SADC,  
ECOWAS, IGAD etc 
AU has direct access and                                    1         2           3           4 
control of regional standby 
 brigades/peacekeeping force 
African Peace and Security                                  1         2           3           4 
Architecture(APSA) is a  
guiding document for 
 sub regions and  
States participating in 
 peace interventions 
 
  




Annex 3: Participant Consent Form 
 
Research Project Title: Leadership, regionalisation of peace operations 
and conflict mediation: African Union and Southern African Development 
Community in perspective 
 Please initial 
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the participant 
information sheet for the above study and have had the 
opportunity to ask questions. 
 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I 




3. I understand that all the information I provide will be 
anonymised unless I give express consent to be identified 
and the information will be stored securely. 
 
 
4. I give express consent to be identified in certain aspects of 




5. I understand that I reserve the right to change my mind 
about participating in this study and that I can freely withdraw 
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6. I agree to be recorded during the interview. 
 
 
7. I give consent for the information I tell Mphatso Jones 
Boti Phiri to be used in the following ways: in his PhD thesis/ 
in a report to organisations/ for teaching at universities/ in 
academic publications e.g. journal articles, monograph, 










Name of participant:   ....................................................................  
 
Signature of participant:   ..............................................................  
 
Date:  .............................................................................................  
 
 
Name of Researcher: Mphatso Jones Boti Phiri 
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Annex 4: Participant Information Sheet 
 
Research Project Title: Leadership, regionalisation of peace operations and 
conflict mediation: African Union and Southern African Development 
Community in perspective 
 
Name of the researcher: Mphatso Jones Boti Phiri   
 
Purpose of the study: 
I am a PhD candidate at the Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations at 
Coventry University in the UK. The purpose of this study is to investigate how 
leadership is produced in African Union (AU) peace interventions, how regional 
and sub regional actors interact with each other, and the extent of AU leadership 
in peace operations and conflict mediation.  The study has ethics approval from 
Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations- Ethics Reference Number P42230 
 
What is the research about?  
The study investigates how leadership is produced within the AU peace 
interventions and the extent to which African Union (AU) leadership in Africa 
peace interventions. Specifically, the study examines how the AU relates with sub 
regional actors through the example of AU joint mediation with Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) in Madagascar, and how AU interacts with 
troop contributing countries through the example of AU mission in Somalia 
(AMISOM). The study aims to investigate the nature of interaction and 
coordination in regional peace architecture and measures taken to strengthen the 
efficacy and synchronisation of African peace interventions.   The study therefore, 
explores how leadership looks like in African Peace and Security Architecture 
(APSA). The study is undertaken from the view that, high levels of violent conflicts 
in Africa necessitate the need to comprehend the harmonisation of regional 
strategies and capacities to undertake peace support operations.  
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Who is organizing and funding the research? 
The research is organised by Mphatso Jones Boti Phiri and is a PhD research 
project based at the Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations (CTPSR) at 
Coventry University. The researcher has a PhD scholarship from the 
Commonwealth Scholarship Commission (UK Government). 
 
Why have I been chosen to participate?   
I am interviewing policy makers, academicians and peace and security think 
tanks from a cross-section of continental and sub regional levels in African 
society. In this regard representatives of organisations and institutions who have 
had experiences and are knowledgeable in African peace and security. Hence, 
you have been identified as an important contributor to this research. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
No. Participation is entirely voluntary. Even having completed the interview you 
may request for your comments to be excluded from the study. You can withdraw 
by contacting me by email and providing me with your participant information 
number.  If you decide to withdraw all your data will be destroyed and will not be 
used in the study.  There are no consequences to deciding that you no longer 
wish to participate in the study. However, please be aware that there will come a 
point in time where it will be difficult to withdraw your data from the research. You 
will be able to withdraw your data, without a problem up until 30 September 2018. 
After this date, if you want to withdraw, please get in touch and we can discuss 
whether or not it will be possible.  
 
What will my participation involve? 
I will ask you to have a short interview (approximately 1 hour) which I will record 
on a digital audio device if you give me the consent to do so. If no consent is 
given on recording the interview, then I will take notes during the interviews. After 
the interview I may contact you again by email or phone to clarify certain points 
or to invite you to take part in a second interview. The information you give me is 
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completely confidential. After the interview I will transcribe, anonymize the data 
and use it for analysis for my PhD thesis. 
 
Will the email data be secure? 
Yes, the email data will be protected, however, information sent on email can 
never be completely secure. Hence, caution must be exercised by both myself 
(the researcher) and you as a research participant. I will only use Coventry 
University email account in such communications, and I will delete all the emails 
in my inbox and trash as soon as I take away the information. You will be 
requested to use your institutional email account and same procedures in 
deleting the information to ensure data safety. 
 
What are the possible disadvantages of taking part? 
Time. This will take part of your time. I intend to keep the interview as short as 
possible. If, however, you feel that you have a lot to share I may invite you to 
spend more time discussing this with me, which would involve you dedicating a 
longer period of time to the study. 
 
Will the data be protected, and my confidentiality ensured?  
Yes. The information you share will be kept strictly confidential and anonymous, 
unless you give express consent to be identified in the study. I will not name you 
or the organisation you belong to in the final publication. The interview data will 
be kept private and will be destroyed 10 years after the completion of the study. 
I will not discuss the comments you make during the interview with any third 
person. 
 
How will you use the data that I provide? 
The information collected will be analysed and written in my final PhD thesis. 
There is the possibility that all or extracts of this thesis will be published in 
academic journals or presented at conferences. The findings of this study may 
also be shared with policy makers and other sub regional institutions working in 
the area of peace and security including the United Nations. 
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What are the risks associated with this project?  
There are no risks associated with this project. The aim is to find a common 
ground and clarity in conducting peace interventions in Africa. It is also to 
document the leadership challenges faced in peace interventions and how they 
can be resolved. 
 
What are the benefits of participating? 
One of the benefits is that your voice will be heard and documented, (although 
anonymously) and you will be part of the construction of knowledge in resolving 
African peace and security challenges. 
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
The study has been reviewed and approved by my Director of Studies, Professor 
Alpaslan Özerdem, Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, Coventry 
University. 
 
Further Questions or Complaints 
If you have any questions or queries, contact Mphatso Jones Boti Phiri via e-mail: 
botiphim@coventry.ac.uk. If you feel unsatisfied with my response, you can 
speak to Professor Alpaslan Özerdem, the Director of Studies, E-mail:  
aa8681@coventry.ac.uk. Phone: +44 24 659069 
 
If you have any questions about your rights as a participant, any complaints about 
the project or feel you have been placed at risk you can contact Professor Mike 
Hardy, Executive Director, E-mail: ab0974@coventry.ac.uk  Centre for Trust, 
Peace and Social Relations, Coventry University, Priory Street, Coventry CV1 
5FB. Tel: +44 (0) 24 77655765 
 
Contact for further Information 
 Mphatso Jones Boti Phiri 
 botiphim@coventry.ac.uk  
